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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the question of regional 
independence in China under the Kuomintang rule and 
takes as a case study the Kwangsi Clique, which ruled 
the province of Kwangsi from 1925 to 1949? and whose 
leaders periodically played important roles in Kuomin- 
tang politics. The Introduction describes the develop­
ment of regionalism and militarism in the late 19th 
century and their further growth in the early years of 
the Republic. Chapter I gives a historical account of 
the province of Kwangsi and sets out the career of Lu 
Yung-t!ing, who ruled the province from 1911 to 1921. 
Chapter II deals with the background, education and 
early careers of the men who were to lead the Kwangsi 
Clique* Chapter III describes the rise of these men 
within Kwangsi luring the long period of civil war which 
racked the province after 1921 and ended with the alliance 
of Kwangsi with the Kwangtung of the Kuomintang in 1926. 
Chapter IV is an account of the activities of the Kwangsi 
leaders in 1926 and 1927 and of the evolution of the 
Kwangsi Clique as a force in Kuomintang politics. Chapter 
V describes events within Kwangsi between 1926 and 1929? 
when a strong regional base was consolidated for the
Clique. Chapter VI examines the role of the Clique in 
national politics in 1928 and 1929? when its great 
regional power holding threatened the authority of the 
Kuomintang government at Ranking, and relates the Clique* 
defeat hy the Rational Government in 1929* Chapter VII 
gives an account of the Clique*s reduced independence, 
within one province, between 1930 and 1936 and of its 
Reconstruction Movement, which attempted to develop an 
alternative form of government to that practised from 
Ranking. The Conclusion attempts to assess the effect 
of independent regional power holding on the fortunes 
of the Kuomintang; it also gives a brief description 
of the careers of the leaders of the Kwangsi Cliuqe 
after 1936, when its autonomy was finally shattered.
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INTRODUCTION 
Militarism in Republican China
The failure of the Nanking Government to establish 
effective control over the whole of China after the 
technical unification of the nation at the end of the 
Northern Expedition* constituted one of the most serious 
weaknesses of that government. Throughout the period 
from 1928 to 1937) when the Kuomintang1s policies for 
rebuilding a strong nation were supposedly being 
implemented, the actual area of China controlled by 
the Kuomintang was considerably less than the whole 
nation it claimed to rule; various provinces maintained 
a de facto independence, giving nominal allegiance to 
Nanking and to the policies of the Kuomintang, but 
allowing little Central participation in or direction of 
their internal affairs, and contributing little to the 
Centre in terms of tax revenue or military support.
The degree of independence varied from province to 
province, and from period to period, with the strongest 
tendencies towards autonomy existing in the provinces 
furthest distant from Nanking. A rough diagram can be 
constructed, of a series of concentric circles with their 
hub in the Nanking/Shanhai region, each circle indicating 
a receding degree of Central control. Chekiang, Kiangsu
2and Anhwei were firmly controlled from Nanking, from
i
the time of their occupation by Kuomintang forces in
1927* fhe propinquity of the provinces to Nanking was
reinforced, as a factor encouraging Central control, by
the fact that the military, economic and political
leaders of the Nanking Government were commonly natives
of these provinces, who maintained strong ties with
local leaders and gentry members. One step further
removed from Central control were the provinces of Fukien,
Kiangsi, Hunan and Honan, where movement away from
Central control after the initial conquest in 1926 and
1927 had been arrested by Nanking military conquest;
these provinces were bound to Nanking by military control,
the degree of which varied from harsh occupation in
Kiangsi to mild supervision in Hunan, where Ho Chien
maintained a tacit autonomy. Further out still were the
$provinces of Kwangtung, Kwansi, Kweichow, Yunnan,
Szechwan, Shansi and Shantung, which were effectively 
independent, and occasionally actively hostile to
"I
Nanking. In North China, Manchuria, and the Inner-Asian
frontier provinces, the problem was not so much one of
&
regional independence, though the pull towards local 
autonomy was strong among the non-Han peoples of these 
provinces, but of foreign incursion, which by 1937 had 
severed them from Central control.
The Nanking Government made strenuous efforts, from
31929 on, to crush the most obvious manifestations of 
defiance of Central control; the regional groupings 
headed by the Kwangsi Clique, by Feng Yu-hsiang and 
by Yen Hsi-shan were smashed in civil wars in 1929 and 
1930. In 1934, the holders of regional power most 
abhorrent to the Nanking leaders, the Communists in 
Kiangsi, were driven out of the province, and into the 
wilderness, from which they emerged a year later, after 
the Long March, in North-West China. The regional power 
groupings which could directly threaten the Nanking 
government were destroyed, but the more insidious regional 
autonomy, based on individual provinces, was not. Only 
after the contraction of Kuomintang China, after the 
Japanese invasion, was anything like full Central control 
established, over a much restricted area, and in a time 
of national disaster.
19th_
The concentration of power in the hands of regional
leaders was not a new phenomenon of the Republican
period. The regionalism of the post-Taiping period,
which Franz Michael defines as "the emergence in key
areas of China of military and political power centres
that assumed some of the important functions of the state
2
but still remained within its framework" played a 
powerful role in the formation of late-Ch'ing policies, 
and is widely regarded as one of the major contributory
factors to the fall of the Manchu dynasty. This 
devolution of power is also seen as the first stage of 
China’s decline into the regional fragmentation of the 
'official* Warlord Period, from 1916 to 1927*
The nature of regional power-holding during the 
second half of the 19th Century differed in one major 
respect from that of the Republican period; though the 
holders of regional power helped unwittingly to undermine 
the power of the Centre, their fundamental loyalty was 
to the throne, and to the concept of Confucian univer­
sality, not to their individual regions. "The founders c 
regional power, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, were 
interested not in securing satrapies for themselves, but 
in assuring the survival of the Confucian order; only 
later, when the Confucian order was clearly doomed, did
z
the disastrous sauve-qui-peut attitude become common." 
Though their armies were recruited on a regional basis, 
and their officers tied to them by bonds of personal 
loyalty, creating the kind of regional, personal army 
which characterised later warlord armies, men like Tseng 
and Li remained committed to a higher authority, and 
saw no clash of interest between their regional power 
holding and their loyalty to the Centre. In Li's case, 
for example, "no clear line could be drawn between his 
central and regional functions, and he therefore appeared 
to represent central and regional power simultaneously."
5Yuan Shih-k'ai, the founder of the modern army, was the 
first military commander to make use of his personal 
army to advance his own fortunes. Before his emergence,
the holding of regional military, economic and govern-
a
mental power, Independently of the Centre, was tempered 
by ideological adherence to the Centre; the taking of 
regional power was seen only as a stop-gap measure, until 
the Centre could reassert itself and take over the 
government of the whole country again. But the Centre 
did not reassert itself, and ironically, one of the 
reasons that it failed to do so was that it had lost too 
much power to the regions.
Regionalism and Militarism
The key to the successful establishment of a regional
seat of power was the holding of military power. "The
establishment of a bureacratic administration and a system
5of taxation was made possible by military control11.
a.
There could be no regional independence without military 
independence. This was true in the post-Taiping period, 
and even more so after the fall of the dynasty, when the 
holding of military power became the sole criterion for 
the holding of any authority, central or regional. For 
while the authority of the Centre over the regions 
declined, so did the authority of civilians over military 
men, who acquired a prestige unknown before as the army 
was modernised. The collapse of the imperial system
6destroyed one political system without offering a viable 
alternative. In the disruption which accompanied the fall 
of the Manchus, the modern army, united under Yuan Shih- 
k'ai's control, represented'the only effectively 
organised element capable of competing for political power1.
Until 1916, Yuan Shih-l^ai's commanding position 
ensured that though the military was in the ascendancy 
over the infant political organisations of the Republic, 
the control of the military was at least centralised under 
himself. But his attempt to set himself up as emperor, 
and his subsequent death, set the course towards military 
disintegration, and towards the swift development of full- 
scale regional warlordism; in the first place, his imperial 
adventure detached the powerful Southern commanders, who 
though outside the Peiyang military system had given 
allegiance to Yuan up to 1916, and in the second his 
death destroyed the only focus capable of maintaining 
unity within the Peiyang system. After 1916, military 
control descended into the hands of a large number of 
independant regional militarists, whose power extended 
over areas varying in size from a single hsien to several 
provinces.
These men were what James Sheridan has called nthe 
7
Early Warlords'1, commonly but less accurately referred 
to simply as ifthe Warlords*', a class of men held in 
deepest contempt both by Oommunist and Kuomintang 
historians, who accuse them of oppressing the people,
7speeding up the decay of China, allying with China*s 
imperialist enemies, and impeding the process of national 
revival. These accusations are difficult to quarrel 
with, and the recent western studies of warlords, by
I'U 8
Winston Hsieh on Ch*en Ching-ming, hy Janies Sheridan 
on Feng Yu-hsiang,  ^ and hy Donald G-illin on Yen Hsi™ 
shan,^ though they set out to examine the phenomenon 
of warlordism with more objectivity than do Communists 
or Kuomintang historians, and though they deal with 
warlords of very different types, do not attempt to 
disguise the generally unpleasant characteristics of 
warlord rule. But instead of regarding the warlords as 
inherently evil men, who deliberately set out to corrupt 
and degrade China, these writers see them as products 
of a period in which there was no single militarist 
strong enough to unite the rest, nor any political or 
ideological impetus sufficient to provide a centripetal 
force which would drive them towards unity.
Cultural Regionalism
Warlord rule combined the twin features of 
militarism and regionalism, and encouraged the one to 
accentuate the other; it did not however create either* 
Regionalism came into the ascendancy as Confucianism 
declined, depriving China of a centralised, universal 
political system and code of ethics. The universality 
of Confucianism raised it above regionalism; its elite 
of bureaucrats and gentry members were attached not to
8tlieir places of origin, but to a supra-regional identity.
But below the universal culture of Confucianism, there
existed a patchwork of regional cultures, ’’myriad examples
of interest sympathy, even consciousness, cut off and seen
to be cut off well below the 3.evel of any national
11integration*.,”, which found their most obvious mani­
festations in regional differences of language, diet, 
housing and social customs. Regional differences arose 
naturally from the size of China, and from the variations 
in climate and topography which exist within its borders. 
In their most specifically expressed forms, these local 
characteristics were attached to individual provihces; 
the stereotyping of provinces and their inhabitants was 
a long-established practice. The ties to the provinces 
were felt strongly by the mass of the people, (provided 
they had reached a level of sophistication sufficient to 
allow them to think in larger terms than of the hsien), 
and even to some extent by the Confucian elite, who made 
use of them for such purposes as employing secretaries, 
and finding lodging outside their own areas, but as a. 
convenience, not as an expression of deep loyalty.
The existence of cultural regionalism did not 
threaten the unity of the state so long as it was not 
coupled with regional military independance. Y/hen the 
Centre was strong, the centralised bureaucracy and the 
dispersed educated elite acted as centralising forces, 
which, combined with the dependance of the army on the
Centre, and a centralised taxation system, depressed 
tendencies towards the development of regional autonomy. 
Nevertheless, these tendencies were latent; when the 
power of the Centre was relaxed^ they came to the 
surface, and could then be exploited by those who had 
established regional military control, that is by the 
warlords.
It is not intended to make any detailed discussion 
of the warlord period here, nor to analyse the charac­
teristics of the early warlords, but rather to examine 
the interaction of warlordism and regionalism, and to 
look into the legacy which these phenomena left to the 
Kuomintang.
The development of regionalism, which, especially 
in South China, sometimes developed to a point where it 
could be described as local chauvinism or local national­
ism, can be seen as a reaction to the loss of a higher 
focus of loyalty, an attempt to find a substitute for 
the absence of an effective supra-regional authority; 
the region represented the most natural substitute, and 
offered a conservative haven from the confusion of the 
national scene. Although the growth of regionalism in 
the early Republic did not create the warlordism of the 
period, it helped to perpetuate it. The warlords did not 
create regionalism, but they could manipulate it to 
maintain their positions, by posing themselves as leaders 
of local-nationalist movementsi Kwangtung for the Cantonese
10
Hunan for the Hunanese, Greater Kwangsi-ism. Regionalism 
and warlordism complemented each other, and on occasion 
became so closely enmeshed that they were indistinguish­
able. 1 It is conventional to say that the -'warlord1 
exploited a province or a region. Sometimes it would be 
more realistic to say that the 'warlord' was but the
effective agent spearheading a regional separatism that
12was supported by the populace."
Regionalism and Nationalism
Regionalism was anathema to the advocates of national­
ism, the forward-looking political parties of the early 
Republic, notably the Kuomintang (under its various 
metamorphoses) and the patriotic intellectual youth, who 
were aroused to national consciousness in the May 4th 
Movement and its aftermath. Regionalism worked against 
nationalism, preventing its development} regionalism tended 
to be conservative and backward-looking, nationalism 
forward-looking and progressive. For the nationalists, 
the two could not coexist.
Sun Yat-sen found the regionalist military leaders 
of South China amongst the greatest trials of his whole 
troubled career, for though he railed against such men as 
Ch'en Chiung-ming and Lu Yung-t'ing, he was forced to 
cooperate with them; his cooperation compromised his 
principles, without in the end bringing him the advantages 
he had hoped for from such cooperation. Sun's military
11
weakness meant that if he was to establish a government, 
he had to obtain external military support; this was 
most easily found through playing on regional ties, and 
by entering into alliances with fellow-Cantonese. Twice 
he made such alliances, in 1916 and 1920, and twice he 
was ejected from Canton, having failed to break the 
regional allegiances of the military leaders with whom 
he was dealing^which were stronger than their allegiance 
to him, or to impose his political authority over them.
The Kuomintang had to bow before Cantonese chauvinism.
The antipathy of nationalism to regionalism was
strengthened by the close links between nationalism and
anti-imperialism. It was widely held that China would not
be able to resist imperialist incursions until the nation
was united under a strong central government, which the
existence of regional spheres of power prevented from
materialising. At the same time, because of the disunity
of China, the imperialist powers were able to develop
their strength in individual areas of China, without
having to bargain with any central authority. “British
policy in the mid-1920s was predicated upon an image of
13China which was federal rather than centralised.1 This 
attitude was shared by all the major powers, with the 
exception of the United States, which still maintained an 
official adherence to the Open Door Policy. The Powers 
went through the formality of recognising the succession 
of government at Peking, and of maintaining embassies 
there, but they developed their interests in whatever part
of China interested them most, and their policies did not 
reflect a "belief in the integrity of China.
The weakness of China in relation to the imperialist 
powers shamed and enraged a growing "body of Chinese 
during the early 1920s, and led them to accuse the war­
lords, whose regional independance prevented national 
reunification, of being the tools of the imperialists.
The charge of collusion with foreign powers, though inade­
quately substantiated, proved an ideal stick with which 
to beat the warlords; it was a direct, simplistic weapon, 
easier to use, and more emotive than attacks on the social 
and economic evils of warlordism. As in 19th eentnry 
Japan, where anti-Bakufu forces had used criticism of1 the 
weakness of Bakufu foreign policy to attack the Bakufu, so 
in 20th century China opponents of existing power holders 
found that accusations of betraying the nation had a 
strong appeal: 1 It was an accusation which invariably
aroused popular excitement however little it accorded
14with the facts.1 In South China, T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan 
and Lu Yung-t'ing of Kwangsi were accused of being in
LL
league with the French in longking, and Ch(en Chjfng-ming 
of Kwangtung of being the tool of the British in Hong Kong; 
but there is little evidence that foreign aid was a material 
determinant of their policies. Whatever aid they received 
was bought in return for foreign trade and commerce, and 
though such concessions may have damaged South China*s 
own economic life, they may not have had a great influence 
in moulding the policies of the southern warlords in the
13
interests of the British or the French, who probably 
found them just as aggravating and difficult to work 
with as did the Kuomintang.
Federalism
By the early 1920s, regionalism was strongly 
enough established in South China to give rise to a 
movement for the creation of a federal state in China, 
which would legitimise the holding of regional power.
The advocates of federalism argued that China was too 
large and too diversified to be governed under a unitary 
system, and that a union of semi-autonomous provincies 
similar to the United States of America would provide a 
more logical and efficient method of governing and deve­
loping China. The federalist movement was centred on 
province of Hunan, where the local tuchun, Chao Heng-t'i, 
had a federalist provincial constitution promulgated in 
1
1922. Chao was supported by other provincial leaders 
in the South-West, notably T*ang Chi-yao in Yunnan, who 
also had a programme of federal government compiled for
16 U/his province, and Ch'en Ching-ming in Kwangtung. Buta
it proved impossible to find any support for federalism 
from political leaders with national following, who 
regarded it as a rationalisation of regional militarism, 
and the movement petered out. In 1926, when it was already 
a dead letter, it was attacked at the 2nd Congress of the 
Kuomintang: "Major warlords used the pretext of military 
unification to seize control of the Central government;
14
minor ones used the pretext of federal autonomy to gain
17regional control".
Federalism was the only major attempt to justify 
the decline in central power, and to put regionalism 
into a political framework; though it appealed to the 
conservative and to the confused, who found a refuge 
from national disorder in regionalism, it ran counter 
to the growing pull of nationalism, and the desire for a. 
revival of strong, centralised government, which came to 
be felt, during the early 1920s, not only by patriotic 
students and professional politicians, but also by 
workers, merchants and overseas Chinese, groups which 
were increasingly organised under the leadership of the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party, especially in Kwang­
tung province. In many of these people, nationalist and 
regionalist loyalties coexisted, on different planes, the 
one rar^ified and idealistic, the other practical and 
immediate; though they did not and could not reject the 
cultural regionalism bred into them, the idea of openly 
abandoning the concept of a unitary state was intolerable. 
The growing committment to nationalism, fired by national 
humiliation, demanded that they support efforts to reunify 
the nation; ".....increasingly wide sectors of the popula­
tion were prepared to throw their support to whoever gave
18most promise of effective central government".
The Kuomintang and Regional Militarists
In 1923? when he returned for the third time to
15
0 ant on, and set about establishing his third regime there, 
the disastrous experience of his previous sojourns in 
Ganton, and the advice of his new Soviet advisors, deter-
force for the Kuomintang, which would eventually free the
But in the meantime, Sun had to continue to depend on 
such men to maintain his position in Kwangtung. In 
addition to Cantonese troops, he drew his support from Yunn- 
anese and Kwangsi troops whom he brought into the province 
as mercenaries.
Sun!s alliance with militarist forces was essential 
if he was ever to establish the Kuomintang as a potent 
force, and build up its armies; there was no alternative 
for him, but to form alliances with non-Kuomintang 
militarists, men who were prepared to make only a limited 
committment to the Kuomintang, determined chiefly on 
mercenary considerations. This practice sowed the seeds 
of later problems, which manifested themselves during 
and after the establishment of Kuomintang rule over the 
whole of China. Chiang Kai-shek continued Sunfs policy 
of forming alliances with regional militarists, who gave 
nominal loyalty to the Kuomintang without surrendering 
regional power. The emphasis on military development 
within the Kuomintang, initiated by Sun Yat-sen on the 
basis of objective circumstances, and perpetuated by 
Chiang Kai-shek not least in the interests of strengthening 
his own position, led to the domination of the military 
over the civilian within the Kuomintang. "An undue
mined Sun Yat-sen to establish an it military
Kuomintang from militarists.
reliance on military power, and a tendency to prefer
military support to loyalty to his (Sun'sJ political
testament, were destined to characterise the regime
19of his own followers" • Sun helped, unwittingly, to 
set the Kuomintang on a course which gave the upper 
hand to the military, and which permitted the allegiance 
to the Kuomintang of incompletely converted regional 
militarists, encouraging the continuance of modified 
military regionalism after the victory of the Kuomin­
tang. Sun's use of alliances with regional militarists 
endorsed the split between the Centre and the regions, 
and also blurred the distinction between outright mili­
tarist rule, under a full-blown warlord, and military 
rule under the auspices of the Kuomintang.
In 1926, the Kuomintang launched the Northern
Expedition, with the intention of reunifying the nation
20and wiping out the warlords.
Ardent nationalists within the Kuomintang and its 
armies believed that Kuomintang military victory would 
be followed by the establishment of a genuine national 
government, led by civilians. The early successes of 
the Kuomintang, the apparent strength of political 
motivation within the army, instilled by political com­
missars, and the rapid development of mass movements in 
the wake of the Kuomintang armies, appeared to confirm
17
the hope that the country would be reunited, not under 
apolitical generals, but under politicians-in-uniform.
But even before the Expedition started, two ominous 
developments occurred. The first was the ascendancy of 
Ohiang Kai-shek to personal military control over the 
National Revolutionary Army, demonstrated forcibly in 
the Ohung-Shan Incident of March, 1926, and by the 
detachment of the G-eneral Headquarters for the Expedition 
from political control. The second was the formation of 
Kuomintang alliances with regional militarists outside 
Kwangtung, with the new Kwangsi leaders and with T*ang 
Sheng-chih in Hunan, who were prepared to fight for the 
Kuomintang, but not to be fully amalgamated into it, and 
who, with many other militarists who were brought into 
the Kuomintang forces as the Expedition progressed,, re­
tained a high degree of control over their armies and 
their regional bases.
In 1927, after the Kuomintang forces had reached the 
Yangtze, an all-out clash developed between the Right- 
Wing of the Kuomintang, and the Left-Wing and Communists. 
All attention was focused on this drama; the failure of 
the military command to remould its new militarist allies 
was unremarked. The new '*revolutionaryH generals achieved 
the respectability of alliance with the most potent new 
powers in China, but, perhaps to their surprise, were 
required to surrender little of their independance. The 
one instrument which might have drawn their teeth, by
18
weakening their control over their armies, that is the
political training and activation of their troops, was
virtually destroyed by the purge of communists and Left-
Wingers, which began in April, 1927, for it was these
people who had seriously undertaken political training.
The discipline and political motivation of the "princi-
-21
pled troops" (ohu-i ti ohiim-tui) of the Kuomintang, 
notably in the 4th A m y  commanded by Ohang Fa-k'uei, 
which had given such an excellent (and astonishing) 
impression when the Kuomintang forces first moved north, 
broke down in the welter of political confusion. Regiona- 
list feelings, which bound together the men of individual 
units (usually raised in a single area), asserted them­
selves to fill the political vacuum, and were capitalised 
by regional militarists to strengthen their own independance 
"Luring 1927, the Kuomintang, to a gradually increasing 
extent, lost control over its own militarists, so that at 
the present time (February, 1928J Kuomintang militarists
are as independant from any central authority as Northern
22
militarists normally are".
Residual Warlordism
James Sheridan describes the period after the 
completion of the Northern Expedition, and before the
2 '
Anti-Japanese War, as the "Period of Residual Warlordism". 
Many of the "old" warlords, especially in North Ohina, 
had been crushed, but regional independance under military 
rule persisted. Frequently, this regional independance 
was simply a perpetuation of established regional rule;
in outlying provinces which were now technically loyal 
to Nanking, established regional militarists, such as 
Huang Shao-hsiung in Kwangsi, Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi 
and Feng Yu-hsiang in Shansi and Honan, reestablished 
their hold which had been slightly disturbed by the 
activities of Kuomintang and Communist political workers 
in 1926 and 1927* The brief progress towards mass 
mobilisation and the installation of the spirit of 
nationalism which had been made in such provinces was 
arrested after the purge of communits and Left-Wingers 
in April, 1927* A more disturbing feature of resurgent 
regional independance was the emergence of new regional 
leaders, notably those connected with the Kwangsi Clique, 
who established autonomous control over provinces which 
had previously appeared to be under central Kuomintang 
control. Kwangtung became the personal domain of Li Chi- 
shen, Hupei of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi.
The completion of the Northern Expedition in June, 
1928, and the Disbandment Conference which followed it, 
did not ease the situation. The new military organisa­
tion of four Croup Armies, which came into being for the 
final drive on North China, confirmed the existence of 
four major regional spheres of powex1, dominated by Chiang 
Kai-shek and the National Government, Feng Yu-hsiang,
Yen Hsi-shan and the Kwangsi Clique. Politically, there 
was little to distinguish the four groups from one another; 
all were anti-communist and authoritarian. In admlnistrati0:
20
their principle concern was the maintenance of law and 
order, which can he generally taken to mean the suppres­
sion of all opposition, especially from the Left, and 
the strict regulation of mass organisations. Each based 
their control on regional ties; army commanders were 
valued for personal loyalty, often above military compe- 
tenee, civilian officials were chosen on the basis of 
regional connections rather than technical worth. 
Professional politicians outside the four main groups, 
such as the Left-Wing of the Kuomintang, were reduced 
to impotency. Even the Left-Wing, which claimed for 
itself the greatest devotion to nationalism, was forced 
to use the tools of regionalism in its attempts to oppose 
Nanking. The attempts of the Left-Wing to reassert it­
self, in 1927 and in 1929, were prefaced by attempts to 
reestablish military control at Ganton through the agency 
of Ghang Ea-kfuei,and his Gantonese troops, for Ganton, 
besides being the birthplace of the revolution, was also 
the place of origin of most of the Left-Kuomintang leaders 
and the place where they had the closest connections.
Chiang Kai-shek, though the national commander-in- 
chief, and the dominant figure in the National Government 
at Nanking, was no more immune from utilising regional 
relationships than were the other big militarists. His 
closest allies were Ghekiang and Kiingsu men, most 
valuable of all, the merchants and bankers of Shanghai.
His region was richer and more advanced than any othei^
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and the prestige of the National Government, combined 
with the economic power and favourable geographic loca­
tion of this region to raise him above the other 
regional militarists* From this superior position, he 
was able, between 1929 and 1930, to crush his three 
most powerful rivals, the Kwangsi Clique, Feng Yxf-hsiang 
and Yen Hsi-shan. But while they were deprived of their 
power over extended, multi-province regions, only Feng 
was driven from power completely* Yen clung to his 
autonomy in Shansi, the Kwangsi Clique retained its 
absolute hold over Kwangsi.
Large-scale regional autonomy was defeated, but 
provincial autonomy continued. The provincial militarists 
were less colourful but better educated and trained than 
their predecessors in the Warlord period, and their 
power was often more firmly entrenched. In Kwangtung, 
Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan and Shansi, only lip- 
service was paid to the Nanking government. Shantung was 
to all intents and purposes independant; its governor,
Han Fu-chu, allowed no Nanking interference, and attempted 
to make his own quietus with the expansionist Japanese in 
his province. The three provinces of Manchuria were lost 
to Japan in 1931? while Hopei, Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar
came increasingly under Japanese domination. Hsinkiang
rule. Sikang and unxngnai were vircuany xnaepenaanu, uhe 
non-Chinese populations rebuffing Nanking attempts to 
establish its rule there; the same kind of situation 
obtained in Ninghsia and parts of Kansu, where Moslem
was under Soviet ' “f  \ Isuzer^ignity^ Thibet under pro-British
leaders, (all surnamed Ma, though not all related to 
each other) were the ruling elements. Until 1934 much 
of Kiangsi was under Communist rule, and in Shansi,
Kansu and Ninghsia, communist power was spreading. Fukien 
was under Nanking rule, hut there was a serious rebellion 
against Nanking in the province in 1933* Hunan was faith­
ful to Nanking, but independant in administration. Only 
in Hupei, Honan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsu and parts of 
Shensi and Kansu was Nanking control strong, that is in 
the provinces originally occupied by Chiang*s 1st Group 
Army, together with three provinces taken from Feng Yu­
li s i ang and one from the Kwangsi Clique.
The implications of such wide-scale regional indepen- 
dance for the Nanking Government were formidable; Nanking 
had to maintain an enormous army, not only for action
against the Communists, but also to keep the regional
24militarists in check* The army had to be financed out
of a 1 national* budget to which many provinces made no
contributions; an undue proportion of the budget went to
the army, leaving little money available for the projected
reconstruction of China. Nankingfs difficulties in
collecting revenue from the provinces...encouraged an
existing tendency to put too heavy a reliance on the
support of the developed sectors of China,* s economy, and
to encourage the further growth of the urban sector of
25the economy in the Shanghai region, ignoring the urgent
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problems of the agricultural sector , thus ensuring the 
alienation from the Kuomintang of the mass of the 
Chinese population, the peasantry. In international 
relations, and &gp*pially in the question of relations 
with Japan, Nanking was critically weakened by the 
disunity of China. Chiang Kai-shek1s slogan of "First 
Unite the Country, then Resist the Japanese'1 was inade­
quate in' a situation where Japanese imperialism was 
growing faster than national unity. China's disunity 
made her an easy victim for physical assault; it also 
allowed the Japanese to deal with individual regions and 
provinces separately, and to carry out a joint policy of 
encroachment through agreements with local leaders, and 
of actual military attacks. Yet the call for all-out 
resistance to Japan after 1937 proved the one rallying 
call which could unite China, bringing together (briefly) 
the Kuomintang and Communist parties, and inducing even 
the most recalcitrant holders of regional power to'co­
operate with the Central Government. Chiang's failure 
to make an adequate response to the calls for resistance 
to Japan made from 1931 on5 by the Communists, the students 
and f m m  diverse regional groupings, including the 
militarists in South China^and his continuing failure to 
make use of the power of nationalism during the anti- 
Japanese War, v</hen his prestige as the national leader 
increased, allowed the custodianship of the awakened 
nationalism of the Chinese people to pass to the Communists
24
Regional Military G-overnment
The administration of the autonomous and semi- 
autonomous provinces during the period from 1929 to 
1937 was as authoritarian and as totally dependant 
on military control as had been the administrations 
of the early warlords, and as were those of the 
provinces directly governed from Nanking. Regional 
militarism of the residual warlords retained the worst 
features of early warlordism: heavy land taxation, 
coupled with the extortion of numerous "petty and vexa­
tious !/ taxes, which impoverished the peasantry and hit 
hard at small merchants; the perpetuation of an XpPres~ 
sive agricultural system, which sank the peasantry into
debt and destitution, and depressed the rural economy;
26the unfettered demands of the military, for recruits , 
for a huge proportion of provincial income, and for the 
subordination of transport facilities to their needs*and 
the swift crushing of any manifestations of social and 
political unrest.
Within these enormous limitations, there is reason 
to believe that many of the autonomous provinces were 
better administered than those controlled directly from 
Nanking. At the top of the list of so-called '“Model 
provinces1 was Shansi, while Shantung, Kwangtury and 
Kwangsi all had reputations for efficient government.
The rule of the Kwangsi Clique, one of the most persistent 
defenders of regional autonomy, was authoritarian and 
conservative, and yet, in the context of China in the
25
first half of the 1930s, relatively progressive. The 
system of wide-scale militia training as a method of 
mass organisation emphasised the strongly militaristic 
flavour of the provincial administration, and gave 
Kwangsi the reputation of 'being a *Modern Sparta1'. The 
dominance and efficiency of the military ensured at 
least a stable order within the province, and freed the 
population from the curse of banditry, for which the 
province was traditionally noted. Kwangsi gained a 
high reputation in anti-Nanking circles for discipline, 
lack of corruption and conservative progressiveness.
The methods of the provincial leaders were praised by 
those who rejected both the Communists and the Kuomintang, 
and who criticised the incapacity of Nanking to come to
grips with China1 s problems. " if one wished to
make a comparative study of the various provincial admini­
strations in China, one would not hesitate to put Kwangsi
at the top of the list as the best governed province,
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inhabited by poor, but happy, contented people*. The 
degree of happiness and contentment of the people is 
debatable; the existence of efficient administration is 
widely confirmed, though it was small compensation for 
the other ills suffered by the population.
Conclusion
The continuance of autonomous regional power-holding 
up to the outbreak of the anfti-Japanese War baulked the 
processes of national regeneration which, it had been
26
hoped, would follow the establishment of a Kuomintang 
government in China* It encouraged conservative provin­
cialism, with its implications of cultural stagnation 
and rejection of social and political reform. The 
existence and strength of such phenomenon in the pro­
vinces promoted the emergence of similar traits in the 
National Government; the Centre and the regions turned 
away, in a parallel hut separate process, from the 
spirit of Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples' Principles, 
though all maintained a technical allegiance to the 
letter of the Principles, a practice made easy hy the 
vagueness of the Principles, which allowed almost any 
interpretation to he put on them.
The local nationalism of the province worked against 
centralised nationalism, and delayed the emergence of 
organised nationalism, the only force that proved capable 
of achieving unification and national revival. It 
helped to prevent China from gaining equality with other 
nations, and to lay China open to foreign aggression. 
Regionalism, a response to weak central government, and 
to inadequate national leadership, was an alternative to 
chaos and to lack of administration; it offered a short­
term solution to the inability of the Centre to cope with 
its domains, hut at the same time it had the long-term 
result of impeding the Centre's efforts to establish 
strong rule.
CHAPTER I
Kwangsi Province: Historical Background
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In 1903, a French officer on an official visit to 
Kwangsi to attend the unveiling of a monument to a 
murdered Catholic missionary was appalled by the con­
trast between Kwangsi, and the French colony of Tong- 
king. He described Kwangsi as "a rugged, mountainous 
province, ruined by civil war, terrorised by piracy, 
impoverished by the exactions of the mandarins, depopu­
lated by poverty*.."^ His observations touched on the 
two most distinctive features of Kwangsi, both at this 
period and for a considerable time to come: its extreme 
poverty and its persistent lawlessness.
Kwangsi's chronic poverty and unrest stemmed in 
part from geographical factors, from the natural barren­
ness and isolation of the region. The province lies in 
the upper basin of the West River, whose tributaries 
rise in the high plateau beyond the borders of Kwangsi, 
and carve deep valleys through the tableland of Kwangsi 
as they flow east. In some parts of the province, notably
around Kweilin, erosion of karst formations has created
2strange stone pinnacles and steep-sided hills. "...the 
very name of Kwangsi aroused in the minds of educated 
Chinese the idea of a place like no other, where the 
fairy landscapes - pine-clad mountains of fantastic shape
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rising abruptly from a lake-studded plain, and breaking
through, wreaths of mist to show glimpses of ravines and
waterfalls - which for centuries had haunted the imagina-
3 'tion of poets and artists, really existed." Most of the 
hills are riddled with caves, which made ideal lairs for 
bandits? an old saying of the province goes: "there is 
no place without hills, there are no hills without caves, 
and no caves without bandits."^ ,
The province is surrounded by mountain ranges, whose 
only natural break lies on the frontier with Kwangtung. 
Geographically and economically, Kwangsi is the hinter­
land of Kwangtung; the two provinces are isolated from
the rest of Ghina by mountains and by the sea, giving
5
rise to a strong regional integrity between the two.
Like Kwangtung, the area that is now Kwangsi was 
brought late under permanent Han rule. It was first 
colonised during the Oh'in Dynasty; to aid communications 
with central China,, a canal was dug between the headwaters 
of the Li River, a tributory of the West River, and the
g
headwaters of the Hsiang River in Ilunan.
It was not until the T'ang Dynasty that Lingnan, as 
Kwangsi and Kwangtung were then known, was firmly brought 
under Han rule. Kwangsi was constituted as a province 
during the Ming Dynasty, and at this time, and during 
the Gh'ing, the first large-scale Han-migration into the 
area occured.^
Han migration drove the native* Inhabitants of the 
province, people of the Chuang, Mieuo, Yao and other 
races, up into the hills in the western part of the 
province, while the Han settled in the fertile valley 
bottoms in the south and east of the province. The 
dispossessed tribal peoples existed in deep poverty, 
scratching a living in the infertile hill country. Rela­
tions between the two groups were tense and hostile, and 
the tension frequently erupted into rebellions by the 
tribal peoples. The economic and social malaise suffered 
by the Kwangsi ethnic minorities, and by the large number 
of Hakka people in the province, was a contributory fac­
tor in the development of the Taiping Rebellion in the
g
province. The Hakkas injected a further rebellious
streak into the province: "their pillaging character,
avid for combat, is the cause of the continual movements
of revolt which are for ever breaking out in Kwangsi, and
9against which the imperial authority seems powerless."
Although Kwangsi was the source of the Taiping 
Rebellion, after the Taiping armies mo vest north, the 
province enjoyed a period of relative calm. But the sup­
pression of the Rebellion, and the revenge which Peking 
wrought on the source of the Rebellion, plunged the pro­
vince into desolation and anarchy. Some of the associates 
of the Taipings in Kwangsi fled the province, and moved 
with their troops into Tongking, among them Liu Yung-fu, 
the leader of the Black Flags, a semi-bandit, semi-military
band. Liu formed an alliance with the native authorities
in Tongking, and his soldiers acted as mercenary troops
for them. When, in the early 1880s, the French started
to expand into Tongking, Liu and his Black Flags formed
the mainspring of the Tongkinese defence, and worked
closely with the Chinese authorities, who had become
embroiled in the question of Tongking's sovreignty to
the extent that China was drawn into war with France."^
The war ended less unfavourably for China than was the
case with most of the wars waged by the Powers against
China in the 19th Century; China was not able to prevent
the annexation of Tongking by the French, but the French
won no concessions on Chinese soil. Liu gained fame as a
patriot, and as the scourge of 'foreign devils', which
was enhanced by his subsequent activities, as a general
11in the Chinese Army, against the Japanese.
The activities of the Taipings, and of Liu Yung-fu,
gained for Kwangsi a warlike reputation, and a name for
nurturing fine fighting men. The same French officer who
had deprecated everything else about the province, found
the troops of Su Yuan-ch'un, the military governor at
the turn of the century "robust, sober, with capacities
of endurance, very well drilled to marching, kept always
1 2on their toes by the persuit of rebels and pirates..."
Su's favoured method of pacifying bandits was to 
incorporate them into his own forces, a practice which 
led to his impeachment by Ts'an Ch'un-hsuan, when he
13became governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1903.
Ts1en Impeached Su on the grounds that he had tolerated
the activities of bandits, and had allowed his own troops
to degenerate to such an extent that there was very
little distinction between them and the bandits they
were persuing. Nevertheless, he continued Su's policy
of cooperating with the more amenable bandits to suppress
the more intractable. He retained the services of two
important ex-bandits, Lu Yung-t'ing and Lung Ch’i-kuang,
14and brought them into his forces as regular officers.
With their help, he was able to check the worst excesses 
of banditry, but in 1904, his efforts were disrupted by 
a military rising at Lftxehow, in the centre of the pro­
vince, led by secret societies with connections with the 
T fung Meng Hui; though the uprising was put down by the
end of the year, Lmichow remained the chief centre in
15Kwangsi for anti-Manchu activity. In 1907, another
attack by revolutionary forces, led bjr Sun Yat-sen in
person, ended in fiasco, after his forces, which had just
participated in an abortive rising in Kwangtung, were
defeated by Lu Yung-t'ing on the border between Kwangsi 
16and Tongking. Lu was becoming an increasingly important 
figure in the province; his career was not hampered by
i 17the disgrace of Tsen Oh'un-hsuan, his sponsor, 1906.
a
Economically speaking, Kwangsi was rather better off 
during the last years of the Gh’ing than it was in the 
early years of the Republic. As a poor province, it
32
received i.nwa,rd transfers of money and grain from
more prosperous provinces, and a considerable
military subsidy^ from Kwangtung, to help support
the 13,000 old-style troops, and the 6-7,000 modern
10
troops in the province* Under official guidance, 
there were small-scale attempts to exploit the rich 
mineral resources of the province. Some 1 deposits1 
were less fruitful than expected. G-ood quality coal 
'discovered' by local officials for a foreign pros­
pector in an area near the Kwangtung border turned
out to be a cargo of Cardiff coal, judiciously
19arranged across the top of a worthless seam.
The poverty of Kwangsi deterred foreign merchants
from expanding their trade into the province. The
only foreign power seriously interested in Kwangsi
was France; the Tongking authorities went so far as
to build a, railway line up to the Kwangsi border. But
the Chinese did not reciprocate by building a line on
their side, and without it, it was considered that
20there was no hope of developing trade. "Can the
French hope to find there an outlet for their commerce?
21We do not hesitate to says no I" The only trade
which flourished between Tongking and Kwangsi was said
to be the trade in human beings, which was conducted
along small, unguarded paths across the border. The
'cargoes' were women and girls, kidnapped in Tongking,
"a chosen land for the supply of human flesh", and
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destined for Canton and Hong Kong. French Missionaries
were more hopeful ahout the potential that Kwangsi 
offered for their work, hut were sadly disappointed.
In 1925} a missionary reported that: "In spite of 
fifty years of work, it (KwangsiJ is still far from 
having received even a .veneer of Ghristian civili­
sation, few of its inhabitants having been attracted
up till now by the beauty of the doctrine of our Lord
23and Sovereign Master.-** Oatholic missionary work
in Kwangsi, which started in the mid-19th Century,
passed through many vicissitudes, especially at times
when relations between Erance and China were bad. Many
missionaries were murdered, and the compensation
demanded by the french government for these murders
worsened the relations between the priests and the
people of Kwangsi. Kwangsi was one of the least
rewarding of all Chinese provinces, from the point of
view of catholic conversions; in 1921, it had only
5,000 converts, scarcely more than Tibet, at the
24bottom of the convert table. Of 125 seminarians
enrolled between 1893 and 1925? only 14 were ever 
25ordained. Converts often demonstrated the wrong 
motives in attaching themselves to the Catholic Church, 
as was understandable in a province beset by poverty 
and banditry. Catholic priests detected desire for 
the financial gain and physical security offered by 
foreign protection in short-term converts: "nothing
is more common in Kwangsi than ingratitude...*a cause
26of suffering for the missionary heart."
The catholics were aggrieved by what they considered 
the unscrupulous activities of the protestant mission­
aries in the province, who arrived many years after 
the catholics; "the temporal advantages which the
American sects offer to their followers are a strong
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temptation for some of our new Christians." They 
suspected that the protestants were stealing marches 
on them by their offers of medical aid, and of instruc­
tion in English in their schools, a foreign language 
more popular in Kwangsi than was french. But they 
over-estimated the success of their rivals: "shortly 
before 1910, a missionary (Protestant} walked through 
Kwangsi one thousand English miles, seventy-two days, 
without seeing a single Christian or coming near a 
gospel hall."
The lack of success of both missionaries and 
foreign merchants in Kwangsi confirmed the belief held 
by most foreigners, and shared by many Chinese, that 
Kwangsi was a hoplessly uncouth and backward province, 
with nothing to recommend it beyond its extraordinary 
scenery, and its fame for bandits, rebels and fighting 
men. After the 1911 Revolution, one of Kwangsi's 
warriors, Lu Yung-t'ing, emerged as a leading figure 
in SoLith-West China, as the leader of the first Kwangsi 
Clique.
Lu Yung-t1ing
Lu Yung-t'ing started M s  career^s a bandit,
operating in the Kwangsi/Tongking border region.
Like other bandits in this area, he occasionally
acted for the regular army as an 'unofficial guerilla*
in operations over the border in Tongking. Lu served
in this capacity at the time of the Sino-Prench War,
and later under Su Yuan-c&'un, the military governor
of Kwangsi, who brought him into the regular army
29on a permanent basis. Lu's career flourished under
the benign eye of Ts'en Gh'un-hsuan, Su's successor;
with another protege of Ts'en's, Lung Ch'i-kuang, Lu
came to share control over the bulk of Kwangsi regular
troops, while at the same time maintaining close
contacts with his former bandit friends. Their only
rival in the province was the Kwangsi unit of modern
troops, which was not large enough to offset their 
30authority. In April, 1911? Lung was sent into 
Kwangtung, to help put down the Huang-Hua-Kang Uprising, 
and Lu rose to the position of military governor 
(t 1 i-tu) of Kwangsi. ^
After the Wuchang Uprising in the late summer of 
1911, a group of revolutionaries and subordinate army 
officers at Liuchow prepared to declare their independ- 
ance. Lu Yung-t'ing guaged the strength of their move­
ment, and put himself briefly at the head of it,
36
ensuring that when the formal declaration of the
province1s independence was made on September 17th,
32
he should emerge as the leader of the province.
Within a few days of the declaration, he was able to
enforce the departure of all the imperial office
holders in the provincial government, and to have him-
33self declared tu-tu. There was no political revolu­
tionary motivation in Lu's activities; his concern 
was to make himself the ruler of Kweaagsi, and he 
quickly moved to relieve the revolutionaries, and the 
officers who had participated in the anti-Manchu 
activities in the province, of what authority they had.
When, in 1913? they attempted to stage a second up-
34rising at Liuchow, he crushed them summarily. He 
assured his position by bringing more of his old bandit 
friends into .the regular army: "After the foundation 
of the Republic, Kmmgst1 s military affairs were 
controlled by local bandits turned generals. An examina­
tion of the situation led them to the realisation that 
being a bandit was a short cut to being an official, 
and so all those who held local military or financial.
35
power did extremely well.*." The tradition of the 
Black Blags continued: "The Kwangsi soldiers of the 
Republic seem to have charged themselves with proving 
that they still have in their veins the blood of those 
to whom they have shown themselves worthy successors." ^
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Lu gave .no sign of wishing to do anything more
than dominate Kwangsi; hut in 1915 and 1916, external
events impinged themselves upon Kwangsi, and as a
result, Lu found himself in control of Kwangtung as
well; the normal relationship between Kwangtung and
Kwangsi was reversed, with the backward, poverty-
stricken province dominating its rich and advanced
neighbour. The circumstances which brought about
the elevation of Kwangsi's status was the imperial
adventure of Yuan Shih-k'ai, and the anti-monarchist
Hu-kuo (Protect the Nation) Movement which sprang up
in reaction to it.
The situation in South-West China in late 1915 >
as Yuan Shih-k'ai prepared to make himself emperor,
was fluid. None of the four South-Western provinces
were garrisoned with Peiyang troops, and though Yuan
had been currying the favour of the provincial leaders,
he had succeeded in gaining the firm support only
Lung Ch/i-kuang, who had gained control over Kwangtung
srnae 1914* ^  Lu Yung-t'ing did not favour Yuan,
apparently because he felt slighted by the lowly rank
in the Hung-Hsien nobility which Yuan had conferred 
38upon him; but he had no plans for opposing hi^ actively
He was linked to Lung Ch/i-kuang, Yuan's most loyal
ally in the South-West, by marriage; Lung's nephew was
39his son-in-law. The civilian leaders of Kwangsi
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40were Yuan appointees. He depended on Yuan for
financial contributions. Most important of all,
his son, Lu Yu-hsun, was virtually a hostage of
Yuan Shih-k'ai; the boy lived in Peking, with the
sons of other dubious allies, who were supposedly
to receiving military training, but were in fact
there to ensure their fathers1 loyalty. ^
Events forced Lu to renounce the neutrality
over the monarchical issue that he would have
preferred. He came under increasingly strong
pressure from the leaders of the aati-Yuan movement,
centred on Yunnan province, who included his former
chief, Ts'en Ghu!i®n~hslian, a long-time enemy of 
42
Yuan's. Lu found this pressure difficult to resist?
he petitioned Peking for sick leave, in order to
extricate himself from his dilemma, and asked for the
return of his son to care for him. His son started
south, but died in mysterious circumstances, probably
43murdered, at Wuchang. It was generally believed
that Yuan had caused the boy's death.
Meanwhile, the military situation in the South-
West was swinging against Yuan. Yunnan declared its
independance on December 25th, 1915? and launched
attacks into Szechwan and Kweichow. Kweichow declared
44its independance on January 27th, 1916. Bitter 
fighting was in progress in Szechwan; to relieve his 
forces there, Yuan Shih-k'ai planned an attack on
39
Yunnan from Kwangsi, and when Lu Yung-t'ing showed
reluctance in mounting it, he ordered the brother
/  /  of Lung Ch'i-kuang, Lung Ch^in-kuang, to attack
45from Kwangtung through Kwangsi. Lung raised 
troops in Kwangsi for the expedition against Yunnan.
Lu was down-graded by Yuan, and ordered to go to 
Kweichow and organise an expedition against Yunnan 
from there, granting him for the purpose one million 
yflan. ^
Lufs downgrading proved the final incentive to
47him to come out against Yuan. On March 15th, he 
declared the independance of Kwangsi, and named him­
self commander-in-chief of the Kwangtung/Kwangsi 
Hu-Kuo Chun* La&ng Ch'i-ch'ao, a, leading supporter
of the Hu-Kuo Movement, arrived in Kwangsi two days
48later and became chief-of-staff. The army of
Lung Gh'in-kuang, moving slowly towards the Yunnanese
border, was taken unawares by Lufs move, and was dis- 
49armed. With the collapse of Yuan's flank attack on 
Yunnan, the Hu-Kuo iftovement grew from a localised 
rebellion to a movement powerful enough to force the 
independance of all southern and south-western provinces.
In Kwangtung, Lung Ch^i-Kua.ng1 s position was being 
eroded by the defection of local Gantonese armies. At 
the same time, Lu Yung-t'ing was massing forces for 
an attack into Kwangtung from Kwangsi. On April 6th, 
Lung, under strong pressure from Lu, declared the
40
independance Af Kwangtung, but without denouncing
50Yuan Shih-k'ai. He reached a compromise with Lu
Yung-t'ing and the Hu-Kuo leaders whereby a military
government was set up at Ohaot&ch1 ing, on the West
River above Canton, of which Ts'en Ch'un-hs&an became
51the acting head.
The declaration of independance by Hunan in mid- 
May, under military pressure from Hu-Kuo forces, 
sealed the doom of Yuan Shih-k'ai*s imperial adventure. 
Yuan died early in June; his death marked the end of 
unified national government in China. Li Yuan-hung 
succeeded to the Presidency, and the 1912 Constitution 
was reactivated, nullifying the pretext for the indepen­
dance of the provinces which supported the Hu-Kuo 
movement. The Military Government was therefore wound 
up on July 14th.
Lung Ch/i-kuang, who still regarded himself as 
loyal to Peking rather than to the Military Government, 
had preempted the dissolution of the Military Govern­
ment by rescinding the independance of Kwangtung, in 
early June. His move, which was coupled with hostile 
moves against Hu-Kuo forces in the province, led to a
military campaign against him, and to his downfall as
53 r*ruler of Kwangtung. Lu Yung-t1ing became tu-ohun
of Kwangtung, an appointment made by the Peking govern­
ment, but which was not a choice on the part of that 
government, but a confirmation of the existing power 
situation in Kwangtung. Lu, aided by Yunnanese and
41
local Cantonese units, had installed himself as 
de facto ruler of Kwangtung, a manoeuvre accom­
plished more by chance than by design, through 
Kwangsi's fortuitous connection with the Hu-Kuo 
Movement. Though Kwangsifs declaration of inde­
pendance in March gave valuable help to the Hu-Kuo 
Movement, the Hu-Kuo Movement gave Kwangsi a dispro­
portionate gain, that of extending Kwangsi control
54to the rich and populous province of Kwangtung.
In October, 1916, Lu Yung-t'ing set up his 
headquarters at Ohaoc^eh1 ing, as tu-chim of Kwang­
tung. The open breach between North and South China 
had been healed, but individual provinces in the 
South remained independant in all but name. As a
result of the Hu-Kuo Movement, Northern troops had
55been withdrawn from Hunan and Szechwan; Yunnan
was controlled by T'ang Chi-yao, Kwangtung and Kwangsi
by Lu Yung-t'ing. The phenomenon of the independant
provincial warlord, was already perceptible. Lu
severed his connections with the politicians with
whom he had been associated during the Hu-Kuo Move- 
56ment, giving his administration in Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi an uncompromisingly militarist flavour.
Lu took little part in the regular administration 
of Kwangtung and Kwangsi; his brother-in-law, T'an 
Hao-mlng, was tu-chlim of Kwangsi, and Ch'en Pfrng-kun 
of Kwangtung; these two men were responsible for 
civil and military government, while Lu was in charge
of affairs concerning both provinces, in his capa-
57city of Commissioner for the two Kwangs. His
post, and those of T'an and Ch*en were confirmed
by the Peking Government, after Lu had visited the
58capital in March, 1917* Though he no longer 
gave genuine allegiance to the Peking government, 
he still felt the need for official sanction for 
his appointments; he was not prepared to renounce 
his independance, but neither did he intend to be 
blatant about it. Since he had no political anti­
pathy to the Peking government, there was no point 
in his renouncing its technical authority, as 
demonstrated by asking its confirmation of his 
appointments to office. His inclination was to 
maintain friendly relations with Peking, first be­
cause there was the possibility that he would need 
its aid against opponents in the South, and secondly 
because he felt uncomfortable operating outside the 
framework of national government. His concept of 
regional independance was of local control confirmed 
by a higher authority, i.e. the Peking government.
While in the North, Lu was approached by Ghang 
Hsiin, who was then planning his attempt to restore 
the Manchu monarchy. His meetings with Ghang, and
wi:bh P'u Yi, gave rise to rumours that he was asso-
59ciated with the Restoration Plot. Whether he 
planned to support the Restorationists is uncertain, 
for when the crisis in the North occurred in June, 
1917, Lu found his hands tied; the strength of
opposition in Kwangtung to the Restoration, and to 
the seizure of power by Tuan Oh'i-jui which followed 
it, was such that Lu was forced to bow to it, and to 
welcome Sun Yat-sen to Ganton; Sun had put himself 
at the head of a movement known as the Hu-Fa (Protect 
the Constitution) Movement, and who enjoyed the sup­
port of many of the groups in Kwangtung who were not
60committed to Lu. Under this pressure, Lu was
forced to agree to the declaration of independance by
Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, in protest against
61the dissolution of Parliament in Peking.
Sun arrived in Canton on July 17th, and began to 
make plans for the convention of an extraordinary 
parliament in Ganton, made up of members of the Peking 
Parliament who had come south after its dissolution, 
and for the establishment of a military government 
in Ganton. This government was set up at the begin­
ning of September, a few days after the first meeting 
of the Extraordinary Parliament. Lu was not pleased
about Sun's moves, and he did not at first give Sun
6 2any material backing. Nevertheless, he was drawn 
closer to Sun by events in Hunan, which once again 
became the pivot of conflict between North and South. 
Tuan Oh'i-jui felt confident enough of his authority 
after the failure of the Restoration and the dissolu­
tion of Parliament, to attempt to extend Northern 
control into Hunan again, the first step in his wider 
plan to reunify China. He started moving troops
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into Hunan at the end of July, in an attempt to oust
the Hunan tuchhn, f a n  Yen-k*ai, who was sympathetic
to Sun Yat-sen. Fighting started in Hunan in September,
and in October, Kwangsi forces moved into the province
64to give f a n  assistance, partly in the interest of 
safe-guarding Kwangsfs security, and partly to ful­
fill a secret alliance that Lu had made with Feng Kuo- 
chang of the Chihli Clique, which was quietly working 
against Tuan and the Anhwei Clique in the North. The 
fighting in Hunan petered out in November, after the
Chihli/Anhwei split had come out into the open, and
6 5Tuan had resigned. Lu proceeded to enter into 
negotiations with the Northern forces for a peaceful 
settlement of the North/South division.
The Kwangsi expedition into Hunan, an^bhe Kwangsi 
negotiations with the North, were undertaken without 
the sanction of the Military G-overnment in Canton, 
and without reference to it. Sun Yat-sen was enraged 
by Lu's intention of reaching a settlement with the 
North before the constitutional issue had been settled; 
he ordered a bombardment of the headquarters of the 
Kwangtung tuohun by gunboats loyal to himself, in an
66attempt to oust the Kwangsi generals from Kwangtung.
The Hunan leaders were equally incensed by Lu's 
actions, since their aim of expelling Northern troops 
from their province had not been achieved. Under
combined pressure from Sun and from Hunan, Lu was 
forced to reactivate the conflict in Hunan early 
in 1918, and by the end of the month, Kwangsi and
C H
Hunan forces had cleared the province.
The renewed fighting in Hunan, and the Southern
setbacks which followed, helped to recreate a tenuous
cooperation between the Kwangsi military authorities
in Kwangtung and the Military Government, but by May,
when Hunan had been completely lost to Northern forces,
the dissension between the two groups had reemerged.
Acting through Tsen Oh'un-hsiian and his political
followers, Lu Yung-t'ing was able to get a motion
passed by the Extraordinary Parliament which provided
for the reorganisation of the Military Government under
a Directorate of seven, instead of under a Grand Marshall.
Although Sun Yat-sen, the former Grand Marshall, was to \
be retained as one of the Directors, this position was
obviously untenable for him, and he resigned, and left 
68Ganton. Lu reopened peace negotiations with Peking,
and though the negotiations did not get under way until
1919? and never led to a settlement, they effectively
69stopped the Hu-Fa Movement, which faded out.
T'ang Shao-i, another of the seven Directors, left 
Canton with Sun, and a third, T'ang Ghi-yao of Yunnan, 
never attended the meetings of the Directorate. The 
Directorate was merely a tool of Lu Yung-t'ing,
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a&mi:n|stere& for liim by Ts'en Oh1 un-hsuan. Lu 
continued his laisez-faire j)olicies towards local 
government, relying solely on his military strength
70to maintain his position in Kwangtung and ICwangsi.
At this time, Lu's forces numbered about 50,000.
The majority were commanded by untrained officers, 
whose military experience had been gained as bandits; 
the major exception was the Model Battalion, set up 
in 1917, which was commanded by a foreign-trained 
officer, Ma Hsiao-chun, and was officered by young 
graduates of military schools. For the rest, Lu's 
troops were ill-trained and oblivious to modern 
military methods; they owed their success in Kwangtung 
not to their own ability, but to the disunity of the 
Oantonese forces. But their presence in Kwangtung 
proved a unifying force to the Oantonese generals, 
while their stay in Kwangtung, and their enjoyment of 
the riches of the provice, weakened their fighting 
capacity. The Kwangsi forces in Kwangtung sunk into 
a satiated stupor, unaware of the threats which were 
building up against them.
Early in 1920, the rumour that Tsen Oh1 un-hs‘ua,n was 
about to sign a peace treaty with Peking, ending 
officially Sothern independance, spurred those members 
of the Extraordinary Parliament who had remained in 
Canton after Sun Yat-sen1s departure, to leave Kwangtung,
4?
in protest against the abject surrender on constitu-
71tional issues which the treaty was said to contain.
Wu T'ing-fang, the commissioner of finance in the
Military Government, made off for Hong Kong with the
hulk of the contents of the treasury, which, it was
intended, would finance the reestablishment of the
Extraordinary Parliament in the foreign concessions
at Shanghai. Part of the money was used to pay. the
fares of the members of parliament to Shanghai, but
the remainder was sequestered by the foreign police
72there, as stolen property.
These developments were coupled with a military
threat to Kwangsi power in Kwangtung. Ch’en Chiung-
ming, one of Bun Yat-sen's closest supporters, was
marshalling his forces in Fukien, preparing to attack
into Kwangtung; T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan, a former
ally of Lu Yung-t'ing, had been alienated by a clumsy
Kwangsi attempt to detach the loyalty of his troops
still stationed in Kwangtung, and was planning to ally 
73with Ch'en, while within Kwangtung itself, the 
local-nationalist movement was gaining strength, and 
had won the support of most Cantonese generals. In 
the summer of 1920, local Cantonses troops rose against 
the Kwangsi forces, and in response, Ch1 en Chiung-ming 
launched his attack from Fukien. Kwangsi forces 
crumpled before this dual onslaught. The Military 
Government collapsed, and Kwangsi forces began to
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retreat from Kwangtung, their withdrawal hampered by
the loot of four years of occupation which they
74carried with them.
It appeared that the Oantonese would he satis­
fied with the expulsion of Kwangsi troops from Kwang­
tung. Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton at the end of 
November. and set about reorganising the Military 
Government there. The Cantonese had nothing to gain 
from launching an attack into Kwangsi, and they be­
lieved that Lu Yung-tfing would appreciate the reality 
of his position, sandwiched between two hostile 
provinces, Kwangtung and Yunnan, and would give no 
further trouble. But Lu's loss of territory, and of 
prestige, irked him, and in the spring of 1921, he 
attempted to launch a counter-attack into Kwangtung, 
with backing from the Peking government. His attack 
was a fiasco; his subordinate deserted him, his troops 
scattered, and instead of revenging himself upon the 
Cantonese, he succeeded only in laying his province 
open to Cantonese invasion. In the summer of 1921, 
Cantonese troops under Ch'en Chiung-ming advanced up
the West River into Kwangsi, almost without resistance,
75and took all the major centres in Kwangsi. The 
Kwangsi troops, who fled before the invasion were 
subjected to aerial bombardment from Cantonese planes; 
since bombs were unobtainable, the Cantonese satisfied 
themselves with dropping baulks of wood, which did little
49
*7 6damage* Lu fled from Kwangsi across the Tongking 
frontier, and entered upon his first exile, which 
was to last just over a year* fhe province passed 
from the relative calm which had marked Lu's ten 
year rule into anarchy and disruption, which v/as 
only ended in 1925 when the leaders of the new 
Kwangsi Clique consolidated their hold over the 
province•
CHAPTER II
The Background, Education and Early Careers of the 
headers of the Kwangsi Clique
i
Two features distinguish the leaders of the 
Kwangsi Clique from, other warlords or regional 
militarists of the Republican period. Eirstly, 
the Clique was not dominated by a single individual,
but was led by a triumvirate of military men of
virtually equal authority. Secondly, the Clique 
showed an enduring internal cohesion, which 
contrasted with the pattern of shifting loyalties 
commonly associated with warlord politics, and 
allowed the Kwangsi Clique to endure for over a 
quarter of a century, showing a durability only 
matched by Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi. This cohesion,
and the ability of three men to maintain a
relationship of mutual cooperation, may be ascribed 
in part to the similarities in their backgrounds, 
education and early careers, which established 
strong bonds between them and reinforced the ties 
of fellow-provincials; their equality of education 
and experience discouraged the domination of one 
of the three over the other two.^
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The Clique also drew strength from the stability 
of the second echelon of leadership, which was 
made up of men who shared the social and 
educational backgrounds of the Clique leaders.
(See Chart 1).
The ties which bonded the Clique together were
L
formed in two military s^ols, at the Kwangsi 
Military Preparatory School (Kuang-hsi hu-chtn
O
Hsiao-hsileh), and at the Paoting Academy near
Peking. Kwangsi officers who were trained in
Japan5 or at the Whampjao/Academy in Kwagtung, do
not appear to have formed connections with the
Clique3 but seem to have served outside their
native province.
*
Before we discuss the education of the leaders 
of the Kwangsi Clique, we must look at their social 
backgrounds. Considerably more information is 
available on Li Tsung-jen, Huang Shao-hsinng and 
Huang Hsti-ch'u than on Pai Ch’ung-hsi and the 
greater attention given to the first three men 
reflects this imbalance rather than the relative 
importance of the four men.
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Li Tsung-jen
Li Tsung-jen was born in 1891, near Kweilin, 
into a family which had once been prosperous, but 
had suffered a serious decline over the past 
decades, partly as a resell t of the ravages of the 
aftermath of the laiping Rebellion in Kwangsi, in 
which the Li family home had been destroyed. Li!s 
father was a failed scholar, who made his living 
by tutoring and pen-pushing, while his mother ran 
the small family farm, assisted by her five sons.
When he was six, Li started to attend the 
village school, which was run by his father, 
spending half his time studying the Classics with 
his father, and the other half working in the 
fields with his mother. His schooling was adjusted 
to the farming calendar: at harvest time, or
when the fields were being planted, he spent his 
whole time on agricultural work, but at slack 
seasons, he would go to school full time,
Li*s father was bitterly anti-Manchu and 
anti-foreign; at the same time he appreciated 
the need for a modern education, in which ‘western*
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subjects were included. When a modern elementary 
school was set up in lin^kuei Asien, near Li*s 
home, his father sent him to it. Li did not take 
well to the education offered by this school, and 
within a short time he had moved to another 'modern1 
school, the provincial Cotton Weaving Institute in 
Kweilin. Li completed a course at this school, 
but could find no work when he graduated, and 
returned in low spirits to his parents* farm. After 
a period of work on the farm and with his father, 
he returned to Kweilin in 1908, and enrolled in 
the Kwangsi Military Elementary School, a course 
of action which was dictated by his failure to 
gain an adequate education in other schools, rather 
than from his own or his parents * desire that he 
should be a soldier, a career that was still widely 
deprecated, especially by people with some 
pretension to scholarly pursuits, such as Lifs 
father.
Huang Shao-hsiung.^
Huang Shao-hsiung was born in 1896, in a village
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in Jimg-hsien, only a few miles from the Kwangsi/ 
Kwangtung border. His father, like Li's, was a 
failed scholar, and a school teacher; in addition 
he practised Chinese medicine and also drew 
income from renting land. Like Li, Huang studied 
in his father’s school, a clan school which had 
been set up by the Huang clan elders. His 
childhood was unrestricted and boisterous; 
through his father he was introduced to a certain 
amount of modern ideas, though his education in 
the Classics was neglected. The freedom of his 
childhood, and the encouragement to modern thinking 
and physical daring given him by his father, marked 
Huang out from his contemporaries. In 1908, he 
went to Kweilin to enroll in the Military 
Elementary School; his departure from his home 
at so young an age, and his desire to become an 
officer aroused considerable parental misgiving.
Huang Hsll-ch’u . ^
Huang Hsu-ch*u, like Huang Shao-hsiung, was a 
native of Jung-hsien. His family had declined 
from an earlier prosperity; his father worked as
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a tutor, and made repeated attempts to pass 
the Imperial examinations, while his mother 
managed the family farm. When his father finally 
became a hsiu-tsai, in 1900, he found his 
qualification worthless; he could get no 
worthwhile post, and rather than continue his 
tutoring, he enrolled, with his son, in the 
Wuchow Sericulture Institute. For Huang HsTI-ch'u, 
the experience was just as abortive as was Li 
Tsung-jen1s at the Kweilin Weaving Institute; it 
only served to delay his entry into the Military 
Elementar^chool. When he arrived there in 1912, 
Huang Shao-hsiung, Pai Chfung-hsi and most of the 
members of the second echelon of the Kwangsi 
Clique had already left. Huang played an active 
part in the 1911 Uprising at liuchow, and this 
episode in his life enabled him to claim, later on, 
a revolutionary record.
It is significant that the fathers of Li Tsung-jen, 
Huang Shao-hsiung and Huang HsU-chfu should all 
have been men who attempted to achieve success in 
the traditional way, through becoming
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scholar-bureaucrats, and that all should have 
failed. The example of their fathers must have 
turned their sons away from seeking traditional 
careers, and towards making their way in the 
army, which must have appeared to them a far 
better prospect for advancement than had been 
their fathers* choices.
Pai Qh *ung-hsi.
Pai Gh*ung-hsi was born in 1893, near Kweilin. 
Little is known of his family background, beyond 
that his forebears had migrated to Kwangsi from 
Nanking at the end of the Taiping rule in Nanking. 
The most distinctive feature of his family was 
that it was a Muslim family, one of the very few 
in Kwangsi. Otherwise it is only recorded that 
Paifs father was a farmer*, that Pai was the 
fifth of six sons, and that he enrolled in the 
Military Elementary School at about the same 
time as Huang Shao-hsiung and Li Tsung-jen.
7
The Kwangsi Military Elementary School. '
The Kwangsi Military Elementary School (Kuang-hsi
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Lu-chffn Hsiao-hstteh) was established at Kweilin 
in 1906, as part of a programme instituted in 
Peking to set up military preparatory schools 
in every province, to improve the calibre of the 
officers of the Chinese Army. The military 
preparatory schools were the lowest of three 
levels of officer training; at the next level 
were four military middle schools, and at the top
o
was the Paoting Military Academy. The military 
schools were financed by the central government, 
and the prospect of getting a free education 
appealed to young men whose parents could not 
afford to have them educated privately or abroad.
The Kwangsi school gave a highly-disciplined, 
spit-and-polish training, under the instruction 
of officers trained in Japan. ’Modern’ subjects, 
such as science, mathematics and foreign 
languages, were taught, in addition to military 
training. The first head of the school was
<3/Ts’ai^o, who later achieved fame as the leader 
of the 1916 anti-monarchist movement, and under 
his tolerant administration, the school attracted
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many instructors with revolutionary leanings; 
revolutionary ideas were widely, if secretly, 
discussed, and there were many secret members of 
the T'ung Meng Hui in the school.
When the Wuchang Uprising occurred in the late
summer of 1911* there was great excitement in the
school, which was increased by the declaration of
Kwangsi's independance from Peking. The new
Kwangsi authorities decided to send a small force
north to the Yangtze, to participate in the
anti-Manchu fighting there; a small band of
students from the Military Elementary School and
10other Kweilin schools went with it. The leader
of the student group was Ghao Heng-tfi, then a
teacher in a Kweilin school and one of the leading
11revolutionary activists in the province. Huang 
Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hai were included in 
the group, along with several other students who 
were later to play important roles in the Kwangsi 
Clique, li Tsung-;Jen was not, and his exclusion 
meant that he missed the chance of further military 
education in Central and Horth China which came to
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the participants.
The students from Kwangsi, to their chagrin,
played little part in the fighting against the
Manchus. By the time they reached the Yangtze, it
had died down. After several months of inactivity,
which most of the students devoted to sight-seeing
in Nanking and the surrounding area, the student
unit was disbanded early in 1912. Huang Shao-hsiung
and some of his comrades were able to enroll in the
Military Preparatory School (hu-chttn Yu-pei
Hsueh-hsiao) at Wuchang, formerly the Military
Middle School (Lu-chun Chung-hsueh). Huang
graduated from this school in 1915, and with
Pai Ch'ung-h&i and others went north to Paoting
and enrolled in the 3rd Glass of the Paoting Academy.
They graduated in 1916, having received a sketchy
and inadequate education; the Academy was seriously
affected by Yuan Shih-kfaifs distrust of the staff
and students of the Academy, which he regarded as
1 2a hot-bed of agitators.
Whatever the drawbacks of the education given at 
Paoting at this time, their stay there was valuable
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for the future Kwangsi leaders, for while they 
were there they met many of the future generals 
of the Kuomintang» and of warlord armies, and 
were afterwards linked to them in the old-school 
network. The fellow-feeling of Paoting graduates
nwas never as important as that of Whampjao 
graduates, hut it was activated from time to 
time to cement alliances, notably in 1927> when
it was used to organise opposition to
it was
H
1 3Chiang Kai'shek. In this respect, 
occasionally of great use to the Kwangsi leaders.
After their graduation, Huang Shao-hsiung and 
Pai Ch'ung-hsi returned to Kwangsi, along with 
several other Kwangsi graduates, to serve in the 
army of Lu Yung=tfing. Pai Ch'ung-hsi had earlier 
considered going to serve in Sinkiang, instead of 
in Kwangsi, probably drawn to Sinkiang by his 
Moslem background.  ^ Several Kwangsi graduates 
did not return to their native province, but made 
their careers elsewhere, especially in Hunan. 
Amongst these were several men who were later 
identified with the Kwangsi Clique.
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The Kwangsi Model Battalion!^
The failure of some of the Kwangsi cadets 
graduating from Paoting in 1916 to return to their 
native province was caused in part by their 
uncertainty as to whether they would he able to 
make careers in Kwangsi. xhere was known to be 
considerable hostility among the senior officers 
of Lu Yung-tfing?s army to modern-trained young 
officers, who did not fit in well with officers 
from bandit origins, and there was little chance 
that such young men would be employed in Lufs 
regular units. Some of them chose not to return 
to Kwangsi; those who did had to be given posts 
of some kind, for Lufs advisors felt that otherwise 
there was a danger of their organising opposition 
to Lu. In 1917) a Model Battalion was organised, 
headed by Ma Hsiao-chun, and officered by the 
young graduates of Paoting and the Kwangsi Military 
Preparatory School.
Ma had been attached to Lu Yung-t’ing’s 
headquarters for some time, but he was of a very 
different calibre from the majority of LuTs
62
officers; r,he stood out as the one red spot
1 7in a mass of green branches ,f. ' He was a 
hsiu-tsai, and a graduate of a military academy 
in Japan; he had been active in both the 1911 
and the Second Revolutions. He was exceptionally 
well qualified to command a battalion staffed by 
modern young officers, and his influence on his 
subordinates was crucial in their later careers.
The battalion was formed at Nanning, in May 1917, 
and consisted of about thirty young officers, all 
military school graduates, and about five 
hundred soldier-cadets, many of whom were middle 
school or primary school graduates.
Huang Shao-hsiung, Huang Hsu~ch!u and 
Pai Ch’ung-hsi, plus a number of other men who 
were to become long-term associates of the 
Kwangsi Clique, served in the battalion; Huang 
Hsu-ch!u, who had recently graduated from the 
Peking Military College (Pei-jing Lu-chun Ta-hsueh) 
was a company commander, while the others held 
lower posts.18
The battalion was not conceived as a fighting
force, but as a training unit, and as an 
oubliette for Kwangsi*s potential dissidents.
Ma Hsiao-chun had presumably been warned that there
was to be no agitation in the battalion, for in
spite of his former revolutionary connections,
there was no overt political work in the battalion.
The battalion saw no action until 1919, when it 
was sent to deal with bandits in the west of the 
province, although it participated in the Hu-Pa 
ad-vance into Iiunan in 1917- lu 1920, when Kwangsi 
forces in Kwangtung came under attack from 
Cantonese forces, the battalion was sent into 
Kwangtung, but was thrown back into Kwangsi with 
the defeated Kwangsi forces before having engaged 
the Cantonese forces. The battalion retreated 
into western Kwangsi, and was stationed at Po*£&©, 
in the Right River Yalley. In June 1921,
Ma Hsiao-chun surrendered to the advancing 
Cantonese forces, to allow his unit to remain 
intact; this surrender made the battalion the 
target of attacks in 1922 by forces of the 
Autonomous Army, a loose organisation of the forces
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of former subordinates of Lu Yung~tfing, who 
reasserted themselves after the withdrawal of 
Cantonese troops in 1922. Ma left the battalion, 
while Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Chfung-hsi led as 
many men as they could keep together across country 
and into Kwangtung. Huang Hsu-ch'u also left the 
battalion, and returned to his home in Jung-hsien, 
thus forfeiting his seniority over the other future 
members of the Kwangsi Clique. After a brief stay 
in Kwangtung, Huang Shao-hsiung, now completely 
alone in command of the remnants of the battalion, 
(since Pai Ch!ung-hsi had gone to Canton for 
medical treatment), moved his troops back into 
south Kwangsi, where he joined Li Tsung-jen, who 
was established in an area centering on Yuclin /isien.
1 QLi Tsung-.jenTs Career after 1911 ■
Having failed to join his fellow-students on 
their expedition to Wuchang, Li Lsung-jen had to 
be content with remaining in Kweilin and finishing 
his course at the Military Primary School, from 
which he graduated in 1913. Soon after his
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graduation, the school was closed, and was 
replaced by a school named the Officers T Training 
Centre (Chiang-chiao Chiang hsi Suo). Li obtained 
a junior post in the new school, but it brought 
him little satisfaction; standards had declined 
with the departure of the best students and 
instructors for Wuchang, and there was little for 
li to do; he spent his time at rifle practice 
and physical training* In 1914, the school 
stopped functioning altogether, and li found 
himself unemployed. In spite of his own 
estimation of his popularity, which led him to 
believe that his qualities of amiability, 
sincerity and devotion to duty were widely 
appreciated, he could not find another job. He 
was forced to become a physical training instructor 
in a middle school; the job had one compensation, 
in that it paid him well, but it was not the 
career which either he or his parents had 
envisaged for him.^
In 1916, li left his job to enroll as a 
lieutenant in a Yunnanese unit, which was passing 
through Kwangsi on its way to Kwangtung, to
66
participate in the Hu-Kuo action in Kwangtung.
In Kwangtung, Li transferred to a unit commanded
by Lin Hu, a Kwangsi native who had served in
Kwangtung and Kiangsi, and who was to become one
of the chief supporters of Ch'em Chiung-ming. Li
saw his first action in the campaign against
Lung Oh 1i-kuang, the Kwangtung tu^hun and supporter
of Yuan Shih-k'ai, who was driven from the province
21by Lu Yung-t!ing.
Li spent the years from 19^6 to 1920 in Kwangtung 
and in Hunan, serving under Lin Hu and under Ma Ch*i, 
the adopted son of Lu Yung-t'ing, and one of his 
closest supporters; during this time, Li rose to 
the rank of major. In 1920, when Ch'en Chiung-ming 
drove the Kwangsi forces from Kwangtung, Lin Hu's 
troops were dispersed; some remained in Kwangtung, 
and were amalgamated with Cantonese forces, while 
others, including Li Tsung-jen's unit, which was
op
made up of Kwangsi men, withdrew into Kwangsi.
Each unit became virtually autonomous, and 
self-sufficient, living off the land. Li made his
way to YucJLin, in southern Kwangsi, where he stayed 
until 1921, when Cantonese forces invaded Kwangsi;
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then he withdrew with his troops into the 
Sixty Thousand Hills (Liu-wan Shan), on the 
Kwangsi/Kwangtung border, to prevent forcible 
amalgamation into the victorious Cantonese forces. 
Here he gathered together various wandering bands 
of soldiers, and emerged some time later with 
2,000 well-armed men. This strength allowed him 
to negotiate with the Cantonese occupation forces,
and to have himself named commander of the Third 
Route of the Kwangtung/Kwangsi Border Protection 
Army, stationed at PeicJ-iu, a neighbouring hsien 
to Yu^lin. In the confused conditions which 
accompanied the Cantonese withdrawal from Kwangsi 
in 1922, Li was able to extend his control to 
cover five hsien, including Huang Shao-hsiung's 
native Jung-hsien and to reach a working
arrangement with the Autonomous Army, by which 
he maintained his independance and his local 
control- It was here that Huang Shao-hsiung 
joined him at the end of 1922, and it was from 
this base that he and Huang launched the actions 
which gave them, by 1925? control over the whole 
of Kwangsi, the base from which the Kwangsi Clique 
launched its activities on the national scene.
(See Map I).
CHAPTER III.
The Background to the Unification of Kwangtung 
and Kwangsi in 1926. ~
In March 1926, the Central Political 
Committee of the Kuomintang passed an Act of 
Alliance, which formally united Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi. This was an important step in the 
Kuomintang's struggle for power in China; for 
the first time its power was officially 
extended beyond the boundaries of Kwangtung.
Its significance for Kwangsi was much greater.
It indicated that the province had emerged from 
the period of chaos and isolation into which it 
sunk after the Cantonese invasion of 1921, and 
was ready again to take a part in national affairs.
Lu Yung-t'ing, who ruled Kwangsi from 1911 
to 1921, also dominated Kwangtung between 1916 
and 1920. In 1920, Ch'en Chiung-ming marched 
into Kwangtung from Fukien, and drove Lu Yung-t'ing 
back into his own province. Ch'en's campaign 
allowed Sun Yat-sen to re-establish himseif in 
Canton, where he soon revived his plans for a 
Northern Expedition.^ It must be launched, Sun 
decided, from Kwangsi into Hunan, which meant 
that Kwangsi would first have to be subjugated.
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A threatened counter-attack from Lu Yung-t'ing 
into Kwangtung gave an added pretext for 
Kwangtung military action against Kwangsi. In 
the summer of 1921, Oantonese troops under 
Oh'en Ghiung-ming marched into Kwangsi, and by
the end of September, had occupied all the key
2
towns in the province. The Kwangsi troops put 
up little resistance; with the exception of 
Lungchow, near the Annam border, all fell without 
major fighting. The important opium centre of 
Pose:., near the Yunnan border, was taken in
t\.
a co-ordinated attack by Xunnanese forces.
The Cantonese campaign was brutal; the
soldiers were avenging themselves for four years
of Kwangsi occupation of their own province.
"The invaders pillaged everything in their
route, abducting women and girls...there was a
great fear almost everywhere; as soon as the
Oantonese soldiers were seen arriving, the
alarm was given, and a sauve-qui-peut ge'Wr.al 
followed" French missionaries in the
province suddenly found themselves appreciated. 
Their compounds were crowded with refugees, and 
there were numerous conversions, "non pas toutes
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d^sinter^sses".6
In many areas, no such protection was
available. Between Nanning, the capital, and
Poc>se, for instance, a thousand hamlets were
7destroyed, by Gantonese or Kwangsi troops. In
the midst of the turmoil and disruption, Lu
Yung-t'ing fled to Annam* His rule had given
Kwangsi nine years of calm, "...there had been
no serious natural disasters...nor had there
been any currency collapse or advance collection
of land taxes, nor any miscellaneous taxes to
cause the people distress. The fact that the
operations of the Kwangsi troops were all outside
the province had brought about something difficult
to achieve: no trouble from soldiers within the
province. The only negative aspect was that the
government had not been active in pursuing the
welfare of the people, but, because there was
less of the oppression of bad government, the
people could live their rough and simple lives
8without intereference..." All that was now 
ended.
The sufferings of the people were compounded 
by the rapid spread of banditry. The Kwangsi 
Army disintegrated before the advancing
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Cantonese; its commanders in areas occupied
by the Cantonese either surrendered, fled the
province, or took to the hills, transforming
q
themselves into bands of brigands* Those in
unoccupied areas maintained their positions, but
independent of all higher authority. In these
circumstances, the distinction between soldiers
and bandits became academic. Kwangsi became an
10"immense field of desolation11. The trade of
the province for the whole of 1921 was down by
half - indicating that it must have virtually
11ceased on the Cantonese invasion in June.
The Kwangsi Bank collapsed, and its whole issue
of 27 million yuan in paper notes became 
12worthless.
The Cantonese did not press their attack
beyond the conquest of the major cities. These
they "bled white, with their intemperate
recquisitions, their exhorbitant demands for
war contributions, exasperating the population
15with their vexations of every kind”.  ^ Sun 
Yat-sen appointed Ma Chlin-wu govenor of the
province. Ma, a Kwangsi native, doctor of
/
Berlin University and clos^&ssociate of Sun's,
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was filled with good intentions concerning
the administration of Kwangsi; he himself
lived with the greatest frugality, and was
determined to bring good frugal government to
the province. But he was powerless; the
only economies he could bring about were in
14-official entertaining. His control did not
extend far beyond the walls of his yamen at
Nanning; he was distrusted by the Cantonese,
as a Kwangsi man, and by the Kwangsi people, as
15a puppet of Canton. ^ He was caught up in the 
growing hostility between Sun Yat-sen and 
Chfen Chiung-ming, over the proposed northern 
expedition, for which, at the end of 1921, Sun 
was making preparations at Kweilin. Ch'en, 
however had already started to withdraw his own 
troops into Kwangtung.*^ As they withdrew, the 
remnants of the Kwangsi Army took over the 
areas they vacated, contracting the area 
nominally controlled by Ma. In the spring of 
1922, when Cantonese troops withdrew completely, 
Ma admitted defeat. He packed up his seals 
of office, and the translations on which he 
had been working during the long hours of 
inactivity entailed in administering an area one
does not control, and took a boat for Canton.
At Kuei-hsien, it was attacked by soldiers of
Li fsung-jen, and, to Ma's desolation, M s
17favourite concubine was killed. f
By mid-summer, the last 'guest1 troops had 
left the province. A semblance of centralised 
provincial government remained; a series of 
govenors held office, but effective provincial 
government fell into abeyance. Kwangsi was
divided between an assortment of armies and
bandit gangs. Borne were allied into a loose
federation known as the Autonomous Army, which
was set up in May, 1 9 2 2 . Lin Ch^pn-t1 ing was
its official commander-in-chief, and from August
on, he also held the title of govenor, conferred
19on him by the Peking government. y Lin's
authority as commander-in-chief was purely
nominal; most of his 'subordinates' were
entirely independant, each ruling the area, often
very small, which his forces dominated. Kwangsi
was teeming with petty warlords: "there were
more battalion commanders than dogs, and the
streets were full of commanders (ssu-ling)
20running around". In addition to small bands,
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there were at least fifteen forces in Kwangsi
21with several thousand troops. The two largest 
individual forces were those of Shen Hung-ying,
controlling the northeast of the province, and
22of Lu Yung-t'ing on the Tongking "border.
Tsung-jen, controlled an area on the
Kwangtung border, where he was joined in the
summer of 1922 by Huang Shao-hsiung, his
main collaborator in the unification of 
23Kwangsi.
Petty Warlords: The area which Li and Huang
controlled lay along the Kwangtung/Kwangsi 
border, and included Huang's native hsien, 
Jung-hsien, which became his personal stronghold. 
The bitter enmity felt in Kwangsi towards the 
Cantonese, and especially towards Ch'en 
Chiung-ming, who in 1922 was the dominant 
figure in Kwangtung, made open contact with 
Canton impossible. But when Bun Tat-sen 
returned to Canton early in 1923, the situation 
changed.
Sun was aided in his resumption of power
by Xunnanese and Kwangsi mercenary troops, who 
attacked into Kwangtung from Kwangsi% amongst
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these troops were the troops of Shen Hung-ying, 
who had taken over the port of wuchow, on the 
Kwangtung/Kwangsi border, in December 1922.
When's area of control bordered on that of Huang 
Shao-hsiung, at Jung-hsien. Shen offered Huang 
the chance he wanted to expand his area of 
control. Huang felt impotent in his alliance with 
Li Tsung-Jen, whose subordinate he was in real 
terms. Li had 2000 men and 1000 rifles, toj
Huang's 1000 men and 900 rifles.^ Huang did 
not want to break with Li, but he felt the 
need for action, and expansion, which he felt 
would not come with the slow and cautious, Li.
When Shen invited him to Join his command, and 
move his troops into the Wuchow area, he agreed* 
Superficially, this new alliance was a 
poor one. Shen, an ex-brick layer and bandit, 
was notoriously untrustworthy. But Huang had 
relatives in Shen's entourage and he knew that 
the first alliance Shen planned to break was 
that with Sun Yat-sen; Shen was expecting to 
extend his power in Kwangtung by an attack on 
other forces loyal to Sun. Huang believed that
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he would fail, and that after Shen was defeated,
he himself would be able to gain control of the
Wuehow region, if he first moved troops there
■under the guise of an alliance with Shen,
Li Tsung-jen believed that the element of risk
involved was too large, and was strongly opposed
to it, but the gamble was irresistible to Huang,
In the event, Huang was proved right. War
broke out between Shen and Kuomintang forces
26in April 1923* Shen was swiftly driven back
up the North Fiver, away from Kwangsi; Wuchow
27was left defenceless. ( Huang, using Pai 
Ch'ung-hsi in Canton as a go-between, now laid 
plans for a concerted attack by himself and 
forces from Kwangtung on troops of Shen Hung-ying
pQ
remaining at Wuchow. The attack was launched
in July, and the city taken over quietly on
July 18th. Apparently through the intervention
of an American gunboat lying at Wuchow, Shen’s
commander in the city, Feng PacJt-Ch’u, surrendered
29without a fight. Huang officially Surrendered1 
to the Kuomintang forces at the same time,^ but 
Pai ChVung-hsi, who returned to Wuchow with the 
incoming Cantonese forces, brought with him
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instructions from Sun Yat-sen which made 
Huang commander of the anti-Bandit Army 
(T'ao Tse Chlln) , as Huang's forces were now 
renamed, Huang was to operate in Kwangsi, 
in close liaison with Cantonese troops of the 
1st* Division, who were to be stationed along 
the West River in Kwangtung, as far as Wuchow, 
Their commander was Li Chi-shen, a native of 
Wuchow, who had made his career in the Cantonese 
Army. He was now appointed Behabilitation 
Commissioner for the West River, with his 
headquarters at ChaocJCh’ing. ^  This was the 
start of a long co-operation between Li Chi-shen 
and the emergent leaders of the Kwangsi Clique, 
which eventually led to his complete 
identification with the Clique.
Huang Shao-hsiung intended to use his base 
at Wuchow for further expansion up the West 
River valley into Kwangsi. His rear was secured 
by his entente with Canton, but before he could 
move, he had to secure the base itself, by 
removing Shen Hung-ying's subordinate, Keng 
Rao-ch'u, who was still believed loyal to Shen. 
Reng was arrested at a party on board a local
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' flower-boat1 (i.e. brothel), attended "by all
commanders in the,region, in honour of Teng
Yen-ta, who had come to Wuchow with the
33Cantonese troops. He was thrown into the
vault of the local "bank, and subsequently 
34executed.^
Huang increased his forces after the capture
of Wuchow, by the standard procedure of
amalgamating defeated enemy troops, bringing
his strength up to three regiments, in all
5000 men.^ Pai Ch'ung-hsi was his chief of
staff. The Opium Suppression Board at Wuchow gave
him a substantial income. Control of opium
revenues, that is the ability to tax opium in
transit from Yunnan and Kweichow to Canton, was
the key to success for any militarist in Kwangsi.
Those who won control of a city through which
the opium trade passed found it "far more
advantageous to encourage and tax this industry
36rather than to hinder it".
Huang maintained his connection with Li 
Tsung-jen, though this was now undercover. 
Officially, Li supported Lu Yung-t'ing, who had 
returned from exile in the autumn of 1922,
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establishing himself in his native region of 
Lungchow.^ At the end of 1923» be had built 
his troops up to a point where he felt strong 
enough to return to Nanning, and to his ruined 
mansion at nearby Wuming, which had been sacked 
by Cantonese troops in 1921. He assumed the 
title of tu-pan. H i s  power was centred m  
the south and west of the province, where Li 
Tsung-jen's own satrap lay. Li was not strong 
enough to oppose him; by giving him
superficial support, however, he could maintain
$ ^ 
hiy own independence; he assumed the title of
commander of the 5th Independent Brigade, which
Lu conferred on him. His independence did
not, however, go far enough to allow any open
connection with Huang Shao-hsiung, who was
considered to be in the camp of the Kuomintang,
Lu*s sworn enemy.
Neither Li nor Huang believed that Lu would 
be able to regain overall control of Kwangsi, 
for many of his former subordinates, notably Shen 
Hung-ying, were reluctant to accept his renewed 
authority. Li and Huang believed that their 
future lay in connections with Canton and the
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Kuomintang. For the moment, however, it suited
them to have a foot in both camps. Their own
private alliance must have been widely suspected,
but in an atmosphere of constant shifts in
loyalty, it would have been quite possible to
believe that the apparent split between them
was an actual one, Li can have been no less
reliable than the majority of Lu Yung-t'ing's
subordinates. Li himself claims that Lu trusted
him, and that on his advice, Lu abandoned a
plan for an attack into Kwangtung via Wuchow, and
decided instead to go on 'tour* through the
4-1north and east of Kwangsi. This tour, which 
saved Huang Shao-hsiung at Wuchow from the 
danger of attack by Lu's forces, was Lu's 
undoing.
At Wuchow, Huang was extending his contacts 
with Canton. Farly in 1924-, he went to Canton 
for his first meeting with Sun Yat-sen. The 
material aid which he hoped for, and in pursuit
of which he made suitable declarations of 
revolutionary devotion, was not forthcoming.
Sun made it clear to Huang that true revolutionaries 
must stand on their own feet - perhaps as a
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test: for Huang, who had yet to display any
42revolutionary characteristics. Another year
was to pass before he even joined the 
43Kuomintang. There were other, more 
influential Kwangsi generals in Canton, the 
mercenaries. who had helped to bring Sun Xat-sen 
bach to power in 1923. They probably prevented 
the Kuomintang from financing their fellow- 
provincials, whose activities in Kwangsi they
/ i  / i
regarded as threatening to themselves.
By early 1924, Li and Huang, though still not 
openly allied, had consolidated their hold on 
lower Kwangsi, and by crushing a minor warlord 
who held an area between them on the West River, 
had linked their two domains firmly together.^
In a pincer action from east and west, they 
squeezed the offending warlord out; their troops 
met at Peng^liua on the West River, the former 
Chinot'ien, the starting point of the Taiping 
Rebellion.
At this moment, the power balance in Kwangsi 
suddenly shifted violently. Troops of Shen 
Hung-ying besieged Lu Tung-t'ing at Kweilin. Lu 
had left on his tour in January 1924, taking with
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4-6him a guard of 2000 men* After discussions 
on the Hunan border with representatives of 
Chao Heng-t'i, the Hunan tuchun, and advocate 
of federalism, concerning a possible joint 
attack into Kwangtung, he made his way to 
Kweilin, which was again controlled by Shen 
Hung-ying. Lu apparently believed that Shen 
was still subservient to him; he entered tie 
city, and ordered Shen's troops to withdraw, 
which they obediently did* They returned,
however, in the middle of April, and besieged 
the city.
The two strongest forces in Kwangsi were 
neutralised* The siege promised to be a long 
one* The topography of the Kweilin region 
made it difficult to attack, the small plains, 
dominated by weird, sheer-sided hills, were 
easily defended. The besiegers were safe from 
attack by the reinforcements which Lu Yung-t'ing 
immediately sent for. None of the four armies 
which he summoned - two from Kwangsi, two from 
Hunan, one commanded by his adopted son,
Ma-Chi - were able to break through to his
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rescue, The besieged on the other hand were 
safe behind the thick walls of the city. Their 
main enemy was to be hunger.
The siege started gaily, with a New Year 
celebration in which fire-crackers competed with
ZlQ
the sound of gunfire. But as food supplies
dwindled, it became increasingly unpleasant.
Lu Yung-t1ing was impatient to be out, and had
himself carried on to the wall, where ,Trifle
in hand the old man...fired away at the foe".^
The foreigh community was brought low by the
death of the Reverend Cunningham, struck down
by a stray bullet. His death occasioned the
appearance of posters which proclaimed: "Jesus
G-od was not a strong spirit, that one of his
SOmissionaries has been killed1.1-^ An attempt by
a group of missionaries from Wuchow, led by the
flamboyant !Cowboy missionary1, Rex Ray of
Texas, to break through to their besieged
brethren ended in their own capture by bandits,
and to an incident whose settlement involved the
SIexecution of a large number of Chinese.
The siege lasted three months. By the time 
it neared its end, Lu Yung-t'ing‘s authority
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in the province had effectively been eroded; 
the time had come for Li Tsung-jen to break 
with him. Li now renamed his army tiie Army to 
Settle Kwangsi (Ting-Kuei Ghun),^  and in June, 
he and Huang Shao-hsiung launched a joint 
expedition against the provincial capital, Hanning.
Strategically, their task was easy; the bulk
of Lu's forces were in the Kweilin region,
attempting to extricate him from the city.^ Bdt
84*both had misapprehensions about attacking Lu;^ 
they regarded him as a worthier man than Shen 
Hung-ying, their other potential candidate for 
attack; it went against the grain to attack Lu 
rather than Shen. But this was no timo^or 
moral scruples, and Li and Huang found it 
within themselves to overcome them. They reached 
an accommodation with Shen whereby they would 
join with him to take the important city of 
Liuchow, in central Kwangsi, from L u . ^
For their attack on Nanning, Li and Huang
86marshalled about 8000 troops.* Huang 
commandeered a large number of boats at Wuchow 
to transport his men up river; additional 
financing was taken care of by a grant from
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Ganton of 30^000 yilan.*^ Foreign sources
believed that the attack was ordered by Sun
58 59Yat-sen, and it certainly had his support-;
nevertheless, the troops of Li and Huang were
still fighting under the personal banners of
the two jaen.^
In the event, the Cattle' for Hanning was
fought and won before Li and Huang arrived.
Ihe local Chamber of Commerce paid Lu Yung-t'ing's
forces in the city 30,000 yuan to evacuate
peacefully. T 1 an Hao-ming, the local commander
(and Lu Yung-t'ing's brother-in-law), retired
it
to Lungchow. Lin Chun-t'ing, the illiterate 
governor, whom Lu had permitted to retain his 
sinecure after Lu's return to Nanning the year
before, had earlier moved down into the Nan-Lu
area of Kwangtung, where he teamed up with a
group of anti-Kuomintang militarists.
Having gained Nanning, Li and Huang sent
troops, under Pai Ch'ung-hsi, to attack Liuchow
in conjunction with Shen Hung-ying, who had
already raised the siege of Kweilin; the town
62fell in August.
Other troops of Li and Huang continued the 
campaign up river to Lungchow. Although
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resistance was expected in this region - the
officers of the attacking army took their
coffins with them - the defenders fled into
Tongking, commandeering a fleet of taxis which
had recently started operating between Lungchow
and Langsom, over the border, along a road
which Lu Yung-t'ing had built, perhaps just
for this purpose. The French consul made a
large amount of money by extending consular
territory to cover an assortment of buildings,
where he housed such of the terrified local
63inhabitants as could pay the entrance fee. ^
The final consolidation of Kwangsit- The 
emergent Kwangsi Clique had won quick success 
from their first major campaign. Except at 
Liuchow, their forces were scarcely extended. 
Part of the reason for their easy victories 
lay in their reputation as formidable fighters, 
which proceeded them, and struck fear into 
their enemies. The continuing unity between 
Li, Pai and Huang gave them an advantage over 
other warlords; instead of one man dominating 
a group of subordinates, these three men acted 
as a team. Their unity was founded on their
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common "backgrounds and experience, and on 
ties of friendship; it was also "based on 
the realisation that none of them would ever 
come to anything without the others, and that 
their forces were too small for them to 
operate singly. The three men's characters 
complemented each other: Huang supplied the 
dash and daring that was necessary to allow 
any advance, and Li the caution which prevented 
Huang from over-reaching himself, while Pai 
brought to the group the military skill which 
gave them victory on the battle-field. Pai 
was undoubtedly one of the best field 
commanders of his generation in the whole of 
Ghina, and in Kwangsi he was in a class of his 
own. Their unity was strained immediately after 
the capture of Hanning. In $uly, 1924-, a 
joint Headquarters was set up at Nanning, 
under which the two armies of Li and Huang were 
officially amalgamated for the first time.
Li Tsung-jen became commander in chief, and Huang 
his deputy. Huang appears to have resented his 
lower status. However, he realised that a split 
at this stage would cost them all that they had
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won to date; he swallowed his pride, and
dramatically smashed his wine-glass as a pledge
of his loyalty to Li, daring the banquet to
celebrate the establishment of the new
65headquarters, ^
In spite of their success, there was no
time to relax; threats were looming from
several directions, There were many small
militarists still to be dealt with; Shen
Hung-ying was a dubious ally; and an attack
from Xannan seemed likely. The first threat
that had to be dealt with was not, however, a
military one. It concerned the nature of their
relationship with Canton.
Sun-’Tat-sen was desperately trying to
curtail the power of his Xunnanese and Kwangsi
allies in Canton, who now dominated the city
and its revenues. It seemed an attractive idea
to send Liu Chen-huan, the Kwangsi commander
in Canton, back bo Kwangsi, and to make him
govenor of Kwangsi. Sun ordered his appointment
to this post in November, 1924, shortly before
66his own departure for Peking. Li and Huang
89
could not accept this solution to Sun's problem;
they were indignant at this response to their
efforts to unify Kwangsi, which they had believed
wuuld lead them into closer co-operation with the
Kuomintang, Rather than accept Liu as govenor,
they named themselves Rehabilitation Commissioner
and Deputy Commissioner (Shan-hou Tu-pan, Hui-pan)
of Kwangsi, a few days after Sun had made Liu's 
67appointment. f Huang then went down to Canton 
for consultations with Hu Han-min, who was 
temporarily in charge of Kuomintang affairs 
during Sun's absence. On Huang's insistence, 
the leaders of the Kuomintang accepted the 
principle that he and Li Tsung-jen, of all the 
Kwangsi leaders within and without the province, 
would have sole right to Kuomintang recognition 
and support. Their new appointments were confirmed, 
and Huang returned to Hanning, where he and Li 
officially tockup their new posts; their armies 
were renamed the 1st. and 2nd, Kwangsi Armies.
The Kuomintang was forced to shelve the problem
of the Kwangsi forces in Canton, and to abandon
the plan of malting Liu Chen-huan governor of 
68Kwangsi. The new relationship between Li and
90
Huang knd the Kuomintang was symbolised by
Huang*s action in joining the Kuomintang, which
he did at a special ceremony while he was in 
69Ganton. The recognition given to Li and Huang
also represented an explicit rejection of Shen
Hung-ying, who, although still technically allied
to Li and Huang, was given no official recognition.
The alliance had never been regarded as anything
more than temporary, and now that Lu Tung-tfing
was defeated, war was anticipated between Li
70and Huang, and Shen.f
At the beginning of 1925, Kwangsi entered
into its fifth consecutive year of civil war.
The province was overburdened with troops; there
were possibly as many as 100,000 men under arms
which put the province in the same class as
rich and populous provinces such as Kwangtung,
71Szechwan, Kiangsu, Chihli and Hupei. The trade 
of the province was still badly disrupted, and 
the various currencies in circulation were 
completely unstable. Bandits still controlled 
most of the rural areas of the province, while 
the cities were periodically looted by warlord
91 '■
armies. The populations of the cities suffered 
terribly during the sieges which warlords 
resorted to from time to time, and from the
72occasional use of arson as a military tactic.
Alongside the impending war with Shen Hung-ying, 
a threat was building up from Yunnan. Sun Yat-sen 
had made T 1 ang Ohi-yao, the ruler of Yunnan,
Deputy Grand Marshal^ in September 1924, before 
his departure for Peking, in an attempt to obtain 
a measure of unity in the South-West before 
launching his Northern Expedition, which got 
under way in November. T 1ang was however more 
interested in expanding his own influence and 
that of the federalist movement,^ with which he 
was then involved; he saw Sun*s absence from 
Canton as a chance for him to move into Kwangtung,^ 
The route to Kwangtung lay through Kwangsi.
T'ang moved troops to Pose in January 1925, 
but was delayed there while he attempted to dispose 
of a large stock of opium, with which he 
proposed to finance his expedition,^ This 
delay gave Li, Huang and Pai a chance to start 
their attack on Shen Hung-ying.
Shen struck first, attacking in strength
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"between Wuchow and Nanning, in the hope of
dividing the forces of Li and Huang* His attack
was driven hack, due in part to the spontaneous
flight of a large section of Shen's army, who
took the repositioning of one of their own
76,
gun "batteries to be a sign for retreat* Shen1 s 
forces put up a better fight for Liuchow, 
which nevertheless fell in February* Kweilin 
was abandoned and occupied by Pai Chfung-hsi; 
the region north of Wuchow was secured by a 
combined Cantonese/Kwangsi e^qpedition from 
Wuchow. ^
Before the campaign against Shen was 
finished, Li and Huang were forced to withdraw 
troops to meet T'ang Chi-yao, whose troops 
took Nanning in j$iid*~February, at about the same 
time as Pai Ch*ung-hsi entered Kweilin. The 
small body of troops guarding Nanning withdrew 
w it hout a f i ght.
In response to urgent appeals from Kwangsi, 
Canton sent the 2nd« Yunnanese Army, long 
stationed in Kwangtung, to their aid. This 
army was commanded by Fan Shi hr-sh eng, an old 
enemy of T 1 an^  Chi-yao. He entered Kwangsi in
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early March, and advanced up river towards 
Nanning with Huang Shao-hsiung. Between them 
they had 20,000 men, plus a quantity of 
supplies from Kwangtung;^ at ihe beginning 
of April, they laid siege to Nanning.
The withdrawal of troops from the campaign 
against Shen Hung-ying, before he had been 
finally defeated, allowed him to counter-attack 
in March and recapture Kweilin. At the same time, 
Han Ts'ai-feng, a former subordinate of 
Lu Yung-tfing, attacked Liuchow, but was driven 
off after heavy fighting. Kweilin was soon 
recaptured by Pai Ch'ung-h&i, but not until it 
had been thoroughly looted by Shen Hung-ying*s 
troops, who had earlier looted Liuchow.^ The 
people of the cities of Kwangsi were undergoing 
greater hardship than at any time since the 
Cantonese invasion of 1921. Nanning, under 
siege, had become na city of mourning".
In March, on the death of Sun Yat-sen,
T ’ang -Chi-yao announced his intention of 
succeeding Sun as Grand Marshal^. His announcement 
provoked immediate condemnation from the
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Kuomintang. Although superficially T 1ang 
appeared to have a good deal of strength in 
the South-West, and was seen "by some foreign
QT
newspapermen as the "saviour from bolshevism" 
he was actually beset with difficulties. He 
had withdrawn troops from Kweichow for his 
attack into Kwangsi, and now found his own rear 
threatened by an attack from local Kweichow 
troops. An attack on Liuchow ended disastrously; 
three thousand Yunnanese were killed on the 
battlefield, or drowned in the river into which
o p
they were driven by victorious Kwangsi troops.
In June, T'ang's potential Yunnanese and Kwangsi
allies in Canton, Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan
were crushed by Kuomintang forces* The Yunnanese
besieged in Nanning were increasingly weakened
by hunger and disease, as were the townspeople.
The Yunnanese were, according to missionaries in
the city incredibly dirty and uncouth, and their
heavy death roll from illness was due in part to
8?>filth of their living conditions. ^ In July, the 
Yunnanese wege finally broken out of the siege, 
and made their way hack to Yunnan, pursued by
95
84Fan Shih-sheng. The province of Kwangsi, exhausted 
after five years of continuous civil war was unified 
under the control of the new Kwangsi Clique - Li 
Tsung-gen, Huang Shao-hslung and Pai Ch* ung-hsi. 
Alliance with Kwangtungs- They had completed the 
first - and at this stage probably the only - part 
of their grand design. They had become rulers of 
their native province, province, provincial warlords. 
Their power and authority were entirely based on 
the armies they commanded5 no civilian authority 
was functioning 9 except the Customs, which was run
by func t i oning, excapiLj^e^n^^ms— whlehr-wa-s-^ -un
by foreign nationals. Their adhievement differed 
little from that of other men who had fought their 
way to the top in one province, except in that the 
situation in Kwangsi had been so confused for so 
long: there were so many petty militarists, that
their struggle for power had been rather more 
protracted and arduous than it might have been if 
they had only had to overthrow one strong man.
But there were some striking features about 
Li and Iiuang, and their immediate supporters.
They were still very young 5 none of them was mukh 
over thirty. Their military education had made 
them aware of the need to train their soldiers 
properly, and they devoted a great deal of time 
to this. They differed most noticeably from
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more traditional warlords, in that they were 
not impervious to the modern ideas and ideologies 
abroad in China. Their horizons had been 
extended beyond the borders of their own 
province^ by their birth, into educated if 
declining families, which gave them some 
pretensions to the universal values of 
Confucianism; by their education, which 
introduced them to new ideas on the role of 
the soldier; and by their contacts with 
revolutionary ideas, as in 1911, when Huang 
and Pai went to Wuchang with a student corps.
They had lost the unthinking provincialism 
of men such as Lu Yung-t'ing, for whom Kwangsi 
had been the world, but on the other hand, they 
had far stronger connections with the province, 
and identification with it than the most 
distinguished contemporary Kwangsi natives,
1
Ts'en Ch’uen-hsuan, whose roots were clearly 
national and cultural, not provincial. Li, Huang 
and Pai were uncomfortable amalgams of petty 
provincial warlords, and young aien with modern 
nationalist leanings. The only way out of this
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predicament was to accept the position they 
had won for themselves, and to try and cover it 
with more seemly clothing, that is to associate 
tlieir warlord dominions with a modern, nationalist 
group outside the province. They would offer 
their military strength to an alliance, in 
return for achieving respectability as members 
of a national group. This need not, and did 
not, entail any loss in real power, or in 
real control, over their province. Geographically, 
traditionally and economically, as well as 
politically, the only choice for Kwangsi was 
an association with the Kwangtung of the 
Kuomintang.
It appeared, in the summer of 1925? that 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi were about to form an 
alliance. From the start of their careers as 
independant military leaders, Li and Huang 
had formed their main external connections with 
the Kuomintang. They had sent representatives 
to the Aftermath Conference (Shan-hoiL Hui-^i), 
organised by the Tuan Ch’i-jui in Peking, in 
early 1925? but this was the only sign of 
interest in external contacts elsewhere. The
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Kuomintang had given Li and Huang significant 
help in the past, and now seemed prepared to 
enter into a formal unison. In his speech to 
the newly formed Military Committee of the
Kai-shek outlined plans which called for the 
complete unification of the two provinces. He 
saw Kwangsi as the first stepping stone on 
the route of a future northern expedition, 
and therefore proposed the establishment of 
military schools, arsenals and even an 
aeroplane factory in Kwangsi, in the Kweilin 
region. Strategic roads linking the two
the geographic importance of Kwangsi for 
Kwangtung, and to its ’’very close connection 
with revolutionary history”, to which he added 
the loyalty of its present leaders to Canton.
He also made it clear that such an al liance 
would involve the incorporation of Kwangsi's 
armies into the Kuomintang Army on an absolute 
basis. His tone was severe; he was not 
offering an alliance of equals, but the submission
National Government on July 6th 1925? Chiang
provinces would be built.
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86of the one to the other. Many Kuomintang 
leaders in Canton were not convinced of the 
purity of the motives of the new Kwangsi 
leaders in entering an alliance with the Canton, 
and would not trust them except in a subsidiary
Qr?
position. (
Nevertheless, moves were made to prepare
for an alliance. On August 6th, the Kuomintang
Government at Canton ordered Li Tsung-jen
and Huang Shao-hsiung to take charge of all
affairs in Kwangsi, in the name of rehabilitation,
88preparatory to reorganisation. At the same 
time, Li Chi-shen visited Nanning, to discuss 
full-scale unification, and Kwangsi participation 
on a future northern expedition.
89fhe Kwangsi leaders accepted his proposals.
Wang Ching-wei also visited Kwangsi in the
90summer of 1925 for similar discussions.
But the assasination of Liao Chung-kfai at 
the end of August and the start of the second 
Eastern Expedition against Ch'en Chiung-ming 
diverted Kuomintang attention from matters of 
less urgency, and for a time there was no further
progress towards unification.
It is also probable that the Kwangsi 
leaders were deterred by the demand that 
they surrender sovereignty over their armies. 
Their whole position within their province 
depended on their armies5 it was one thing 
to put them at the service of an ally, another 
to hand over control completely.
The question of unification was shelved.
In September, Kwangsi set up a Civil Affairs
Office, to run the province, headed by Huang
Shao-hsiung. This organisation was independant
of Canton, and kept Kwangsi*s internal affairs
firmly in Kwangsi hands. Co-operation and
Collaboration between Kwangtung and Kwangsi
did exist, however, in two fields. Kwangsi
followed Kwangtung *s lead izyibupporting the
anti-foreign strike and boycott then in
progress, especially in Hong Kong and Canton,
and in encouraging the anti-foreigh and
anti-imperialist movement, within Kwangsi.
In the Cantonese-dominated city of Wuchow,
the boycott was *rigid,f. Servants and food
were withdrawn from the local Japanese Customs 
91officials. The Labour Federation, which had
been organised in Wuchow in December 1924, was 
strong enough to demand compulsory union 
membership. It was also strong enough to 
oblige the local military authorities to 
arrest vessels suspected of breaking the boycott. 
British residents were withdrawn from Wuchow 
on the advice of their consul there, in July,
and shortly afterwards the consulate was
93wrecked by a mob. Demonstrations by workers 
and students echoed those in other parts of 
China. Even in Nanning, remote from Cantonese
influence, a workers1 syndicate was formed
94in the summer of 1925* It was believed by
foreigners that Li Tsung-Jen and his colleagues
95had become bolsheviks. ^ Anti-foreign agitation
was worst along the West River, but the wave of
hatred for foreigners spread throughout the
province, even into the remote areas on the
96Kweichow border.
The demonstrations and boycotts were 
tolerated and in many cases encouraged by the 
new rulers of Kwangsi; in February 1926, Huang 
.Shao-hsiung personally led a demonstration to
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97the catholic mission in Nanning. r But
although resident foreigners felt that the
,!red peril" had arrived in Kwangsi, the
Cantonese authorities did not share their
feelings about mass action in the province.
The manifesto of the 2nd Kuomintang Congress,
held in January 1926, reported that the
mass movements in Kwangsi were poorly developed,
and that they had not yet established a
98proper revolutionary base. The mass 
movements were prevented from developing 
independant bases, and though encouraged by the 
rulers of Kwangsi, they were also carefully 
channeled and directed, into anti-foreignism, 
which was quite harmless to the Kwangsi 
authorities, and away from social questions, 
which might have threatened the position of
the Kwangsi rulers.
On the military fron^, Kwangsi forces 
took part in two campaigns, which, though 
less important than the Eastern Expedition 
against Ch'en Chiung-ming, played an important
103
role in the unification of Kwangtung itself* 
Having built up large forces to fight their 
internal enemies, the Kwangsi leaders now had 
surplus military capacity, which they could
deploy to aid their neighbour, especially
when, as in these two campaigns, their own
interests were directly involved.
The first campaign, against Hsiung Ko-wu,
took place in the Horth River valley of
Kwangtung. Hsiung had long-standing connections
with the Kuomintang, and was currently a member
99of the Central Executive Committee. After a 
chequered career in his native Szechwan, where
t
he had been for some time tuchun, he was driven 
from Szechwan into Hunan, in 1925. In the 
summer of 1925> he was on the move again, this
time into K#angtung, prodded by the Hunan tuchun,
Chao Heng-t'i, who wanted him out of his
p r o v i n c e . T h e  Kwangsi leaders did not
hinder his passage through north Kwangsi into 
101Kwangtung but when, in September, Hsiung went 
to Canton, and was arrested on suspicion of 
being in collusion with Ch’en Ch'iung-ming, they
104
sent troops into Kwangtung and mopped up 
his troops.
The second campaign involving Kwangsi
troops was in the Han-lu area of south
Kwangtung. Here, three former subordinates of
Lu Xung-t'ing, Teng Pen-yin, Shen Pao-i and
Lin Chun-t'ing controlled several hsien, and
102had established a new 'province',;, Kwangnan.
As long as these men remained independant, they 
offered a threat both to Canton, and to Kwangsi, 
their native province. At the end of 1925, a 
combined Kwangtung/Kwangsi campaign was launched 
against them. Kwangsi troops attacked south 
from Kwangsi, while Cantonese troops moved west 
along the coast. By December, all important 
points on the mainland had fallen, and by 
January 1926, Hainan Island had also fallen.
Some of the defeated troops from this 
campaign were incorporated into the Kwangsi 
armies; their contribution to the strength of 
the Kwangsi armies was less, however, than that 
of the arms captured from them and from Hsiung 
K'o-wu. Kwangsi was still largely dependant 
on external supplies of armaments; her own
arsenal at Kueiping appears only to have
103produced bullets. J With the end of the Nan-bu
campaign, Kwangtung was completely reunified
for the first time under the Kuomintang. The
time had come for the Kuomintang to expand
beyond Kwangtung, Negotiations started again
to bring Kwangsi into a full alliance with 
104Kwangtung. At the end of January, as a
prelude to formal negotiations, Wang Ching-wei,
chairman of the Ganton government, and
T'an Yen-k'ai paid a courtesy visit to Wuchow.
The two men made a round of speeches and visits,
and were rapturously received by the citizens
of Wuchow. Informal discussions were held
with Kwangsi leaders - "they exchanged ideas
105on co-operation". ^ The Kwangsi leaders 
again signified their desire for co-operation, 
and their willingness to participate in a 
northern expedition."**^ It remained only to 
draw up a detailed agreement. It was decided 
that Pai Ch'ung-hsi should go down to Ganton, 
to negotiate individual points, and to act as 
chief Kwangsi delegate on the Kwangtung/Kwangsi 
Unification Committee, which was set up shortly
106
afterwards in Canton,
Pai Ch'ung-hsi arrived in Canton in
February. If he had hoped for a quick settlement,
he was disappointed; negotiations did not go
smoothly. There were three main points of
dissension; the number of armies which Kwangsi
would contribute to the National Revolutionary
Army; financial aid from Kwangtung, and army
pay. Kwangsi wanted two armies, the 7th and
8th Armies of the National Revolutionary Army,
while Canton wanted Kwangsi to have only\o.ne,
the 7th. Kwangsi wanted financial aid from
Kwangtung, which Kwangtung felt unable to give;
Canton felt that soldiers should be paid 10 y\ian
per month, which Kwangsi could not afford to
107pay without financial aid. r Deadlock was 
reached, and Pai returned to Kwangsi at the 
end of February. The suspicion was strengthened 
in Canton that all Kwangsi really wanted was 
financial aid from Kwangtung.
The Kwangsi leaders were determined to 
continue negotiations. They drew up a new set 
of pre-conditions to an alliance, whex^eby they 
undertook to finance themselves independently, 
provided that they were allowed to establish
107
two armies.
In March, Huang Shao-hsiung went down to 
Canton to continue negotiations, and an 
agreement was finally reached, but not on 
Kwangsi terms. Only one army was established, 
the 7th Army, No definite arrangement was 
reached about financial matters, though some 
money was promised. Half of Kwangsi's troops 
were put into the new 7ik Army, commanded by 
Li fsung-jen; the rest remained under the 
control of the Kwangsi Military Bureau, and 
were later formed into the 15th Army.
On March 15th,^official act of unification 
was passed by the Central Political Committee
Kwangsi with a crowd of young political workers, 
and an incompetent Russian adviser, Mamaey, a 
former steel-worker.
The unification was achieved. If it caused 
any excitement in Canton at the time, it was 
overshadowed almost immediately by the Chung-shan 
Incident, for in the Chung-shan incident, crucial 
questions of revolutionary direction were 
involved, while revolutionary considerations 
were hardly uppermost in the Kwangtung/Kwangsi
109in Canton. y Huang Shao-hsiung returned to
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alliance. Kwangtung needed allies, so did 
Kwangsi. By linking Kwangsi to tlie ideology 
of the Kuomintang, by enrolling their armies 
into the Kuomintang en masse, as the leap in 
Kwangsi party enrollment between 1925 and 1926 
indicate that they did,110 the Kwangsi leaders 
stood a greater chance of maintaining their 
position within their own province, where 
revolutionary ideas had already gained ground.
It was a marriage of convenience, and a quiet 
one at that. Ganton was seething with its own 
problems. Li, Huang and Pai looked quizzically 
at the factions and cliques of Canton, and 
tightened their own unity, laying the foundation 
of their own clique.
Three months after the signing of the act 
of unification, Kwangsi forces were already in 
action on the northern Expedition. Over the 
next three years, Li Tung-jen and Pai Qh'ung-hsi 
carved out for themselves careers on the 
national stage. But they kept their base 
inviolate, under the control of Huang Shao-hsiung. 
When they were forced to retire there in 1929* 
they reverted to the roles they had shunned in 
1926 - provincial warlords. They had cause to
be grateful that the unification of 1926 had been 
so sketchy, and that the Kuomintang had failed
to establish any real authority in the province*
The alliance with Kwangsi was the first 
which the Kuomintang government made with another 
province. For a variety of reasons - lack of 
time, lack of resources, lack of funds, the 
relative unimportance of Kwangsi^ the Kuomintang 
failed to establish any significant measure 
of control over Kwangsi. This set a pattern 
for the subsequent treatment of provinces which 
came into the Kuomintang fold. In almost every 
case, government of the province was entrusted 
to existing provincial power holders, a tacit 
recognition of the inability of the Kuomintang 
government to impose any other settlement in 
the first instance.
In Kwangsi, the first addition to the 
Kwangtung base, the Kuomintang ignored, in practice, 
the question of real unity. It would have been 
difficult for it to have done anything else.
Ganton could send a few young activists to 
encourage political work, but could not force 
the submission of pro-Kuomintang militarists who 
wished to maintain their independence, short of
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waging war on them; and the Kuomintang was 
not strong enough to fight its allies, 
however dubious their allegiance*
CHAPTER IV*
KWANGSI AND THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION*
The ICwangsi militarists were the first 
militarists not based in Kwangtung to ally 
themselves with the Kuomintang* Their alliance 
with the Kuomintang grew out of their discomfiture 
as petty militarists, out of the traditional 
links between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and out of 
their need to strengthen their position within 
Kwangsi through external allies. Their position 
in relation to the Kuomintang was singular in 
that, because there was a disproportionate 
number of soldiers within the province after 
five years of civil war, and because of the 
very close relationship between the three 
Kwangsi leaders, they could afford to operate on 
behalf of the Kuomintang outside their province, 
without losing control of it; two of the three 
could leave the province, and confidently 
leave the control of their base to the third*
T*ang Shen^-Chih and the Kuomintang; T 1 ang 
Shen^-chih of Hunan was the second warlord convert 
to the Kuomintang. His activities in Hunan 
during the first four months of 1926, and his 
alliance with Canton, were crucial factors in
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the Kuomintang decision to launch the Northern 
Expedition in the summer of the year. The 
Kwangsi leaders played an important part in the 
obscure and complicated negotiations which led 
up to 'Pang's entry into the Kuomintang camp.
Pang was an amalgam of the traditional 
and the modern, a graduate of the Paoting 
Academy, but also a devout Buddhist, strongly 
influenced by his personal priest, Ku Tzu-t'ung.*^ 
He was one of four division commanders whose 
forces made up the Hunan Army, and Shan-hou Tupan 
for South Hunan, though his influence extended 
into the other divisions through the old-school 
network o^5?aoting.^ T !ang was an ambitious man, 
and he wanted to take over the whole of Hunan.
But first he had to secure defensive alliances 
with militarists in neighbouring provinces, 
especially with Pang Pen-jen in Kiangsiy and toffo 
Kwangsi. An alliance with Kwangtung was unlikely, 
since the Kuomintang Army contained two Hunanese 
units, under f a n  Yen-kai and Ch'eng Ch'ien, who 
were old enemies of fang's. His first overtures 
to the Kwangsi leaders were made in the winter 
of 1925, without any apparent outcome*^ Then, in 
January 1926, a further Hunanese delegate
appeared in Wuchow. fhis man, Yeh Ch'i, was a 
Kwangsi native who had made his career in the 
Hunan Army; he was also a t ' ung-h.sia.ng of 
Huang Shao-hsiung, and a Paoting classmate of 
both Huang and Pai Ch'ung-hsi.^ He was therefore 
an ideal go-between for talks about the formation 
of a Hunan/Kwangsi alliance. As it turned out, 
Yeh's visit bo Wuchow was to have a direct 
influence on the formation of fang's alliance 
with the Kuomintang, though this was not his 
original mission.
Yeh was representing not f a n g  Sheng-chih,
6but Chao Heng-t'i. He had come to Wuchow to 
follow up his visit to Hanning in the summer of 
1925, when he had brought to the Kwangsi leaders
Chao's proposal that they take up the Federalist
n
cause. In 1925, Federalism was a strong enough 
force in South China to force the Kwangsi leaders 
to take overtures from Chao Heng-t'i seriously, 
and this may explain why there was a delay in 
their reaching a settlement with the Kuomintang. 
At the same time, the possibility of Kwangsi 
forming an alliance with the Federalist forces, 
which would put the Kuomintang at great 
disadvantage, probably encouraged the Kuomintang
to make its own alliance with Kwangsi. Chao
had a strong personal claim on the Kwangsi
leaders - he had been their teacher. Chao
was in Kwangsi around the time of the 1911
Revolution, working in various military schools,
and had played an important part in the revolutionary
o
movement in the province.
What changed the nature of Yeh Ch'i's visit 
to Wuchow, and helped to secure T 'ang Sheng-chih's 
entry into the Kuomintang camp, was that it 
coincided fortuitously with the visit of Wang 
Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders, who had 
come to establish the basis of Kwangsi's 
alliance with the Kuomintang. Yeh was impressed 
with the pro-Kuomintang demonstrations which he 
saw in Wuchow, and with the new-found revolutionary 
zeal of the Kwangsi leaders, and wavered in his 
own support of Federalism. The Kwangsi leaders 
then forced his hand by spreading rumours that 
he had come to negotiate T'ang's alliance \*ith 
the Kuomintang. Yeh was put in the position of 
appearing to represent T'ang while in fact 
representing Chao, and was obliged to change his 
allegiance to T'ang. To reinforce his change in 
loyalty, he was taken down to Canton and given an
10official reception at Whampao.
T'ang Sheng-chih., who found himself allied
to the Kuomintang without ever having intended
such a development, saw no harm in it once it
had occurred- Strategically, it was convenient,
since it protected his rear. From January on,
his connection with Oanton was common knowledge,
and it spurred his attack on Chao Heng-t'i, a
hitter opponent of the Kuomintang. In March, he
launched an attack north from his base in
South Hunan, Two of the other three Hunan
divisions remained neutral, and the third was
easily swept back. T'ang took Ch'angsha on
March 16th, and soon held the whole Hsiang
Valley as far as Yochow.
It now became clear that T'ang did not
intend his 'alliance' with the Kuomintang to
hamper his own ambitions as far as Hunan was
concerned. He adopted the slogan of the provincial
11warlord, 1pao-ching-an-min*, had himself
proclaimed govenor of Hunan, undertook to
uphold the federalist provincial constitution
of Hunan and denied all connection with the 
12Kuomintang. He sent an emissary to Wuhan to
try and secure Wu F'ei-fu's non-intervention in
116
Hunan, and also tried negotiating through the
13consular body there.
T'ang was not strong enough to maintain his
position in Hunan, for Wu had decided to throw
his considerable strength behing Chao, and help
him to win back the province. Chao still had
support in West Hunan, and T'ang knew that he
could not resist the combined forces of Chao and
Wu. He now needed help from Kwangtung, and when
Pai Ch'ung* and Ch'en Ming-shu visited him late
in March, he assured them of his sincerity and of
14-his loyalty to the Kuomintang.
The start of the Northern Expedition: -
T'ang was driven back as easily as he had
advanced, when the counter-attack started early
in April, and by the beginning of May he was
back at Hengyang, where he held the enemy on the
15edge of the hills. Although T'ang managed
to halt the enemy advance, he was still under 
heavy pressure, and had lost his protective 
cover in Kiangsi, where IP' ei-fu had engineered 
the downfall of Pan^ Pen-j en. He called 
desperately for aid from Kwangtung, which Canton 
was obliged to offer him, since his defeat would
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leave them face to face with Wu P'ei-fu. On 
April 24th, a meeting of military leaders in
17Ganton decided to send troops to T'ang*s aid, (
Canton could raise such troops from two 
sources: either from the 2nd. and 6th Armies, the 
troops of Tan Yen-k'ai and Ch'eng Gh'ien, then 
stationed in North Kwangtung; or from the Kwangsi 
7th Army. There were two objections to sending 
the Hunanese troops: in the first place they 
were not good fighting forces, and in the second
18they were totally unacceptable to T'ang Sheng-chih.
The enmity he felt for these exiled Hunanese
equalled that which he felt for Wu P'ei-fu, and
there was a danger that he would chose to submit
to Wu rather than have them back in Hunan.
The Kwangsi forces, on the other hand, were
acceptable to T'ang and were already mobilised
on the border between Hunan and Kwangsi. At the
Wuchow Conference in January, Li Tsung-jen had
proposed sending two Kwangsi brigades into 
19Hunan y and had moved troops up to the Hunan
20border when T'ang first started north. Heavy
recruiting had been going on in Kwangsi since 
21January. Kwangsi's build-up was not disinterested. 
Defeated Kwangsi troops had fled into Hunan at
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the time of the reunification of the province in
19255 and. were serving under Chao Heng-t'i and
Wu P'ei-fu. Wu was negotiating with Kwangsi1s
most powerful enemy, T'ang Chi-yao of Yunnan to
launch a two-pronged attack on Kwangsi from
funnan and Hunan, if his expedition into Hunan 
22succeeded.^" T'ang Sheng-chihi provided a bulwark 
between the Kwangsi troops in Hunan and Kwangsi 
itself, and Kwangsi was obliged to give aid to 
T'ang to protect it.
It was thus in the interest both of the 
Kuomintang and of Kwangsi that the 7th Army should 
go to the aid of T'ang. The Kuomintang Military 
Committee ordered Kwangsi troops into Hunan in 
the first week of May. ^
The northern Expedition had long been the
chief military aim of the Kuomintang, and Sun
Yat-sen, whenever he returned to Canton, had tried
to launch a northern Expedition. Sun's troops
had never advanced far beyond Kwangtung, because of
the weakness of his armies, and because of betrayals
in the rear. The feorganised Kuomintang had
set about organising a Party Army, which would be
able to spearhead an expedition, and securing 
Kwangtung firmly, so that the expedition would
not be betrayed from the rear, The second of 
these conditions was fulfilled when the last 
opposition in Kwangtung was crushed at the end 
of 1925* but there was still considerable doubt 
as to whether the Kuomintang was strong enough, 
Wilitarilly and economically, to launch an 
expedition in early 1926. Nevertheless, the
i
Ganton Government issued a manifesto denouncing
the northern warlords Wu P'ei-fu and Ghang
Tso-lin on February 25th, an action tantamount
24*to a declaration of war. The Kuomintang,
however, was not united in its desire for an
expedition at this time. Ohiang Kai-shek had
been calling for an early start since the 2nd.
25Congress in January, ^ but his enthusiasm was 
not shared by the Left-Wing or the Communists. 
Their hand was forced, however, first by Chiang's 
successful coup of March 20th, which brought 
him absolute control over the Kuomintang armies, 
and caused the departure from Ganton of Wang 
Ghing-wei, the leader of the Left-Kuomintang, 
and second by the southward drive of Wu P'ei-fu, 
and the necessity if created to dispatch 
Kuomintang troops to aid T'ang Sheng-chih; there 
was a strong strategic case for the expansion of
120
the Hunan operation into a full-scale Northern 
26Expedition- Li fsung-jen saw Ghiang Kai-shek 
at Whamp^)/ on May 11th and 12th, and pressed 
him to start the Expedition immediately.^ Li 
was supported by Li Chi-shen, the Ohief-of-Staff 
and commander of the ^th Army, who was also
po
prepared to send troops into Hunan. Chiang Kai-shek
needed little convincing; he realised the
strategic advantages of an immediate start, and
also the unifying force which the Expedition would
exert on the troubled Kuomintang; the Party would
rally behind him as leader of the Expedition. On
May 21st, the 2nd. Plenum of the Kuomintang
Central Executive Committee declared its intention
2Q
of embarking on an immediate expedition. y
Kwangsi troops reached Hengyang on May 12th,
and went into action immediately, helping T'ang
Sheng-chih to push the enemy back over the
Lien Kiver.y Teh Ch’i defected from the enemy
31at the end of May, and at the beginning of
June units of the Ath Army arrived from
Kwangtung. By mid-June, there were 50,000 troops
32under the Kuomintang flag in Hunan. T'ang 
Sheng-chih became the commander of the 8th Army, 
which his army was renamed, and Eield Commander 
(Gh'ien-ti tsung-chih-hui'), of the
Kuomintang forces. The Kuomintang found itself 
in the anomolous position of having its great 
revolutionary undertaking directed, at the 
front, by a man who a few weeks before had been 
a not very distinguished warlord.
At the beginning of July, the Kuomintang 
forces again attacked north, and met with little 
resistance. The floods in Hunan that summer were 
so severe that the opposing armies had not 
expected the Kuomintang to attack, and were
7 7\
caught off-balance.-^ They were forced to 
abandon Ch'angsha, to avoid being trapped there, 
and the city was occupied by the Kuomintang on 
July 10th. Two days later the Northern 
Expedition was officially launched in Canton.
The political workers who followed the
armies north started work at once, organising
mass movements, and bringing together existing
revolutionary organisations in the province.
This work was largely in the hands of low-level
communist and Left-wing Kuomintang cadres, and
was immediately successful. At the top the Hunan
Provincial Committee came into being on July 30th,
34-with T'ang Sheng-chih as chairman. For all 
his status as top Kuomintang man in the province,
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T'ang was not prepared to allow active political 
work in his army. He appointed one of his own 
subordinates, Liu Wen-tao, head of the Political 
Bureau in the 8th Army.,, and continued to 
encourage his troops to worship Buddha rather 
than the Three Principles of the People. ^
After the fall of Oh'angsha, there was a 
hiatus while the next stage of the Expedition 
was planned. Operations continued to mop up 
all of Hunan south of the Tungt'ing Lake, but 
there was no serious fighting. Further Hunanese 
units converted to the Kuomintang, and the armies 
of Kweichow offered their allegiance too. There 
was a possibility that an agreement would be 
reached with the ruler of the five south-eastern 
provinces (Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Fukien and 
Kiangsi) Sun Gh'uan-fang, which would recognise 
his authority over those provinces in return for 
his neutrality towards the Northern Expedition. 
This would have allowed the Kuomintang to move 
directly north, through Wuhan to Peking. A 
series of emissaries from Sun had been to Canton 
from the beginning of the year on, to negotiate 
with the Kuomintang. Sun felt more threatened
by Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-ch'ang to his 
north than by the Kuomintang in the south. ^  The
Kuomintang considered Sun to be more enlightened
than other big warlords, though his rule of the 
five provinces probably fell short of the claims
that it had turned the region into an arcadia
/ tf \ 37Cshih^wai t 1ao-yuan) (
These negotiations broke down when Sun saw
how powerful the Kuomintang was becoming, and
how easily it was attracting converts. He decided
that he could not allow them to get any stronger;
in early September, he issued an ultimatum to
the Kuomintang to withdraw from Hunan, and a few
38days later war started in Kiangsi.
At the beginning of July the Kuomintang's 
main forces in Kwangtung, with the exception of 
the 5th and part of the 4th, which were to 
garrison Kwangtung, were mobilising to move north. 
Chiang Kai-shek was appointed Commander-in-Chief, 
and left Canton at the end of July, for Ch'angsha. 
A top-level military meeting was held there on 
August 13th, at which it was decided to launch 
an immediate expedition against Wuhan, taking 
advantage of Wu Pei-fu's preoccupation with 
Peng X{I-hsiangJ391 The planned attack on Kiangsi
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would be put off until Wuhan had fallen, though
troops coining north from Kwangtung would stay on
the Hunan/Kiangsi border to prevent Sun Chuan-fang
from attacking into Hunan and cutting the Kuomintang
forces in two. The Ghfangsha meeting was
marked by a move by Chiang Kai-shek to impose
his authority on Li Isung~jen and f a n g  Sheng-chih,
who had acted independently on the c^aign to
Ch'angshajj while the General Headquarters was
still in Canton. Their plan for the continuation
of the Expedition was rejected and their
position as subordinates of Chiang's underlined.
T'ang took the snub hard, and revealed for the
first time his jealousy and resentment of
41Chiang Kai-shek.
Eor the attack on Wuhan, the 4th, 7th and 8th 
Armies were to bear the main burden of the 
fighting, while the 9th and 10th (Kweichow) Armies 
made a flanking attack through West Hunan* With 
the exception of the 4th Army, (which had only 
half its strength in Hunan) these armies were all 
recent converts, and the Kuomintang cannot 
have had much confidence in their revolutionary 
character. In speeches delivered to the 7th and 8th 
Armies in Ch'angsha, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to
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instil some revolutionary spirit into the men,
by praising their courage, their unity and their
achievement in conquering Hunan; he even held
them up as examples to the whole National
4-2Revolutionary Army, But T'ang Sheng-chih, whose 
eyes were set on Wuhan, was not moved; his 
chief concern was to ensure that this rich plum 
should fall into his own hands.
The campaign for Wuhan saw the first heavy 
fighting of the Expedition. On August 18th, the 
4-th, 7th and 8th moved across the Milo River on 
a wide front. The 4-th, fighting up the railway 
line to Wuhan met heavy opposition, but the 7th 
advanced through wooded, sparsely populated
4-5country, and with the help of local guides, 
was able to break through behind Yochow, forcing 
the enemy to abandon the city to the 8th, which 
was advancing parallel to the Tungt'ing Lake,
In the last week o±" August, the 4-th Army was 
caught up in very heavy fighting for a series 
of strategic bridges on the railway to Wuhan.
These were the last defensive positions before 
Wuchang, and Wu P'ei-fu was so determined to 
hold them that he rushed to the front himself 
from north China. To instil discipline, he
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ordered all men who broke rank to be beheaded.
But the 4th drove his forces back and swept on 
to Wuchang, whose gates were closed on September 
1st.
The siege of Wuchang struck terror into the
enemies of the Kuomintang, who had never believed
that the Kuomintang was capable of seriously
threatening them. "The southerners whose
preparation ibr the attack on Yochow was regarded
with a smile of indifference a week ago are
now hammering on the gates of Wuchang..." The
4th and 7th launched a series of attacks on the
city, but were unable to break in. However,
T*ang Sheng-chihfs forces, which had crossed the
Yangtse up river, entered Hankow and Hanyang
without opposition on September 6th; the local
commander, Liu Tso~lung, had secretly arranged
to defect to the Kuomintang in August, and now
46came out openly. Soon afterwards he was
made commander of the 15th Army, to the fury of
the Soviet adviser, Teruni, who believed that
Liu could easily have been defeated, and that
bringing a uscoundrel1 like him into the Kuomintang
47armies was only storing up future trouble. (
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Converted Warlords;
At the beginning of September, the Kuomintang 
found itself with 15 armies under its control, 
only six of which had any long standing 
connection with the Party, The other nine had 
all defected: "...there had been very few 
engagements during the original northward drive... 
in which the National Army had not been assisted 
in o:p£>resented with victory by the treachery of 
troops either in the actual fighting army of
ng
the enemy or in the rear". The Kuomintang 
cannot have calculated on so many defections, but 
nor could it spurn those who defected, since it 
was saved the necessity of fighting them. The 
speed of the expansion of the Kuomintang armies 
made it impossible to bring these newly-acquired 
armies under full Party control and to instil 
genuine revolutionary consciousness into them, 
without halting the Northern Expedition temporarily. 
But the impetus of success, and the threatening 
attitude of Sun Ch'uan-fang drove the Kuomintang 
on. The warlord converts were left to their own 
devices. Most of them, however, realised that it 
was the possession of ideology which had allowed 
the ill-equipped, out-numbered Kuomintang forces
to defeat Wu P'ei-fu. They were also aware that
the ideology of the Kuomintang had an impact
outside its own armies. "Mercenary armies were
no longer always reliable. Soldiers, recruited
from the pauperised masses, were liable to be
infected by the spirit of revolt spreading
through the peasant masses. Minor militarists
tried to exploit that psychological atmosphere
for promoting their own ambition. They declared
their adhesion to the Kuomintang and the
anti-imperialist movement, in order to retain
zlq
the loyalty of their soldiers..." y The
converted warlords were anxious to have political
50instructors attached to their armies, who they
believed would ginger up their troops: "it is
felt that the Southerners in some degree are
fighting for an ideal, which however erroneous
it may be considered, gives them an enthusiasm
51entirely lacking among che Northerners."^ The 
desire to instil a little political training into 
the men did not mean that the militarists intended 
to remould themselves. Their primary concern 
remained to hang onto their regional control.
Most of the warlords who were transformed into 
generals of the National Revolutionary Army,
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now and during the rest of the Northern 
Expedition, were neither revolutionary nor 
nationalist. They could no longer he called 
'warlords', since this category was reserved 
for "all those military leaders who were not in 
alliance with the Kuomintang, or all those who 
had no 1chu-i1s which was another way of saying 
the same thing."^ They found their new titles 
comfortable; old-style warlordism was becoming 
increasingly unfashionable as the country was 
stirred by nationalism. They also secured their 
regional positions for the time being by joining 
the Kuomintang voluntarily.
There was one compelling reason for not 
surrendering local control to the Kuomintang 
civil authorities®, the question of finance and 
supply. Kuomintang finances, inadequate before 
the Expedition began, had not been improved by 
the fall of Iiunan, for the provincial treasury 
turned out to be empty.^ The considerable 
revenues of Wuhan had to go in part to supplying 
the Hunan troops, as well as the Hupei ones, while 
the Kwangtung finances had to be devoted to the 
forthcoming campaigns into Kiangsi and Fukien. No 
finance was available for troops from other
provinces. Greed and selfishness apart, no
converted militarist could afford to surrender
control of a source of income; to do this, he had
to retain local power. A vicious circle was
created, which made it impossible for the
Kuomintang to set up a centralised finance system
in occupied areas. The 7th Army, operating
away from its base, found itself in constant
difficulties over supply. Though the 7th was
promised financial aid from Canton at various
stages, this was seldom paid; Kwangsi had to
bear a large part of the costs of her troops on
the Expedition, a task made difficult both by
the poverty of the province and by the
increasingly large distances separating the troops
54from Kwangsi. The 7th was chronically short 
of weapons, ammunition and clothing; the troops 
started out from Kwangsi in summer uniforms, and 
suffered badly from the cold as the autumn wore 
on. In Hunan, they had been forced to pay for 
their needs - requisitioning was forbidden - by 
issuing virtually worthless paper currency, 
which was as unpopular with the local people as 
requisitioning would have been.^
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The Kiangsi Campaign.
Early in September, the menacing activities
of Sun Ch*uan-fang in Kiangsi and on the Yangtze
made it clear that the Kuomintang forces would
have to attack into Kiangsi or be attacked
themselves. The siege of Wuchang, which showed
signs of being a long one, since the Kuomintang
lacked the necessary artillery to break down the 
56walls, was continued, but with a reduced force.
The campaign into Kiangsi began in the first 
week of September, with the bulk of the 
attacking force moving in from West Hunan; the 
7th (later reinforced by a unit of the 4th) moved 
east along the Yangtze from Hupei, aiming for 
Kiukiang, while further units marched north from 
Kwangtung, along the Kan Valley. The campaign, 
which started off on a note of wild enthusiasm - the 
7th was for example ordered to take Kiukiang by 
September 17th^ -- quickly ran into difficulties.
Nanch'ang, the provincial capital, was taken 
towards the end of September, but not held; the 
attackers were thrown back in confusion. On the 
Yangtze, the 7th advanced easily at first, but 
then found itself cut off when the enemy landed
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troops up r i v e r . O n  the Nandi'ang front, t.fre 
situation became chaotic. The 6th had taken 
50% casualties during the abortive attack on the 
city, and fell back, no longer in any shape to 
fight.^ The 1st, Army also fell back. The 7th, 
now out of contact with headquarters, had been 
forced to change direction by the enemy threat 
to its rear. Though it was able to drive the 
ere my back, it did not resume its move towards
60Kiukiang, because its way was blocked by flooding, 
but struck across instead towards the Kiukiang/ 
Nanch’ang Railway. The army took Tean, midway 
between the two cities, on October|4-th, taking 
the enemy by surprise, and relieving the 
Kuomintang forces near Nanch'ang. It could not 
hold the town, however, which was recaptured 
by enemy reinforcements two days later.
By this stage, Bun Ch'uan-fang appeared to 
have abandoned his intention to hold Kiangsi.
He was threatened with the defection of his
I!
commander in Anhwei, Gh’en T'iao-yuan, and 
preferred to pull back into Chekiang and Kiangsu 
before his troops were further reduced. He 
made a new attempt at a negotiated settlement 
with the Kuomintang, but when this failed,
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fighting started again, with another Kuomintang
thrust* Hanch'ang and jKiukiang fell into
Kuomintang hands within a few days. Sun's troops
on the Yangtze, now virtually independent of
62Sun, pulled back into Anhwei, while those
further south were withdrawn into Chekiang,
though floods in the|i?foyang Lake region prevented
many of them from getting clear, and the
Kuomintang took 30,000 prisoners. ^
The Kiangsi campaign lacked the easy successes
and low casualties of the Hunan campaign. The
Kuomintang lost at least 7?00Q men killed in 
64Kiangsi. The troops were demoralised by supply
difficulties, and by the approaching winter.
There was serious trouble in the 7th Army, over 
6 3supplies. The end of the Kiangsi campaign 
might have been a good time to straighten out 
these difficulties, and to consolidate the 
converted warlord armies; the only fighting was 
now in Fukien, where Ho Ying-ch*in's section of 
the 1st. Army was advancing. Instead of 
postponing for a while any further increases in 
the size of the revolutionary armies, the 
Kuomintang continued to welcome all defectors, 
and its emissaries continued to pay secret
visits to susceptible enemy generals, hoping to 
persuade them to defect at the appropriate 
moment. In October and November, a motl^ crowd 
of generals from Fukien, Kiangsi, Chekiang and 
Szechwan joined the Kuomintang forces. In the 
short run, it was easier for the Kuomintang to 
win these men over peacefully, rather than fight 
them. But in the long run, the Party was in 
danger of corrupting itself, and diluting the 
revolutionary spirit.
In December, th^Kuomintang decided to press 
its attack into Chekiang. The attack from 
Kwangtung into Fukien was well advanced, and the
t
defection of Ch'en T'iao-yuan in Anhwei was
assured for a future date. Most of the forces
which had taken part in the Kiangsi campaign
were rested, and not used for th^6hekiang
campaign. The ?th took up defensive positions
66on the Anhwei border. The Kuomintang put 
great reliance for the attack into Chekiang on 
the forces of a Chekiang defector, Chou Feng-ch' 
Pai Chfung-hsi was given command of the campaign 
up to that stage he had been acting as Chief-of- 
Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, standing in for 
Li Chi-shen, the official Chief-of-Staff, who
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had stayed in Kwangtung, (The campaign started, 
and then hung fire until the end of January 1927* 
The split in the Kuomintang.
Until the end of 1926, the schisms in the 
Kuomintang, the tensions between the Communists 
and the Kuomintang, and the divergence of ambitions 
within the Revolutionary Army remained hidden. 
Superficially, the Party and the Army were 
united behind the commander-in-chief. The 
political upheavals at ground level which followed 
in the wake of the Kuomintang advance, and the 
growing power of the mass movements attracted 
great attention, masking other questions. But 
at the end of 1926, these divisions, which had 
been fomenting below the surface, started to come 
out into the open, and the seemingly cohesive 
Kuomintang structure was split progressively 
into many parts.
The first issue which provoked the emergence 
of these divisions was the question of moving
the capital, which became urgent in December 1926. 
It was obvious that the Kuomintang Government had 
to be moved, now that almost all of China south 
of the Yangtze was under Kuomintang control.
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Wuhan was the logical place for it to move to*
But militarily, Hunan and Hupei were dominated 
by Tiang Sheng-chih; politically the Communists 
and the /Left-wingers were in the ascendancy in 
the area. Chiang Kai-shek's power would be 
circumscribed if the government was set up there. 
While a substantial section of the Kuomintang 
leaders, who saw no objection to the establishment 
of the capital at Wuhan: participated in a joint 
Committee of the Central Executive Committee, and 
the Government Council, which was established 
there to direct the government in December,
Chiang kept his headquarters at Ranch* ang, and. 
gathered there a group of Central Committee 
members unwilling to serve at Wuhan. Relations 
between Wuhan and Ranch*ang deteriorated through 
the early months of 1927* until, in March Wuhan 
stripped Chiang of all his offices. In April, 
when Chiang turned on th^communists and 
established his own capital at Ranking, the split 
became absolute.
These developments took place against a 
background of continuing success for the Kuomintang 
the victories of its armies, the social revolution 
which followed in their wake, and the forceful
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diplomacy of the Wuhan government, established
the ascendancy of the Kuomintang throughout South
China. The growth of the Kuomintang as the
new repository of orthodoxy encouraged even
more militarists to put themselves under its
command; by the end of 1926, there were 30
67
Kuomintang armies. The tasks of turning these 
armies into useful, reliable components of the 
National Army, of reducing their commanders' 
local power, and placing the armies under central 
control was not pursued; the in-fighting within 
the Kuomintang made the task more difficult 
than ever* From the point of view of maintaining 
mass support for the Kuomintang, it was essential 
that armies under its banner should not behave 
like traditional soldiers, as converted bpt 
unreformed warlord troops were likely to do.
But it was impossible to avoid this while
68political work within the armies was not pressed. 
The Kuomintang was repeating Sun Yat-sen's mistake, 
that had caused him so much trouble in Kwangtung, 
of allying with non-Party militarists for short­
term gains, and then failing to bring them
under Party control and remould their men. The 
major difference was that in 1926 and 1927, the
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Kuomintang did this on a far wider scale than 
Sun had ever been able to. At the end of its 
rule in Wuhan, the Left-Kuomintang issued a 
pronouncement on the dangers of revived 
warlordism, of warlordism under the guise of 
the Party, which attached men who had gained 
power in the name of the Party or had hung on 
to existing power by allying with the Party.
But by then the damage was done. MA pitfall 
in the path of the Nationalist Government is 
the old-fashioned but seemingly converted 
warlord...The encirclement of the National
n
Government by a band of friendly tuchuns is as 
much a menace to civilian government as a direct
Tl
attack by enemy tuchuns.... the observer wonders 
whether the Kuomintang will have time enough 
to whip these acquired armies into shape, or
n
will find itself in the maelstrom of tuchun 
70politics'1. The answer was debatable.
At the end of January,= the advance into 
Chekiang got under way again. There was 
considerable fighting for the province. In one 
important battle the surname of the Kuomintang 
commander, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, played a crucial 
part. Iiis personal standard, the character Pai
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on a plain background, was flying in the
Kuomintang ranks. One of the enemy commanders
was Pai Pao-shan, whose personal standard was
also the character Pai on a plain background.
When the enemy troops saw the Pai banner flying
on the opposing side they assumed that Pai Pao-shan
71had defected, and that defeat was near; they fled.( 
An intriguing aspect of this incident is that, 
unless a deliberate trick was intended,
Kuomintang troops were still going into battle 
under personal banners, essentially a warlord 
practice.
In mid-February, Hangchow, the provincial
capital of Chekiang fell, and Sun Ch'uan-fang*s
troops withdrew into Kiangsu. South of the Yangtze
only the Shanghai/Hanking region remained outside
Kuomintang control, but that region was now
defended heavily, largely by Fengtien and
72Shantung troops.r
The Kuomintang planned to attack the region 
from the south and from the west; on the Yangtze, 
Ch'cng Ch’fen moved along the south bank,
Li Tsung-jen along the north; from Chekiang,
Pai Ch'ung-hsi attacked by the railway to 
Shanghai, while Ho Ying-ch'in moved around the
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Tungt*ing Lake towards Nanking* Li Tsung-jen's 
troops did not have to fight; the arranged
t
defection of Ch'en T'iao-yuan occurred at the 
beginning of March, at the price, it was
t t  n ~ ?
rumoured, of 600,000 yuan.(  ^ The attack on 
Shanghai was held hack until early March; the 
Shanghai workers virtually took over the city in 
advance, allowing Pai Ch'ung-hsi to enter the 
city on March 21st. almost without opposition. 
Three days later, Nanking was taken by Ch'eng 
Gh'ien's troops; his arrival was followed by 
the Nanking Incident, which aroused the mighty 
wrath of the Powers, and since it was popularly 
blamed on communists in Gh'eng's army, gave 
Chiang Kai-shek a useful pretext for his attack 
on the communists three weeks later.
The Purge.
With the fall of Nanking and Shanghai, the
split between Wuhan and Ghiang Kai-shek
intensified. Chiang now controlled Chekiang,
&iangsu, Anhwei and Fukien; Wuhan controlled
Hunan and Hupei, Li Ghi-shen Kwangtung, Huang
Shao-hsiung Kwangsi; Ghu P'ei-te in Kiangsi
was caught awkwardly between Wuhan and Chiang 
Kai-shek's forces, but as long as the General
141
Headquarters remained in Nanch'ang, Kiangsi 
was dominated by Chiang*
The newly found identification of the 
converted militarists became hopelessly confused; 
they were forced to ally with whichever power 
bloc was nearest to them* Li Tsung-jen, whose 
troops were in Anhwei, naturally turned to 
Chiang* Politically, the Kwangsi leaders 
favoured Chiang*s turn to the right* They gave. 
Chiang their full support during the Purge of 
April, 192?. This was the first occasion on 
which the Kwangsi leaders worked together as 
a Clique, on the national scene* Up to this 
point on the Northern Expedition, each of the 
Kwangsi generals had performed his specific job, 
under the auspices of the General Headquarters; 
there had been no opportunity to work as a 
clique or pressure group. But now the four 
Kwangsi generals came together for the first time 
for a year, and worked closely together; they 
deployed their forces simultaneously and in 
different places against the communists*
Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who became garrison commander 
of Shanghai, after its fall, immediately put
142
himself to pains to reassure the foreign
residents of Shanghai, in a state of complete
hysteria after the Nanking Incident, that he
would protect their lives and their property,
and would rigorously suppress all "unorthodox
activities in the city", a clear reference to
74communist activities,
Pai shared with the other Kwangsi generals
a great antipathy towards the communists, the
origins of which are difficult to trace. The
communists did not threaten their personal
positions; there had been relatively little
communist activity in Kwangsi, or in the 7th
Army. Li Tsung-jen had kept a strict hand on
the political department of the army, and had
not allowed its original political director,
Huang Jih-k'uei, to march north with the ?th;
instead he had taken with him Mai Huan-chang,
75a less radical figure. Li and Huang Shao-hsiung
had taken strongly against Borodin, because they
76felt he patronised them,( but this alone cannot
77explain their bitterness towards the communists. 
Perhaps Li had been alarmed by incidents in Anhwei 
in March, when clashes between Kuomintang and 
communist elements resulted in the sacking of the
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Anhwei Kuomintang and Union Headquarters.*^® He
must certainly have been concerned with tbs
decline in discipline in his army, a result of
the privations the men had suffered from the
7th Army's continuing supply difficulties. In
January they had taken part in looting at Kiukiang^
and they had gained the reputation of being a
ft o"particularly lawless lot".
Whatever drove the Kwangsi leaders into their
extreme anti***communism, the fact of its
existence proved an enormous asset to Ohiang
Kai-shek in his attack on the communists. All
four Kwangsi leaders (Li Tsung-jen, Huang
Shao-hsiung, Pai Oh'ung-hsi and Li Chi-shen)
attended the preparatory meetings for the fftirge
(Oh* ing-tang) held in Shanghai at the beginning
of April, and gave their full support to the
ftlmeasures which Ohiang proposed. Without their 
support, it would have been virtually impossible 
for Ohiang to have carried out the Purge.
Pai Oh*ung-hsi was garrison commander of 
Shanghai, Li Ohi-shen controlled Canton and 
Li Tsung-jen led the least communist-influenced 
troops in the vicinity of Hanking. These were
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the three centres where the Purge would have 
to start.
In Shanghai., the Purge started on April 15th.
Pai's official adherence to the Kuomintang policy
of friendship with the communists (tjung-kung) was
maintained for some time before that day, but his
real views were so well-known that reports of
an interview in which he spoke of his acceptance
°£ 1Jimg-Kung 1 were footnoted to say that there
must have been a mistake in reporting, since
82Pai was a known anti-communist. As the actual 
Purge drew near, he dropped his pretences: "the 
approach of zero-hour could almost be plotted 
graphically in the half-page advertisements run 
daily in the Chinese press by the political
8-5department of Pai Ch'ung-hsi's headquarters".
On the day itself, Pai*s troops disarmed labour
unions and worker units in the city, but left
most of the butchery to the obscurely directed
Shanghai gangsters. Pai, who later seems to
have regretted the scale of the slaughter,
adopted the predictable excuse that he was
8 4only 'obeying orders'. He apparently performed 
one charitable act, in releasing the arrested
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Chou En-lai, whom he had known in Canton. ^
Li Tsung-jen's contribution to the Purge
was to move troops from Anhwei into Wanking, to
help carry out the Purge in the 1st* Army
stationed there, which contained communist 
86elements. There was also a slight purge in
the 7tb Army itself
In Canton and Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen's well
laid plans for a purge were put into operation
two days after the Shanghai Purge started.
Li himself was in Shanghai, but had prepared a
"Doomsday Book" of those he wanted purged before
88he left Canton. The Canton Purge represented
the culmination of Li's anti™ communist activities,
which had been going on since the Kuomintang
government moved to Wuhan in December, leaving
Li in control in Kwangtung. Li's early moves
against communists had a strong influence in
shaping the anti-communist attitude of the other
89Kwangsi leaders.
In Kwangsi itself, the Purge was less brutal
than elsewhere, and was confined to the cities
along the West River; it did not touch the
communist-dominated hsien in the north-west of
90the province.
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Li Chi-shen's relationship with the other 
three Kwangsi leaders at this stage is 
interesting. He had made his career in Kwangtung, 
and his power and ambitions were still centred 
there. But since the emergence of Li, Pai and 
Huang as leaders of Kwangsi, he had become 
increasingly identified with them - almost in the 
role of a father-figure, for though he was only 
slightly older than they, he was much more 
experience^, politically and militarily*, it 
was natural that they should turn to their
qi
fellow-provincial for advice and guidance.
Ohiang Kai-shek1s Resignation and the 
Wuhan-Nanking Rapfbochement.
The government established by Ohiang Kai-shek
at Nanking on April 18th depended for its
political support on the right-wing of the
Kuomintang, and for its financial support
chiefly on the wealthy of Shanghai, whose
contributions were not always given voluntarily,
for the 1Purge' continued in Shanghai after
the communists had been disposed of: wealthy
Chinese were kidnapped, and those who reappeared
92came back poorer men. Militarily, Nanking's 
most reliable units were the 1st, under Ho
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Ying-ch* in, and the 7th, under Li Tsung-jen;
//3 forces*
otherwise his army consisted of recent converts
ox
from Chekiang and Anhwei.
Nanking was faced immediately with two
military threats, from the Northern troops north
of the Yangtze, and from Wuhan troops up-river*
It seemed that Wuhan might take military action
against Chiangj because of his action against
the communists; but at the end of April, the
7th Army disarmed units of the 6th Army in
Anhwei., and removed the threat from that 
94direction,^ Li f sung-jen also reached a
non-aggfession pact with Chu P'ei-te, then
96garrisoning Kiangsi, ^ A tacit agreement appeared
to exist between Chiang Kai-shek and T'ang Sheng-chih,
that the continuation of the Northern Expedition
96should be given top priority. Negotiations, 
which cannot have been approved by the government 
at Wuhan, took place, which envisaged Nanking's 
recognition of the autonomy of Hunan and Hupei 
under T 'ang1s control, in return for T 1ang1s 
recognition of Nanking as the Central Government, 
and his undertaking to purge the communists at 
Wuhan, Though there were no concrete results 
from these negotiations, they may have helped 
to prevent Wuhan/Nanking hostilities.
Nanking troops crossed thpYangtze at the 
beginning of May, and moved easily north towards
H
Hsuchow. Wuhan forces were also moving north
at the beginning of May, but encountering much
fiercer opposition, The 4*th Army in particular
was engaged in very heavy fighting and suffered
97appalling casualties\ (
w
Chengchow fell to Feng Yu-hsiang, who had 
been enabled to move east out of Shensi by the 
march north of the Wuhan forces, at the same time
i t
that Nanking forces took Hsuchow at the beginning 
of June. It was clear that if either Nanking or 
Wfeuhan could win the support of Feng, it would 
be in a commanding position over the other* Feng 
was the most powerful pro-Kuomintang militarist 
in North China; he had declared his allegiance 
to the Kuomintang in September, 1926. The 
Wuhan/Nanking Split had not at first concerned 
him, but now the time had come for him to show 
his hand. He held talks, first at Chengchow
it
with the Wuhan leaders, and then at Hsuchow with 
the Nanking leaders. He gave his support to 
Nanking, but not until he had drawn from Wuhan 
an undertaking to withdraw their troops from
Honan. Feng's action was a terrible blow to Wuhan,
which had counted on his support, "but as
Professor Sheridan shows, it was the obvious course
98for Peng to take.
Wuhan was now in a desperate position.
A Nanking-sponsored attack on Wuhan by Hsia 
Tou-yin at the beginning of June had been repulsed, 
but politically and economically, the government 
there was on its last legs. The river trade on 
which Wuhan depended for much of its livelihood 
had been curtailed by the breach with Nanking. 
Politically, an open breach with the communists 
was approaching, which spelled suicide for both 
the Left-Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
Nanking, on the other hand,was improving 
its position, strengthened by its alliance with
i
Peng Yu-hsiang. But Nanking's situation was
reversed in July, when the prospect of open war
on the Yangtze between Wuhan and Nanking developed.
Nanking troops which had started to move north
into Shantung (only to find their way blocked by
Japanese intervention) were withdrawn from the
northern front to the Yangtze. The loyalty of
the converted warlord troops which were left to
99hold the front proved shaky, 'and they offered 
no resistance when the Northern forces
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counter-attacked* They were driven hack to the 
Yangtze in a complete rout; there was no time 
even to destroy the railway bridges* Northern 
forces poured south and recaptured Pukow.
This was a very serious setback, and though 
the blame for it was put on Wang T'ien-p'ei, 
commander of the 10th (Kweichow) Army, who was 
executed in August, it was obvious that it 
really lay with the commander-in-chief, 
Ghiang-Kai-shek.
The futility of the defeat was enhanced by 
the slackening of the war threat on the Yangtze; 
an unwillingness to fight had become apparent in 
the Wuhan and Nanking armies facing each other* On
the front. The Wuhan purge of communists, in
mid-July, further unsettled the already discontented
$rrny, which was pro-communist, and made it quite
unreliable* On the Nanking side, Ghiang Kai-shek's
subordinates, in particular the Kwangsi generals,
were incensed by the collapse of the northern
front, and by the heavy casualties taken in the
retreat* They were cfeeply disturhed by the chaos
into which the wrangling between Nanking and Wuhan 
had thrown the whole Kuomintang, and by the fact
the Wuhan side held
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that civil war within the Kuomintang appeared 
to he given higher priority than the Northern 
Expedition. Chiang was discredited as a general, 
and as a politician. His subordinates were no 
longer prepared to fight his civil war lithin 
the Kuomintang.
As a result of the recent downhill slide 
at Wuhan, Wang Ohing-wei, the government leader 
there, was almost as discredited as Ghiang. 
Technically, since Wuhan had now purged the 
communists, the chief point at issue between 
Nanking and Wuhan no longer existed, and Eeng
it
Yu-hsiang was putting pressure on both sides to 
settle their quarrel; there seemed a strong 
possibility of a settlement*
There was a separate issue involved in the 
unwillingness of the front-line armies of Wuhan 
and Nanking to fight each other. The 7th had been 
withdrawn from the Northern front, and was now 
holding the line on the Yangtze for Nanking. It 
was an exhausted and bitter army; there was a 
feeling that all it had gained from a year of 
fighting was "the name of the Steel Army and 
20,000 casualties" . It was not in good 
fighting shape, and it was particularly unwilling
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to fight Chang Fa-kiie^s troops* Chang* s
4th Army had originally been commanded by- 
Li Chi-shen; its men were raised from west 
Kwangtung, near the Kwangsi border, and it had 
helped the Kwangsi generals during their 
consolidation of their province. There was great 
fellow-feeling between the 4th and 7th. Now 
the 7th was being asked to fight the 4th t!to
satisfy the Napoleonic ambitions of a Ningpo
103 104manlt. ^ Li Tsung-jen refused. As it turned
out, his refusal was unnecessary, for on August
1st, the Nandi*ang Uprising occurred, and
Chang Fa-k'uei's forces were split into three:
one section, the 20th Army, now openly communist,
returned to Kwangtung, followed by a second section,
the 4th Army; the third section, the 11th Army,
moved off into Fukien.
The question of civil war on the Yangtze was
the culmination of a series of difficulties
between the Kwangsi generals and Chiang-Kai-shek.
Pai Chfung-hsi had been closely associated with
Chiang, as Chief of Staff for much of the
Northern Expedition, but there had been friction
105between the two men for some time. ^ Pai was 
an extremely competent professional soldier, but
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poorly versed in political manoeuvre; he was
aware of his worth as a soldier, an astringent,
even arrdgant character, not given to flattery,
and quite unsuited for Ghiang Kai-shek's entourage.
Li Tsung-jen was more conciliatory to Ghiang, hut
he did not want to see his army, his only capital,
weakened by factional fighting in which he had
no personal involvement. In Iiay, he had reached
an agreement with Chu P'ei-te in Kiangsi, which
had helped to neutralise the Yangtze Front until
this time, and which had envisaged the formation
of a third force, standing between Nanking and 
106Wuhan. At the beginning of August, he
emerged as a leading figure in moves to secure
107a rapprochement between the two sides. (
Telegrams flew back and forth between Nanking 
and Wuhan. It was some days before it became 
clear that the communist forces at Nandi*ang 
would move south, and fear on both sides of a 
communist attack into the Yangtze Yalley spurred 
negotiations. The chief obstacle was the 
continuing presence of Ghiang Kai-shek as leader 
at Nanking. But his position was slipping. From 
the end of July, articles questioning his 
continuance in office appeared in the Chinese 
press, and there was a poster campaign against
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him in Nanking itself*. The Kwangsi generals
no longer accepted his orders, and though he
bitterly opposed their negotiations with Wuhan,
he could do nothing to stop them.*^^ Finally, his
most trusted subordinate, Ho Ying-chfin also
110abandoned him, leaving him without any
personally loyal troops in the Nanking/Shanghai 
111region.
With a northern counter-attack mounting across
the Yangtze, a stormy meeting of the Military
Committee took place at Nanking on August ljth.
Chiang was openly defied, resigned on the spot
11?and departed for Shanghai-. The Military
Committee took over all political and military
113responsibility, and power at Nanking passed
to Li, Pai and Ho.
The new Nanking leaders moved to secure a
formal agreement with Wuhan, concentrating their
efforts on the more moderate leaders there,
iik
T'an Yen-k'ai and Sun Fo. On August 22nd.
Li Tsung-jen met Wang Ching-wei and these two men 
at Kiukiang. Wang agreed to consider fae 
transferrence of the Wuhan Government and the 
Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang to 
Nanking, apparently on the understanding that the 
regime at Nanking was on its last legs, and would
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shortly he wound up. Wang also pressed, 
successfully to his belief, for the summoning 
of the 4th Plenum of the Central Executive 
Committee. At the end of the meeting, T 1 an 
and Sun then departed for Nanking with Li Tsung-jen, 
supposedly to prepare for Wang's arrival there. In 
fact, it soon became clear that they had abandoned 
Wang, and switched their allegiance to Nanking, 
there was to be no question of Wang's taking 
over authority at Nanking.
Ghiang Kai-shek was more fortunate with
his political supporters $ the bulk of the senior
116politicians left Nanking with him. It was
a sensible time to leave Nanking. The city was 
being shelled by the Northerners, and seemed 
likely to fall to them. Their first attempt at 
a Yangtze crossing was made on August 24th, but 
was thwarted by the action of the gunboat 
bringing Li, T 1 an and Sun back from Kiukiang, 
which ran into several junks loaded with Northern 
soldiers, and managed to drive them back to the 
northern shore. During the action, Li and T'an 
blazed away with their pistols through the cabin 
windows, while Sun lay on the floor.
The Special Committee.
When they took over control at Nanking, neither
the Kwangsi leaders, nor anyone else, imagined 
that they would be able to establish any 
permanent authority there. They were only there 
as a stop-gap. They commanded no support in 
either of the main sections of the Kuomintang.
The politicians who went to Shanghai with Chiang 
Kai-shek believed that Chiang would soon return. 
Wang Ching-wei had thought he had a chance of 
establishing himself at Nanking, which had been 
lost by the desertion of his subordinates; he was 
bitterly hostile to the new Nanking leaders.
In the short run, the Kwangsi leaders had an 
urgent task to perform, to defend Nanking against 
invasion. Li Tsung-jen moved the 7th back from 
Anhwei into Nanking, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi started 
moving his troops in from Shanghai. Ho Ying-ch'in' 
troox>s were already in the Nanking region. Between 
them, the three generals commanded about 200,000
1 1 o
men, though they only had about 100,000 rifles.
On the night of August 25th, in thick mist,
Sun Ch'uan-fang1s forces crossed the Yangtze,
landing near Lungt'an, outside Nanking. Within
a few hours they had occupied high ground in the
area, and cut the railway line between Nanking 
and Shanghai, cutting off Pai Ch'ung-hsi from
Nanking. His troops, and those from Nanking
counter-attacked desperately. Bitter fighting
went on for four days; eventually, the Northern
forces were defeated. Sun was not able to withdraw
his troops, and 30,000 prisoners were taken. Many
of these 'escaped1, giving rise to the theory that
they were not all from Sun's own units, but were
Chekiang troops recently converted to the
Kuomintang, whose defection Sun had been counting 
119on. Chou Feng-ch'i, their commander, resigned
120shortly afterwards.
Once the immediate military crisis was past,
the political and governmental situation had to
be sorted out. The kuomintang seemed exhausted
after its months of in-fighting, and there was a
1P1"get-together spirit in the ranks". The
anti-communist Western Hills faction of the
Kuomintang, which had been out of power since
the Western Hills Meeting (Hsi-Shan Hui-i) in
November, 1925* was anxious for a settlement
which would bring it back into the mainstream.
Its members had been peeved by Chiang Kai-shek's
failure to employ them after he had turned against
122the communists. Sun Fo and T 1 an Yen-k'ai went 
to Shanghai late in August to carry out preliminary
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negotiations for a three-way settlement between 
Nanking, Wuhan and the Western Hills faction, whose 
headquarters were in Shanghai* Wang Ching-wei 
also arrived in Shanghai, his arrival having
123been delayed by the fighting on the "Yangtze*
At the beginning of September, a series of
meetings was held in Shanghai between the three
factions; agreement was reached to suspend
temporarily the Central Executive and Supervisory
Committees, to reorganise the Government and
Military Committees, and to set up a Special
Committee to take over the functions of the two
Central Committees until the 3rd. Congress could
124-be called - within three months* After the
discussions, members of the three factions went
to Nanking, where, on September 15th, the Special
Committee \^ as officially set up0 Its inaugural
proclammation blamed the troubles within the
Kuomintang on the communists, and vowed to continue
the Northern Expedition and the purge on the 
125communists. The Special Committee was
attacked from its inception as illegal; technically 
a Plenum of the Central Executive Committee would 
have been the only body qualified to make such a 
sweeping change in party and governmental structure,
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but it was known that it wrnld be impossible to
get a majority of the Central Executive
Committee to support such moves* To overcome this
obstacle , a temporary joint committee of members
of the Central Executive and Supervisory
Committees was convened to set up the Special 
126Committee. This joint meeting was attended 
only by thirteen of the thirty-four members of 
the two Committees; none t>f the close supporters
of either Wang Ching-wei or Chiang Kai-shek were
127there. 1 The Special Committee was scarcely
legal, in terms of the regulations of the Kuomintang,
but its supporters from the Western Hills faction
tried to justify its establishment by claiming
that the Kuomintang had sunk into such confusion
with three rival centres (at Wuhan, Wanking, and
in Shanghai, where the Western Hills faction
had its headquarters), that a solution to the
confusion could only be found through reacting to
objective circumstances, and that 'legality'
128had become meaningless. This explanation
satisfied those who placed an active role in the
Special Committee, but no-one else.
The Special Committee had 32 members, six 
from each faction, and 14 neutrals. On September
160
17th, a new Government Committee and a new 
Military Committee were set up. Many of the 
members of these three committees were not in 
Nanking; the only important politicians in 
Nanking were T 1 an Xen-kai, Sun No and the 
Western Hills faction. Of the Kuomintang1s 
three most important political figures, Chiang 
Kai-shek was in Japan, Wang Ching-wei back in 
Wuhan, and Hu Han-min in Shanghai. Only two of 
the five members of the Government Committee,
T 1 an Xen-kai and Li Lieh-chun, were in Nanking. 
C.G.W'u was Foreign Minister, and Sun No Minister 
of Finance.:129
The inability of the Nanking leaders to 
gain any support from the two main Kuomintang 
factions put the seal of impermanence on the 
Special Committee. The only sector in which the 
Committee could operate effectively was the 
military. On the diplomatic front, none of 
the Powers was prepared to negotiate with an
130administration that they regarded as temporary. 
Economically, it was harassed by the fact that 
contributions to Nanking from Shanghai had been 
secured through Chiang Kai-shek*s personal 
relationship with the Shanghai capitalists. While
161
Ghiang managed to raise 40 million yuan in
131Shanghai between Hay and July,  ^ Pai Ch'ung-hsi
only extracted 300,000 yhan from the Chinese \
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai towards
132establishing the Special Committee.  ^ Li Chi-shen
supplemented the meagre budget by remitting
large sums of money from Canton, but this
aroused great resentment in Canton, and could not
133continue indefinitely.
However, in September and October, military
problems were still uppermost, and they did
something to disguise the other weaknesses of the
Special Committee, fhe Northern Expedition got
under way again; Ho Ying-chin led troops into
North Kiangsu*on the Yangtze, preparations for
war with Wuhan were resumed.
During the Northern attack on Nanking at
the end of August, I*ang Sheng-chih had, with
Nanking agreement, moved troops into Anhwei
134against a Northern attack. Before the 
establishment of the Special Committee, T 1ang 
had been planning to form a purely military 
alliance with the Nanking leaders, reactivating 
his Peuoting connection with Pai Ch'ung-hsi to 
appeal to him.^^ But so many differences had 
grown up between Pai and f a n g  that the Paoting
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link no longer had any power, and fang's
offer was rejected. f a n g  went ahead on his own,
to extend his authority, and bring Anhwei firmly
under his control. At the beginning of September,
he ousted all remaining Nanking troops from
the riverine cities of Anhwei, and established
his own subordinate, Ho Chien, as govenor of
Anhwei. He underlined his independance by
setting up a Branch Political Council in Wuhan
on September 1st, in accordance with a decision
of the now-defunct Wuhan Government taken in
August, when it was planning to move to Nanking,
but since counter-manded by tte Nanking. ^
Wang Ching-wei became chairman of this Council
but stayed in Wuhan only a month, since it was
quite clear that he was only to be a pawn of
167f a n g  Sheng-chih. J At the end of October, he 
departed for Canton.
Nanking had already secured the defection of 
some of fang's units in Hunan and H u p e i , a n d  
the action of these forces, combined with forces 
advancing west from Nanking, and the Nanking Navy, 
which played a key role, was sufficient to bring 
f ang  down. On November 12th, Pang fled from 
Wuhan. His remaining loyal units withdrew unscathed 
into Hunan, and control of Hupei passed to the
6th and 7th Armies. Hu fsung-to, commander of
the 19th Army, an offshoot of the 7th, and a
Hupei native, became garrison commander of Wuhan,
another Hupei native, Chang Chih-pen, chairman
of the province. Negotiations to secure the
surrender of fang's forces in Hunan got under
way immediately after the fall of Wuhan, and a
169cease-fire was agreed* it seemed that a
peaceful settlement would be reached. Before
this could happen, the situation in Kwangtung
changed drastically, affecting the whole position
of the Kwangsi leaders, and the Hunan negotiations
were abandoned.
Lp Chi-shen had taken over control of
Kwangtung after the Government moved from there
to Wuhan at the end of 1926, His authority
there was seriously shaken in the late summer
of 1927* when two sections of the former 4-th 
140Army, returned to Kwangtung at the end of
August. Li launched an immediate attack on the
communist section. He sent Kwangsi troops
under Huang Shao-hsiung, which had been in the
141North River area of Kwangtung since June, 
into the Swatow region where Ho and Yeh hadA a
established themselves while troops under Ch'en
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Chi-~t' ang moved into the East Biver area, Huang 
and Gh'en defeated the communist forces in 
September, driving them from Swatow and into 
Hailufeng and Kiangsi. But the second section,
Ghang Ea~k'uei's troops, posed a much more 
serious threat to Li and could not be dealt with 
so easily* Ghang was the favourite son of 
Kwangtung, and had powerful military friends 
in the province. Li had no choice but to welcome
Ghang back, and to give him a triumphal reception 
142in Canton.
With Ghang's troops actually in Ganton, Li's 
position became very precarious. His best units 
were away from the capital, fighting the communists. 
His political authority started to slip. He could 
not prevent the establishment of a Branch 
Political Council, set up under the same 
regulations as the one in Wuhan, which was 
dominated first by Ghang's supporters, and then, 
from the end of October, by Ghang's hero,
Wang Ching-wei. Li had long been the bitter enemy 
of the Left in Kwangtung; now he found that he 
could no longer count on the loyalty of the 
conservative merchant class either; his oppressive 
taxation, necessary to raise money to send to the 
Kwangsi generals in Nanking, had alienated the
165
143merchants# Worst of all, as a non-native,
he aroused no loyalty in the insular Cantonese,
who were critical of him for his use of Kwangsi
troops within Kwangtung.
The Canton Branch Political Council took up
the chorus of attacks on the illegality of the
Special Committee, and issued insistent demands 
for the calling of the 4th Plenum, which, it 
proposed, should be held in Canton. Li was forced 
to echo their demands, even though it meant 
attacking his fellow Kwangsi leaders in Nanking.
The call for the 4th Plenum was taken up in Shanghai, 
where Chiang Kai-shek was living after his return 
from Japan. At the beginning of November, all 
former antipathy forgotten, Chiang and Wang Ching-wei 
came.out together for the convention of a preliminary 
meeting for the Plenum, in Shanghai* Wang left 
for Shanghai in mid-November, taking Li Chi-shen 
with him. Before he left, he and Chang Pa-k’uei 
laid plans to destroy Kwangsi power in Kwangtung.
They recruited from Hong Kong a former officer
ti
of the Kwangsi Army, Yu Tso-po, who had been sent
out of Kwangsi at the time of the Purge, on
144suspicion of being a leftist. He was to take
over command of Kwangsi troops from Huang*-Shao-hsiung.
Wang Ching-wei left for Shanghai on November 
15th, The next day, a surprise attack was made 
on Huang Shao-hsiung, who had come to Canton to
14Stake over Li Chi-shen's posts while he was away,
Huang escaped from his house, and fled, disguised
as a peasant. He made his way back to Kwangsi
via Hong Kong and Hanoi. At the same time, the
Whamp'%) Academy, the Shihching Arsenal, the Rumen
Rorts, and other key installations were taken
over by Chang Fa-k'uei's troops. The coup caused
146a sensation in Canton. Most Cantonese were
delighted by the fact that the coup, and the
military action in the West River ^ against Kwangsi
itself, which followed the coup, spelled disaster
for the Kwangsi Clique.
The coup was less well received in Shanghai;
Wang Ching-wei.. was attacked by the Right-wing of
147the Kuomintang for having acted too arbitrarily. (
Kor the Kwangsi leaders in Nanking the coup had
very serious implications. In the first place,
it put an end to hopes of a settlement with the
Hunan generals; both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang
148Ching-wei encouraged them to fight on, as they 
were no longer threatened by an attack from Kwangsi 
if they did not submit to Wuhan. In the second
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place, it undermined the whole position of the
Kwangsi Clique, In the aftermath of the coup,
it seemed that Kwangsi itself might fall to the 
149Cantonese. The province was the cornerstone
of the Clique's structure of power; if it were 
lost, it would he finished, for ultimately, its 
power depended not on its holdings outside the 
province, hut on Kwangsi. So long as the Clique 
held it, its leaders had a solid hase from which 
to mount their moves on the national scene, and a 
haven to which they could retire if necessary. If 
they lost Kwangsi, they would he rootless, and 
open to attack. Indeed, even as they lost power 
in the South, their position at Nanking was 
slipping.
Chiang Kai-shek, hack in Shanghai, was 
actively working for the downfall of the Special 
Committee, as were the majority of Kuomintang 
politicians, hoth on the Left and the Right. 
Alongside the calls for the convention of the 
4th Plenum, there was a growing movement to 
reinstate Chiang Kai-shek. The Special Committee 
could offer no adequate opposition to the calling 
of the 4th Plenum, and could only quihhle ahout
the date at which it should he held.
The Kwangsi Clique itself was sanguine ahout
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the chances of survival of the Special Committee,
ISOand Li did not oppose the calling of the Plenum.
Now that Kwangsi was threatened, Li and Pai were
more concerned with saving Kwangsi than with
saving the Special Committee. It would he
necessary for them to launch an expedition through
Hunan to Kwangsi, and it would he therefore more
sensible for chem to move their centre of operations
to Wuhan. All their pretensions of playing a
national role, saving the Kuomintang and fighting
for the nation went by the board when their home
province was threatened. The Western Hills faction,
which stood to lose everything if the Special
Committee collapsed, tried to pressure the Kwangsi
leaders into opposing the 4-th Plenum, but without
s u c c e s s . P a i  Ch'ung-hsi handed over his
command of the Shanghai garrison to Ho Xing-ch'in
on November 19th, and made preparations to move
152his troops to Wuhan. ^
In Nanking, the position of uhe Special Committee 
and the Western Hills faction was deteriorating 
rapidly. On November 22nd, during celebrations 
to mark the defeat of 1'ang Sheng-chih, there 
were many casualties when soldiers began firing 
on the crowd. The traagedy was blamed on the
169
Western Hills faction, although there were
lb7)rumours that it had been engineered from Shanghai, ^
to discredit the Special Committee.
Everywhere, pressure increased for the calling
of the 4th Plenum, and for Chiang Kai-shek’s
return to office. At the beginning of December,
preparatory sessions for the 4th Plenum were held
in Shanghai; it xvas decided to wind up uhe
Special Committee at the end of December, and
summon the 4th Plenum in the new Year.
Chiang was emerging again as leader of the
Kuomintang; his unpopularity of the summer
was forgotten* In a speech on December 10th, Chiang
accused the Hanking leaders of having done just
what they had accused him of doing - starting
a war on the Yangtze between Wuhan and Hanking. He
bitterly denounced the Hanking generals for their
failure to obey orders from the Party, and for their
disregard :fbr the welfare of their own men, and of
the population as a whole. He threatened the
development of a new warlordism, worse than the
old,: unless the armies of the Kuomintang were
1S4brought under Party control again. ^
However, before government changes at Nanking 
could take place, there was a communist uprising
170
In Canton and the Canton Commune,established,A 9
radically changing the situation in the South 
155again. ^  In Kwangtung, Qhang Fa-k'uei was
caught off balance, with his troops moving on
Kwangsi, and Oanton undefended. The Kwangsi troops
which had been marshalling at Wuchow to try and
stop Chang*s attack into Kwangsi found themselves
on the offensive when Chang's troops rushed back
to Canton. These troops, and others in the Nan-Lu
h
area of Kwangtung, and^Fukien loyal to Li Chi-shen,
started moving on Canton. The Canton rising itself
was put down by Chang and Li Fu-lin in mid-December,
but they themselves were then attacked by Li
Chi-shen's troops, and driven towards Kiangsi,
The threat to the southern dominions of the
156Kwangsi Clique was removed. ^
Chiang Kai-shek returned to Nanking on January
5th, "in martial splendour, in a special train
escorted by three armoured trains". The
Special Committee was wound up, and the members
158of the Western Hills faction went abroad. ^ The
Kwangsi leaders established themselves at Wuhan;
"the rowdy Kwangsi generals went behind the
scenes, and only faint whispers of their
159off-stage operations reached Nanking". ^
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The Kwangsi Clique was no more sorry to see
the Special Committee wound up than was Chiang
Kai-shek. If the past few months had proved
anything, it was that the Kwangsi generals did
not constitute a faction strong enough to run
a national government• Chiang Kai-shek might
be able to perform f,the traditional juggling
act, to keep regional warlords or politicians
balanced in a framework of personal politics
practically devoid of ideology'1 . The
Kwangsi generals certainly could not. They were
good generals, and they were later to prove
efficient administrators of one province, but they
could not cope with the tangled fabric of national
political life. Their only acnievements while at
Nanking were in putting down T'ang Sheng-chih, and
in disbanding a certain number of the more useless
converted warlord troops - Tsou Lu puts the
number of disbanded men at 100,000, though this
161figure may be inflated*.
Their alliance with the Western Hills faction 
was one of temporary convenience, based on a 
common hatred of Chiang Kai-shek, and of the 
communists* Li Tsung-jen's anti-communism reached 
new heights during this period. The North China
1.72
Herald stated approvingly (and improbably) that
"nothing that has appeared in these columns as
to the menace of Soviet influence in China has
been couched in stronger terms than those used
by General Li in his excoriation of the Soviet
162regime in China". fhe link with the Western
Hills faction did not continue; that faction was
a spent force after the collapse of the Special
Committee, But it had served its purpose of
conferring a dubious respectability on the
Kwangsi generals; the members of the Western Hills
faction at least had long records within the
Kuomintang, which the Kwangsi Clique, with the
exception of Li Chi-shen, did not. In 1927,
Pai Ch'ung-hsi still had no position in the
Kuomintang hierachy, while Li Tsung-jen and
Huang Shao-hsiung were only alternate members of
the Supervisory Committee, elected at the 2nd
Party Congress in January 1926. I1 hey were
justifiably regarded by most senior members of
163the Kuomintang as upstarts.
As for the operations of the Clique itself, 
during the autumn of 1927, it was hampered by the 
inability of Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-hsiung 
in the South to support the other members at
173
Nanking, because of the situation in Canton*
Li fsung-Jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi co-operated 
smoothly most of the time, but at the end, Li was 
not able to persuade the more headstrong Pai to 
compromise with the returning Chiang Kai-shek, 
and reach some kind of amicable settlement.
At the beginning of 1928, the Kuomintang, 
after a terrible year of internecine fighting, 
was a -very different party from the one which had 
launched the Northern Expedition in 1926. The 
Kuomintang had failed to impose any degree of 
centralisation on its conquered provinces, it had 
failed to amalgamate the converted warlord armies 
into a national army; existing regional power-holding 
had not been checked.. Political training of the 
army, which had been one of the Kuomintang's major 
policies, had been virtually abandoned. Officers 
and generals mouthed the now established credo 
of the Three Peoples' Principles, but the common 
soldier was still the illiterate peasant, steeped 
in tradition and superstition, not political 
ideology, who had always made up warlord armies. 
Another 'ideology' was growing in strength, an 
ideology-by-default, that of regionalism.
It is difficult to imagine that the Kwangsi
generals started on the Northern Expedition 
with the idea of establishing a regionalist base 
for themselves in central China, linked with their 
original base in Kwangsi; nevertheless, this is 
what they were doing at the beginning of 1928.
They still paid lip-service to Kuomintang ideology, 
but the immediacy had gone. Their adherence to the
Kuomintang was expressed "only through the colours
16^of the Government flag".
The Kwangsi Clique at Wuhan.
After their move to Wuhan, the Kwangsi leaders 
laid new plans. They broke off all co-operation 
with Nanking, and set about building their own 
empire, which was to include the four provinces of 
Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupei. To do this, 
they had to strengthen their hold over Hupei, and 
assert some kind of control over Hunan, which was 
still independent of Wuhan. They concentrated 
their efforts on establishing their overall 
military authority; they did not intend to set up 
colonial governments. They employed secondary 
figures to conduct every day administration in each 
province, choosing natives of the province for 
these Jobs. Hu Tsung-to was given charge of 
military affairs in Hupei, and it was generally
175
expected that Oh*eng Ch’ien would hold a similar
post in Hunan, once the province was pacified*
Pai Oh'ung-hsi's troops started moving into
Hunan in January, and met 1'ang Sheng-chih’s forces
at Oae Hilo River - where in the summer of 1926
they had fought together against Wu P'ei-fu. The
Hunanese were driven south, splitting into two
groups, one retreating south down the Hsiang
Valley, the other towards Kweichow* Oh'angsha fell
on January 25th.
The Hunan forces were being backed in their
resistance by Hanking: "what appeared to be a
struggle between Hunan and Hupei was in fact a
disguised battle between Chekiang and Kwangsi",
Although the Kwangsi generals had issued the requisite
telegrams welcoming Chiang’s return to office -
delayed in Pai's case - they had no intention of
accepting his order for a cease-fire in Hunan.
They did however amend their original pretext for
the campaign, of returning to Kwangtung to help
166suppress the communists there, to one of
167
suppressing the Hunanese communist, Ho Chien.
They cannot have missed the irony of this, since 
Ho had been the first Wuhan general to attack the 
communists, in May 1927, and was notoriously
176
anti- communist.
By mid-February, Hunan troops retreating up 
the Hsiang Valley had been pushed almost to the 
Kwangtung border, and were in danger of being 
caught in a trap by Kwangsi troops moving in from 
the South. They surrendered on February 25rd, and 
at the same time a cease-fire was arranged with 
the troops in West Hunan.
The Hunan campaign was arousing considerable 
concern in Hanking. The insubordinate actions 
of the Kwangsi Clique were holding up the 
continuation of the northern Expedition, since 
Chiang Kai-shek could not launch his troops north 
while a potentially hostile grouping was 
developing on his flank. He reached an agreement
t
with Feng Yu-hsiang, whose forces were stationed
in Honan, bordering on Hupei, to bring pressure
on Wuhan which would prevent the continuation of
169the campaign in Hunan, and bring Wuhan to heel. y
The Kwangsi Clique knew they could not resist the
combined forces of Chiang and Feng. They decided
not to force the total surrender of their opponents
fo
xxi Hunan, but ^ arrange,# a cease-fire, and then to 
work out a compromise with Hanking.
Li Chi-shen came north to arrange it. He 
extracted from Hanking an undertaking to recognise
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the autonomy of the four Kwangsi-dominated
provinces, to recognize Yunnan and Kweichow as
within the Kwangsi sphere of influence, to sever
connections with Wang Ching-wei and the Left
Kuomintang, to move Ghang Ea-k'uei's forces into
north China, and to waive Nanking's right to
revenue from Kwangtung; in return the Kwangsi Clique
agreed to recognise Nanking, to make no plans to
threaten its rear, and to send forces on the
Northern Expedition, financed by Nanking.^7^ ^0
confirm the new situation, Li Chi-shen was made
acting Chairman of the Military Committee, and
171Li Tsung-jen commander of the 4th Group Army, f
Chiang had originally wanted to appoint T'an Ten-k'ai
to command the 4th Group Armies#. f a n  was thought
to b^acceptable both to the Kwangsi Clique and to
Nanking, But the Kwangsi Clique would only accept
a Kwangsi man, Li was appointed in March, but did
172not take up his post until May. r
Li Chi-shen's successful negotiation demonstrated 
the benefit which the Kwangsi Clique could draw 
from operating on several different fronts at once. 
Since he was not involved directly in the present 
Wuhan/Nanking trouble, he could negotiate from 
the side-lines.
The Nanking agreement confirmed the regional
178
independence of th^Kwangsi Clique. Its regional 
£>ower was formalised by the appointment of 
Li Tsung-jen as 4-th &roup Army commander, and by 
the establishment of a Branch Political Council at
rt
Wuhan, as at Kaifeng, T 'alyuan and Canton. These
councils, established by the 4th Plenum, operated
as independent regional governments. Nanking
regarded them as a temporary expedient, a
recognition that the powerful Kuomintang militarists
would have to be allowed to remain independent
175until the Northern Expedition was completed.
At Wuhan, the Kwangsi Clique started to apply
its concepts of regional rule. It found ideological
backing for its position in the ideas of Li Shih-tseng
174a senior member of the Kuomintang Right-wing.
The situation in Hunan was complicated by the fact 
that the Kwangsi leaders had to allow the 
appointment of Lu T *i-p1ing as chairman of Hunan, 
on Nanking pressure. In Hupei, they left the 
mechanics of government in more trusted hands, those
175
of Hu Tsung-uo and Chang Chih-pen. Hu was a
zealous opponent of communism. The Soviet Consulate 
in Wuhan was closed in December, 1927? and during 
the early part of 1928 executions6f communists 
took place every day. The Wuhan authorities were 
catholic in their dislike of foreigners; they
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arrested Red Russians and White Russians, impartially, 
banned the recently re-established mission schools 
from using the Bible in instruction, and 
maintained an anti-imperialist Dine against both 
the Soviets and the Japanese; there was even 
trouble with the Prench c o n s u l . ' T h e  regime was 
unsophisticated and unenlightened, in its external 
and internal policies.
In the South, Li Chi-shen continued his 
operations against communist remnants in Kwangtung, 
while in Kwangsi Huang Shao-hsiung struck against 
the communist-heId hsien in the norths-west of the
*| ryry
province. The attitude of the southern Kwangsi 
leaders towards international policy was more 
pragmatic than that of the Wuhan leaders. Only 
one power concerned Canton - Great Britain, and 
its colony, Hong Kong. Li Chi-shen started 
negotiations at the beginning of 1928 to restore 
good relations with Hong Kong, and in March the 
govenor of the colony paid an official visit 
to Canton. This visit would have been unthinkable 
at any stage during the past few years, and it was 
the clearest possible indication of the defeat of 
radicalism in South China.
The divergence of policy towards the Powers
180
in the South and at Wuhan again pointed up the
convenience to the Kwangsi Glique of operating
from two centres. The divergence became
particularly clear, when, at the time of the
Ghinan incident, anti-Japanese demonstrations
were forbidden in Canton, but were officially
179encouraged in Wuhan. f ' Wuhan had nothing to 
lose by pursuing an anti-imperialist policy, but 
Canton found it more convenient to appease the 
British and the Japanese. Because of the physical 
separation, this contradiction did not cause a 
split in the Glique itself.’*'^
An unexpected policy, in Wuhan and Kwangsi, 
was the promotion of universities (Ganton already 
had one). Huang Bhao-hsiung set up Kwangsi 
University at Wuchow, and called in Kwangsifs
it
most distinguished civilian, Ma Ghun-wu, to run it. 
In Wuhan, a university was set up in the summer of 
1928, though its beautiful campus beside the Bast 
Lake was not built until 1930.^^ Ihe motive 
for setting up these universities was partly to 
train people to take part in the reconstruction 
which was to follow the completion of the Northern 
Expedition, and for this reason both had a strongly 
technical orientation. But the universities
were also regarded as prestige undertakings, the 
pet projects of not very learned generals who 
demonstrated their cultural sensitivity by 
establishing seats of learning.
In April, 1928, the Northern Expedition got 
under way again. The 1st Group Army advanced north
it
from Hsuchow along the railway line to Tientsin, 
the 2nd into Ghihli and West Shantung, and the 
3rd moved east out of Shansi. The 4th was to be 
used as a general reserve, and did not participate 
in the fighting. On April 29th, Pai Ch'ung-hsi
182announced that his troops had reached Chengchow; 
(Pai was commanding the troops of the 4th Group 
Army that went Nortlj).
Pai Cb^ung-hsi himself left Wuhan on May 19th, 
and conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and Peng
ti
Yu-hsiang at Chengchow on May 21st. His departure
from Wuhan was followed swiftly by the arrest of
Ch'eng Ch'ien. Ch'eng had co-operated with the
Kwangsi Clique in their attack on T 1ang Sheng-chih,
but had been a liability to them ever since. The
original plan of installing him in Hunan had not
come off, and he felt cheated. His bitter hatred
S
of Chiang Kai-shek was irrepresjible, and a source 
of ernbarrassement to the Kwangsi leaders afteriheir
182
ion with hanking. 'Their action in
185arresting him was immediately approved hy Nanking*
184Peking fell to Yen Hsi-shan on June 12th.
Troops of the 4th followed Yen*s troops into 
Peking, where they proceeded to make a quiet challenge 
to Yen*s forces for power in the Peking/Tientsin 
region. At the beginning of July, Li Tsung-jen 
and Chiang Kai-shek came to Peking, and went with 
Yen Hsi-shan and Peng Yti-hsiang to Pi-yilri-ssu,
(The Temple of Azure Clouds) in the Western Hills 
outside Peking, to announce the end of the 
Northern Expedition to Sun Yat-sen*s spirit, which 
supposedly lay in the great silver casket in the 
temple. nA dramatic episode marked the 
impressive memorial rites...Chiang Kai-shek flung 
himself sobbing upon the casket containing the 
dead leader*s remains, and was led sobbing from 
the scene by Peng Yuh-siang (sic)11.18^
The Northern Expedition was finished; with 
the exception of a few pockets of resistance,
China south of the Great Wall was reunified*
The next few years woiild show quite how specious 
this reunification was.
reconcilliat
CHAPTER V.
gsi: 1926-1929-
When the 7th Army left Kwangsi in the late
spring of 1926, to take part in the Northern
Expedition, two of the three Kwangsi leaders,
Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, left the
province; the third, Huang Shao-hsiung, was left
behind to govern Kwangsi* Huang, more active
and outward-looking than Li, was bitterly
disappointed that he was not able to leave his
remote corner of China, and go forth to make
his name on the national scene, but his natural
resilience exerted itself, as it was to do on
the many subsequent occasions that his career
took an unwelcome turn, and he set himself to
develop Kwangsi, and to form close links with 
1
Kwangtung. For the next three years, he ruled 
Kwangsi independently of his two colleagues, and 
imprinted his energetic and forward-looking 
nature on the province. Huang's activities 
were set within the framework of Kuomintang policies, 
but since, especially after the middle of 1927, 
he was neither given nor asked for direction from 
the central Kuomintang authorities, his rule took 
on an increasingly individualistic aspect. It
184
was authoritarian, militaristic and politically 
right-wing, but not static; economically, Huang 
tried to drag Kwangsi out of its abysmal 
backwardness and set it on the road to 
modernisation. His ambition was to establish a 
tranquil, well-run model province, poor but 
hopeful, which would stand out in the continuing 
chaos of most of the rest of Ghina.
The conduct of civil government by the Kwangsi 
leaders up to 1926 had been haphazard. Before 
the unification of the province in 1925? hi and 
Huang had left the administration of areas under 
their control to the existing magistrates, 
appointing new ones where necessary from the 
local gentry. They were perpetuating a form of 
local government unchanged since the Ch'ing 
Dynasty, and one which, Huang observes, was
p
1 genuine local self-government^ In 1924, the 
provincial capital, Nanning, fell into their 
hands, and the question of establishing some 
form of provincial government arose. They 
appointed the head of the Kwangsi Provincial 
Assembly, Oh'ang Yi-ch'i, govenor. However, 
early in 1925, Yunnanese forces took the city,cwcL 
Oh'ang fled, so that when the Kwangsi leaders 
defeated the Yunnanese in the summer and
185
consolidated their rule over the whole province, 
they were again faced with installing some 
form of civil government. They recognised neither 
the Peking Government, nor the recently formed 
National Government in Canton, and could not ask 
either government to appoint a govenor; they did 
not want to recruit another govenor from among 
the old-fashioned elders of the Provincial 
Assembly, They therefore established an Office 
of Civil Government (Min-cheng Kung-shu), of which 
Huang Shao-hsiung became the first head in 
September^ 1925* This was, as Huang said, 
equivalent to "setting himself up as king",(tzu 
li wei wang) , ^
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Initially, the new administration made little 
impact. Most of the province was still disturbed, 
and local government remained in the hands of the 
magistrates; some headway was made in the 
unification of tax collection, but the administration 
continued to depend for the built of its income on 
the easily-collected tax on opium in transit from
Zj.
Yunnan and Kweichow, to Kwangtung and Hong Kong.
Huang's chief concern in late 1925 and early 
1926 lay in mopping up the remaining areas of 
resistance within the province, in improving the
186
standard of Kwangsi1s troops, and in forming 
closer ties with the Kuomintang and Kwangtung,
Givil administration was a secondary matter. Not 
until after a regular provincial government had 
been set up in Juney 1926, in accordance with 
the Act of Union between Kwangtung and Kwangsi, 
promulgated in March ,^1926, did Huang give more 
attention to it,^ We shall look at the major 
problems he faced individually.
Establishment of Order within the Province.
This was Huang's paramount problem. The 
province was still riddled with dissident soldiers, 
and bandife gangs; it was also threatened from 
outside, from Yunnan. To cope with this multiple 
threat, two thirds of the troops under the command 
of the new Kwangsi leaders (three divisions)
6remained in Kwangsi, while the rest went North,
Huang was reasonably successful in coping with
the unorganised bandits; some were hunted down
and exterminated, either by regular forces, or by
local militia; others were simply incorporated
7into the regular army.f The main lines of 
communication were cleared, and the larger towns 
and cities protected from bandit attacks, though 
sporadic bandit attacks occurred in more isolated
187
areas for many years
Dissident soldiers, chiefly former 
subordinates of Lu Yung-t'ing, had in most cases 
already been incorporated into the forces 
controlled by Li Tsung-jen and Huang Shao-hsiung* 
The problem was now to draw their teeth, and ensure 
their loyalty and docility* Huang achieved this 
by sending large numbers of his own troops into 
the western areas of the province, where Lu's 
troops had surrendered, thus robbing them of the 
chance to establish strongholds of their own, 
from which they could plan rebellion*
These troop concentrations had an additional 
function, that of meeting the potential threat 
to Kwangsi1s security from Yunnan. In addition 
to Huang's troops, there was a large Yunnanese 
unit in the area, commanded by Kan Shih-sheng;
Kan had previously been stationed in Kwangtung, 
as part of Sun Yat-sen's Yunnan/Kwangsi 
mercenaries, and had been sent to Kwangsi's aid 
in 1925i when the province was invaded by rival 
Yunnanese troops* Together the troops of Huang 
and Kan were able to repulse a faint-hearted 
Yunnanese attack in the late summer of 1926, timed 
to coincide with Wu P'ei-fu's final defence of the
188
Wuhan region. (Wu had formed an alliance with
T'ang Ghi-yao, the Yunnan warlord, and with Liu
Ghen-huan, a displaced Kwangsi general, to launch
this diversionary attack).^ Kwangsi's recurring
problems with Yunnan were finally settled in 1927,
when T'ang was overthrown, and Yunnan threw in its
lot with the Kuomintang, though there were
difficulties with Fan Shih-sheng, who was unable to
fulfil his ambition of returning to Yunnan, and
remained a 'guest' in Kwangsi. He was later
transferred to th^Kiangsi/Itwangtung border region,
where, for a brief period in 1928 and 1929, he gave
sanctuary to Chu Te after Ghu's defeats in 
10Kwangtung. After 1927, Kwangsi had no further 
problems with her naghbours, all of whom wei’e now 
adherents of the Kuomintang.
Fhe problem of Finance.
Huang faced formidable problems in the ordering
of Kwangsi 1 s finances, which stemmed fx’om the
blank poverty of the province. His committments
were enormous: to support an araiy of somewhere
11between 15,000 and 28,000 men within the province, 
and to contribute to the upkeep of the 7th Army 
outside. In addition he had to stabilise the 
currency, to restore trade and commerce, and to
make an attempt to reconstruct the ravaged 
province.
The amount of money that Kwangsi contributed
to the 7th is uncertain, and it must have decreased
as the army moved further north, and^cquired its
own garrison areas; but until it reached the
Yangtze, it was probably dependent on remittances
from Kwangsi which may have totalled several million 
^ 12yuan. Military expenditure was a crippling
burden for Kwangsi, as for China as a whole; even
in 1928, when the province was completely stabilised
it accounted for 60% of the provincial income -
1Bprobably a conservative estimate.  ^ Kwangsi did 
receive contributions from Kwangtung, though the 
amount and regularity of these is difficult to 
assess. Basically, Huang depended on two sources 
to raise the money he needed to fulfil all his 
committments: regular taxation, and the tax on opium 
The regular tax system had fallen into disrepair 
during the five years of civil war from 1921. Even 
with the re-establishment of order, from 1925 on, 
it yielded only a sum of between 15 and 16 million 
yiian in 1926.^ This rose to 22 million in 19272^ 
chiefly as a result of the reforms in tax collection 
instituted early in 1927, when a Tax Regulation
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Committee (Gheng-li Shui-wu Wei-yuan-hui) was set
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16up* The lucrative gambling tax was tightened
up, by confining gambling to government-run dens,
selective import tariffs were introduced, and the
17number of taxes cut. r But the majority of taxes 
were still collected inefficiently, tax farming 
continued, and as much as 50% of actual revenue
1 A
never reached government hands.
'The opium tax was a far more secure source
of income. Even in 1925, when the province was
in a state of almost complete anarchy, the Kwangsi
19opium monopoly yielded five million dollars. '
The trade continued when most other trade ceased, 
simply because it was so valuable that it could 
carry enormous transportation costs, both in 
transit taxes, and in the armed convoys which the 
opium merchants were forced to organise. But 
though the trade never dried up, however chaotic 
the areas through which it passed, it flourished 
only when there was a stable military authority, 
which guaranteed its passage, in return for tax 
payments. One of Huang Shao-hsiung1s first acts 
after he had gained control of Wuchow in 1925 
was to set up an Opium Suppression Bureau (i.e. an 
opium taxation bureau). Huang1s bureau was staffed
191
day and night; searchlights played on the river
20during the hours of darkness to prevent evasion,
Die trade grew in proportion to tie stability 
of the province, and between 1926 and 1929 yielded
i 2 Lan average of 10 million yrian per annum, ' The
Kuomintang was of course pledged to the suppression
of opium in China, but for Kwangsi the moral
objections remained abstract, though they found
expression in the fact that the trade itself was
seldom mentioned publicly, except by indignant
foreigners, who found in it a proof of Chinese
"hypocrisy".
For Kwangsi, the trade was economically
essential, and was recognised as such by the
Kwangtung authorities, (whoever they might be
at any given time), who saw that without the trade,
Kwangsi would become dependent on Kwangtung, In
November, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek told Huang
Shao-hsiung that it would be "inconvenient" to
reduce the trade, while the possibility of
financial assistance to Kwangsi from Kwangtung
22remained limited. In 1928, Li Chi-shen stated 
that while opium suppression in Kwangtung was 
technically desirable, this would have severe 
repercussions for Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow, 
all of which depended on the trade.^3
Throughout the 1930s, until in 1935 the 
opium from Kweichow was diverted (after that 
province came under Nanking control when Nanking 
troops entered it in pursuit of the communist 
forces on the Long March), Kwangsi remained 
dependent on opium, which gave an income of about 
15 million yuan per annum, or half the provincial 
government’s total income.
In common with other Chinese leaders who 
depended on opium revenue, Kwangsi's leaders 
found it embarrassing to refer to it directly, 
since they were at the same time pursuing an 
official policy of banning opium. Opium smoking 
was banned in January 1929,^ and token arrests 
were made.
The restoration of a stable currency in
Kwangsi was essential for the revival of trade
and commerce 0 In 1925> the currency was virtually
worthless; paper money had no backing, and coins
in circulation were debased. The old currency
had collapsed in 1921 when Lu Yung-t1ing fell; in
the following years, paper currencies were issued
by any militarist, strong enough to force their
acceptance, while private speculators minted
27debased coins. The new Kwangsi leaders themselves
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indulged in these practices; their mint at
Kueipfing was turning out 20,000 yuan worth of
20 cent coins per day in May 1925,■ which were 
2860% alloy, They subsequently refused their own
29coins as tax payment, The only stable currencies
circulating in the province were foreign ones -
Cantonese, Iiong Kong and Indo-Chinese,
In January 1926, all debased coins were
recalled,melted down, and new coins cast from the
six million yUan worth of pure silver obtained
50after the melting process. The reissue was
completed within a year. In May, the Kwangsi Bank
was established at Wuchow; it issued paper money,
backed initially by the proceeds (two million yuan)
from the sale of a huge consignment of opium siezed
near the Yunnan border. This backing Huang
Shao-hsiung described as “turning black goods
51into white silver”.
The currency was temporarily stabilised, but 
by 1928, the Bank was being used as a subsidiary 
provincial treasury, issuing large amounts of 
unbacked paper money. In 1929«> the paper issue 
failed completely, after the defeat of the Kwangsi 
Clique.^
Kwangsi1s external trade had withered in 1921, 
when Lu Yung-ting's fall ushered in prolonged
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civil war. An important; factor in Kwangsi1 s trade
w^s traditionally the role of Cantonese merchants*
who conducted a large part of it. They departed
when the province descended into chaos, to return
only when the new leaders brought stability to the
province. By 1926, total trade, excluding the
opium trade, and 'native'trade 1, had reached
the kind of proportions of pre-1921 trade, but
imports were almost double exports. ^ The
Maritime Customs revenue for Kwangsifs three treaty
ports was still lower in 1927* however, than it
had been in 1912.^
The upturn in trade continued until 1929*
although the import surplus also rose.^ Kwangsi's
exports were limited^ agricultural products,
livestock, wood-oil, firewood, charcoal, and
minerals. Its special products were bizarre:
"the world's supply of star-anise is produced
here. Cassia is also produce^..fishing lines,
made from the intestines of a species of silk-worm
form a speciality peculiar to this province".
Kwangsi also exported live anteaters, for the
37gourmets of Canton and Hong Kong. r Kwangsi*s
exports of tin and manganese were more valuable;
38production rose sharply between 1926 and 1929*
Tung oil was most valuable of all*
The Kwangsi government made attempts to encourage
exports ^ ^introducing protectionist taxes,^ by
4-1supporting anti-foreign boycotts and by organising
4-2a trade exhibition of local products at Liuchow.
Mining production was fostered through loan schemes
4.^
and official sales bureaux,  ^But none of these 
measures were sufficient to alter the adverse 
balance of trade, which continued so long as 
Kwangsi remained dependent on imports to supply 
the great bulk of her needs in manufactures and 
s emi-manuf ac ture s.
The Formation of Links between Kwangtung and Kwangsi.
The relationship of Kwangsi to Kwangtung in the 
mid-l920*s was complex. On the one hand, there was 
deep enmity and division, the result of Kwangsi*s 
depredations in Kwangtung between 1916 and 1921, and 
of Kwangtung1s revenge for these actions in 1921 
and 1922. On the other hand there was a political 
alliance under the flag of the Kuomintang, an 
alliance strengthened by the close personal ties 
between the Kwangsi leaders, and Li Ghi-shen, who 
gained control of Kwangtung with the departure of 
the Northern Expedition. Kwangtung was prosperous, 
industrially and commercially advanced; its 
capital. Canton, was the commercial and cultural 
centre of South China. Kwangsi was poor, undeveloped
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culturally backward and wild. If it bad any 
fame, it was as a barbarous place; its only 
contribution lay in producing fierce, effective
fighters. It was variously described as
nil. 2U5
Kwangtung*s " vassal'1, its 1 step-child *', or,
with greater panache,(by a Kwangsi government
\  zla
guest;, as Rome to Kwangtung*s Greece.
Kwangsi*s whole outlook, commercial, political 
and cultural, was to Kwangtung, Wuchow, its 
largest city and commercial centre, was virtually 
a Cantonese city. Wuchow handled the great bulk 
of Kwangsi*s external trade, Trade nith Tongking 
was minimal; although the Tongking authorities 
had extended a railway up to theKwangsi border, 
which linked with a good road down to the highest 
point of navigation within Kwangsi, at Lungchow, 
the opening of communications had not encouraged 
trade. ,fCe que I'un des pay vend n'est pas ce 
que 1 * autre demande I11^
Kwangsi*s relationship to Kwangtung was 
one-sided, and that of an inferior, in every 
respect except one: her soldiers. Over the past 
century, Kwangsi had developed a tradition of 
producing tough, aggressive fighters, especially
from among thyHakka people settled in the province.
These fighters had made their mark first in the
Taiping Rebellion, and then in the Sino-French
War of 1884/5; they allowed Lu Yung-t'ing to
dominate Kwangtung between 1916 and 1921, and
they formed virtually the only 'liquid asset* of
the Kwangsi Clique during the whole of its career
up to 1949. Kwangsi*s political ties with the
Kuomintang were cemented by the'export* of her
troops, to take part in the Northern Expedition,
and also, on numerous occasions, to help in
suppressing dissident forces in Kwangtung. Kwangsi
troops were sent into Kwangtung in late 1925, to
help put down non-Kuomintang militai^ists in the
North River area, and in the Nan-Lu area of
Kwangtung; in 1927 they helped Li Chi-shen to
maintain his precarious position in Kwangtung,
against communist and Cantonese opposition. (The
relationship of Li Chi-shen to Kwangsi will be
discussed below). In May, 1927, Kwangsi troops
(one division) were in action against communist-led
peasant and worker bands, who had moved into the
48North River area after the Purge in Canton. In
August, the same troops, supplemented by an 
additional division, went into action against the 
troops of Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing near the Fukien
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4-9border. In November, there were Kwangsi tydt>p>
movements in the West River Valley, probably in
support of a planned coup against Ghang Pa-kfuei,
SOwhich was preempted by Ghang * s own coup. In
December and January, Kwangsi troops were in action
against Ghang*s remnants in the East River Area.
There was little fighting in Kwangtung for the
rest of 1928; in 1929, after the leaders of the
Kwangsi Clique at Wuhan and Peking had been
expelled, and Li Chi-shen arrested in Nanking,
Oantonese generals opposed to the Kwangsi Clique
turned on Kwangsi, and helped to bring about the
temporary eclipse of the Clique.
Particularly in 1927, Kwangsi's troops played
a crucial role in maintaining the right-wing
domination of Kwangtung by Li Chi-shen. Their
actions, and Li*s political identification with
the Kwangsi Clique, underlined the fact, less
noticeable before, the Li was not a Oantonese native,
but a Kwangsi man. He became the butt of local
opposition, both political, from the left, and
local-chauvinist, from native Cantonese.
The KuomintangCommunists and Mass Movements 
in Kwangsi.
Kwangsi1s military interventions in Kwangtung 
were her only ‘contribution1 to Kwangtung;
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otherwise, the relationship between the two
provinces was one-sided, with Kwangsi the receiver
of influences from Kwangtung, Kwangsi frequently-
reflected, on a reduced scale, trends at work in
Kwangtung, This was particularly true of the
political activity which swept Ganton and Kwangtung
in the mid-1920's, and overflowed into Kwangsi,
pushing up the West Riser and its tributaries
like a tidal wave,
The establishment of Kuomintang organisation
in Kwangsi preceeded the official link between
the two provinces in March, 1926, A Party branch
was established at Wuchow after the first
51Kuomintang Congress in January, 1924, It had
no connection with the emergent Kwangsi leaders,
52whose troops actually garrisoned the city, but
was concerned with organising the local \©rkers
and students* A labour federation was formed there
at the end of 1924,^ and by the middle of 19255
54-union membership was compulsory. These unions 
were organised by activists sent in from Kwangtung, 
many of whom were communists; they gradually 
extended their activities out from Wuchow, to all 
the major centres of Kwangsi.55 A Communist 
Party Bureau., and a branch of the Communist Youth 
League (Ch'ing-nien T'uan) were established in the
province in 1925, and worker, peasant, student 
and women's organisations set up.
This Kuomintang and Communist-led activity 
was not controlled by the military leaders of 
Kwangsi. When they themselves came out officially 
for the Kuomintang, they found themselves at the 
head of an independent growth. Though they 
were believed by foreigners in the province to 
have adopted the "bolshevik code of behaviour",
and thrown in their lot with the "Red Government",
5?of Canton, r their position was nominal, a
situation that was reflected in the composition
of the first provincial Executive and Supervisory
Committees, elected at the first Provincial
Kuomintang Congress in January 1926; although
Huang Shao-hsiung was chairman of the Executive
Committee, a majority of the nine members were
58either communists or left-wingers.
Por a while, the Kwangsi leaders were 
prepared to let themselves be cairried by the tide, 
and they gave their support to th^mass movements, 
and in particular to their anti-imperialist and 
anti-foreign manifestations. As missionaries 
made up the bulk of the tiny foreign community in 
Kwangsi, they bore the brunt of anti-foreign 
agitation, though this was augmented by the
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anti-religious movement which was launched by 
the Kwangsi leaders, to coincide with the 
existing mass activity.
Pai Ch'ung-hsi was the chief sponsor of the
anti-religious movement, which started in the
Kweilin regiont and was particularly aimed against
superstitious practices. Early in 1926, Paifs
troops went into action, smashing idols, beheading
statues, and converting temples for use as schools
and Party headquarters. In an article entitled
"The Twilight of the Gods", a Kweilin correspondent
described the destruction of the idols in a
building "which formerly housed a realistic model
of hell". Many of the soldiers who carried
out the work were so disturbed by the sacrilege
that they believed they were committing that they
prayed for forgiveness to the idols before
smashing them*^ In some areas, this iconoclasm
led to serious clashes between the troops
carrying out the destruction, and their radical
61supporters, and the conservative inhabitants.
It is difficult to assess how much of the activity 
against local religions was a genuine attempt to 
get rid of traditional, superstitious practices, 
and how much of it was a reflection of Pai 
Gh'ung-hsi’s own distaste, as a Moslem, for
religions alien to himself. His policy was 
supported by Huang Shao-hsiung, but Huang allowed 
himself to be over-ridden by his mother in the 
case of his own village; there the idols were
allowed to remain, and Huang stood at her side
62while she worshipped them.
The anti-foreign demonstrations throughout 
the province forced the majority of foreigners 
to leave the province. British merchants were 
evacuated from Wuchow in December 1925,^ The 
French catholic missionaries, stationed chiefly 
in the west of the province, were subjected to 
constant harassement, but did not leave their
6 zl
posts as did their protestant rivals. The
Southern Baptist Mission hospital at Wuchow was
evacuated by an American gunboat in April. The
Kwangsi Ohinese Christian Promotion Society,
"supported by Bolshevik elements, the military
headquarters, the labour unions and the strikers",
issued a proclammation which stated that: "The
saying that missionaries and doctors are vanguards
of the Imperialistic invaders proves to be a fact
undeniable. Fragrances and stink must be
65separated*.." ^ Rex Ray, the Cowboy missionary, was 
glad to get away from the "devil's crowd", and
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return to the "good old U.S.A. and Texas sunshine". 
The Americans, who had passed relatively easily 
through the anti-British agitation of 19259 now 
found themselves under attack. They were unable 
to protect their converts; the business agent 
of the Southern Baptist mission in Kweilin was 
seized and paraded through the streets of the town, 
with firecrackers exploding at his heels. He was 
denounced at a series of public meetings, and 
finally branded on both cheeks with the 
characters "yang-nu",(foreign slave).^
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These incidents were of course minor in 
comparison to the fury of the anti-foreign and 
anti-missionary movement in other provinces, 
notably Hunan. The most serious was the Wuchow 
Incident in June 1926, which involved a British 
gunboat. The gunboat, en route to pick up the 
body of a British oil salesman murdered by bandits 
in the Lungchow region, blockaded the port at 
Wuchow in retaliation for the Chinese refusal to 
provide the boat with pilots. This action on the 
part of the commander led to protests from rhe 
Canton Government, and to questions being raised in 
the House of Commons. Austen Chamberlain, the 
Eoreign Minister, supported the commander: "Happily 
for the British Empire and the peace of the world,
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they £naval officers]! have shown themselves very
68capable of using their discretion"*
Anti-missionary incidents continued sporadically
throughout 1927* though most were directed only
against property* The real force of the movement
was lost after the Hong Kong Strike was ended in
October, 1926, removing much of its immediacy
from the anti-foreign movement*
But by this time, there had been a recession
over the whole spectrum of mass movements in the
province, and an increasing coldness had grown
up between the official Kuomintang apparatus and
the Communists. As early as April, 1926, attempts
were made to curb the activities of the unions in 
69Kwangsi, J Hostility increased when, at about this
time, control of the local communist organisation
passed from Ch'en Mien-shu, who was concurrently
a member of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, to
the much more radical Huang Jih-k'uei and his
70Bussian adviser*r The root of the hostility lay 
in the fact that though the Kwangsi leaders had 
tolerated and even encouraged anti-foreign, 
anti-missionary and iconoclastic manifestations, 
they were deeply alarmed when the mass movements 
started to agitate for higher wages, for an end 
to corruption, and for a curtailment of the opium
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trade; these were features of Kwangsi society 
which, for all their outward show of revolutionary 
zeal, the Kwangsi leaders had no intention of 
correcting, Huang Shao-hsiung wanted a 
'disciplined' mass movements which would ignore 
local evils, and concentrate on attacking 'foreign 
devils', whose actual importance in Kwangsi was 
irrelevant. (The foreign community in Kwangsi 
might have been designed specifically to fill the 
role of butt of mass agitation, since it was small, 
weak and given to retreating to Hong Kong).
Krom the spring of 1925, Huang began to exert
pressure on the mass movements. He did not
abandon his radical public facade, but acted
through local police chiefs and army commanders,
who were given powers to suppress mass agitation.
In Hanning, the provincial capital, the editor
of the Kuo-min Jiti-pao  ^ Huang Hua-piao, acted as
his front man in conducting a campaign against
71radical students and union members. In July,
Guide Weekly printed a letter which reported 
repression and reaction in Kwangsi. The letter, 
and the advice given to the writer, revealed the 
confusion and uncertainty of the Kwangsi communists 
they were advised not to go underground, but to 
continue to work openly, in line with official
72communist policy.' Their confusion, and the 
confusion within the local Kuomintang, which 
reflected all the strands of national Kuomintang 
activity, gave Huang Shao-hsiung, who was not 
confused, the chances he needed. The radical 
camp was divided, it had no outstanding local
leader, and it was vulnerable to Huang's counter
7.3
moves. Huang asserted control over the mass 
movements, long before the full-scale repression 
of Aprily-1927.74
The confusion and inefficiency of local radicals 
was shown up most clearly in the case of the 
peasant movement. While other provinces occupied 
in the early stages of the Northern Expedition 
quickly had millions of peasants organised in
7 c;
associations, only a few thousand individuals
were organised in Kwangsi. There were only two
hsien peasant associations, and only 34 hsiang
ones, many of which were dominated by politically
76reactionary gentry.( The head of the Kuomintang
Peasant Department was an elderly chil-jen^ who
took to wearing peasant clothing, and was regarded
by Huang Shao-hsiung as naive and eccentric, and
77incapable of organising the peasantry.{’
Much of this inefficiency was probably due to
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the lack of interest shown in backward, isolated
Kwangsi by the central communist and radical
Kuomintang leaders, who rightly felt that their
manpower was better deployed in provinces such
as Hunan and Kiangsi* Young activists wanted to
be nearer the real centre of mass activity; thus
when Huang Shao-hsiung organised the most radical
elements in the province into a comfort corps for
the soldiers at the front, and sent them off to
Wuhan, there were no protests
By the end of 1926, the mass movements in
Kwangsi had been nipped in the bud. The actual
Purge in April 1927 was almost an anti-climax,
and only the final stage of a long process of
repression. The Purge, which started on April 12th,
was directed by Huang’s subordinates, Huang Hstl-chu
and Wu T'ing-yang, since he himself was in Shanghai,
where he participated in the planning sessions
79for the Purge held by Ghiang Kai-shek* The 
number of arrests made in Kwangsi is unclear, but 
probably did not number more than a few hundred*
Most of the communist and radical leaders fled 
the province, though several were captured, and 
probably executed, including two members of the
Q - l
Kuomintang Executive Committee* Other executions
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took place in the late summer and autumn.
The second provincial Kuomintang Executive 
Committee, which took office shortly after bhe 
Purge, had a completely ^ composition from the 
first; Huang Shao-hsiung was the only member of 
the first to sit on the second.^ The mass 
movements were dead; there were occasional 
anti-foreign demonstrations, but there was no 
effective opposition to the Kwangsi Clique, nor 
were there any serious internal threats to their 
position until 194-9. The people of Kwangsi, who 
had been crushed into apathy by years of poverty 
and civil war, retreated into apathy. The upsurge 
of 1926 and 1926 was not strong enough to 
challenge the military strength of the Kwangsi 
Clique, (even if it had seriously attempted to 
do this, while Huang was technically in the 
revolutionary camp). Only in one area of the 
province was there serious and sustained opposition 
to tbe Kwangsi Clique, in the Chuang region in 
north-west Kwangsi.
The Chuang Peasant Movement and Soviet.
The province of Kwangsi, now the Kwangsi-Chuang 
Autonomous Region, has a high proportion of non-Han 
minority peoples in its population. In 1958> when 
the Autonomous Region was set up, it was estimated
that, out of a population of 19 million, 7 million
were Ohuangs (35%)> 11 million Han (58%), and the
8 4rest members of small minority groups.
Similar figures are given for the 1930*s . ^  The
Ohuangs, with the other minority peoples such as
the Miao and the Yao, are the most ancient
inhabitants of Kwangsi. They once occupied the
whole of the area which later became the province
of Kwangsi, but as the Han pushed into the area,
they were driven westwards, and up into the hills
86xn the north and west of the province. The 
vast majority of the Ohuang did not preserve their 
identity as a separate people, but became sinicised. 
Only a few, in the remoter areas of the province, 
preserved their Ohuang identity, and remained 
outside the control of the provincial authorities.
It was among these people that the Ohuang peasant 
movement developed in the early 19201 s.
Relations between the Han and sinicised Chuang. 
and the real minority peoples approached a state 
of permanent warfare. The minority peoples 
suffered sporadic persecution from the dominant 
Han.^ In 1919 and 1920, there were Miao 
rebellions, and the military repression which
followed these outbursts left behind wells of
88hatred. The minority peoples, backward and
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uneducated, were constantly at the mercy of
Han and sinicised Ohuang traders and government.
officials* Most of the minority peoples were
desperately poor; they farmed the infertile hill
land, while the fertile valley land was in the
hands of Han and sinicised Ohuang*
In 1923? the sufferings of the minorities
were exacerbated by the depradations of roving
bands of soldiers who became the only authority
in the area after the collapse of civil order
in 1921. In response to this anarchic situation,
Wei Pa~chiin, the son of a local landlord, started
to organise the peasants of Tunglan jksien into
89self-protection associations.
These first stirrings of peasant organisation
were soon squashed by the local landlords, and
in 1924, Wei was forced to flee. He went to
Ganton, and attended the Peasant Movement Training
Institute there (later directed by Mao Tse-tung)
In 1925, Wei returned to Tunglan, and took up
his organisation work again, setting up his own
91institute for training peasants. Perhaps 
because of Wei's training in Ganton, the movement 
was better able to resist the attacks made on it 
by the local landlords, (though in one clash two
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hundred peasants were killed).92
In spite of Wei's connections with communists
and radicals in Ganton, the Tunglan movement
still had the character of blind revolt, motivated
more by racial anti-Iian considerations than by
socialist ones. There was a strong ritual
element; oaths were sworn and the blood of chickens
drunk before clashes with the landlords
During 1925 and 1926, the movement expanded,
aided by the preoccupation of the Kwangsi leaders
with other parts of the province, and with
Kwangtung. In January, 1926, the town of Tunglan 
94was taken, and a revolutionary committee was set 
95
up there. When the peasants started executing 
landlords, Huang Shao-hsiung sent in troops to 
suppress them, and installed his uncle, Huang 
Shou-hsien, as magistrate. But when the troops 
were withdrawn, the peasant movement surged up 
again. Huang Shao-hsiung found it embarrassing 
to continue his policy of repression, since Wei 
had by this time attracted attention aad support 
outside the immediate area; the organisation of 
peasant associations and the reduction of rents 
were official Kuomintang policies, which Huang 
himself subscribed to, and he could hardly treat 
this particular peasant movement as a rebellion.
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He was forced to negotiate. The negotiations
were successful, but they had an ironic twist;
the leader of the official negotiating team was
Gh'en lviien*~shu, a member of the Kuomintang
provincial executive committee, and also a
communist. He became magistrate of Tunglan, and
quickly brought Wei and the other peasant leaders
an
into the Communist Party. ' Communist Party and
98Youth League branches were organised in the area.
By the spring of 1927* when the Purge occurred,
the peasant movement in Tunglan and the surrounding
area had grown to such proportions that the
organisation was able to survive the repression
and the military action against the area in 1928,
99though it was forced to retire into the hills.
In 19299 after the defeat of the Kwangsi 
Clique by th^bentral Government at Nanking, control 
of Kwangsi fell into the hands of a group of 
leftist officers from Li Tsung-jen's forces in 
Wuhan, who had defected to Nanking and precipitated 
the coup against Li. Their defection had been 
arranged by Yh Tso~po„ a prominent Kwangsi 
left-winger, who had been forced to leave the 
province in 1927* In return for his services, 
the Nanking government appointed him governor of
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Kwangsi in August 1929, while his cousin, Li Ming-jui 
became the leading military figure in the province.
Yti's co-operation with Nanking had official 
communist sanction, and as soon as he was 
established in Kwangsi, communist workers were 
sent into the province, They concentrated their 
efforts on infiltrating the forces of Li lvIing-jui 
(who was already very left-wing), leaving the 
agents of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ghing-wei, who 
were also sent into the province, to wage a more 
open struggle for influence over Y1A Tso-po.^"^
As it turned out, the Kwangsi Clique was not
ih leader
finished; they were preparing a come-back. They 
took advantage of the upheaval following a coup 
against Yil Tso-po, launched by (temporarily) 
pro-Chiang forces, in response to Ytt’s own 
pro-Wang moves against Nanking, to regain control 
of the majority of the forces in Kwangsi by the 
end. of 1929.102
Y'ii Tso-pofs defeat came in October; most of 
the troops officially under the command of his 
cousin, Li liing-jui, were lost through defection, 
but three regiments, by this time communist-controlled, 
retreated into the west of the province, some into 
the Tso Ghiang (Left Kiver) Valley, and some into
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the lyLu Ghiang (Eight Eiver) valley, Li Ming-jui 
went with them, and shortly afterwards joined 
the Communist Party, Yti Tso-po went hack into
exile in Hong Kong,
Luring his brief period as govenor of Kwangsi,
Yd had not ignored the peasant movement in Tung-lan,
He had been sending them supplies, while the
local communists had sent in cadres to improve
loa­the local organisation* When the communist-led
units retreating from the provincial capital
entered the !i)4u Ghiang Valley, and took the
important commercial centre of Pose, Wei Pa-chdn
immediately entered into liaison with them, A
further group of communist cadres, under the
direction of Peng Hsiao-p1ing, the chief representative
105of the GOP Central Committee in Kwangsi, arrived.
The capture of Pose gave the communists a rich
revenue from the tax on opium in transit through 
106the city, for Pose was the main opium centre 
of west Kwangsi; with the help of this income, 
and of the more experienced cadres drafted into 
the area, the peasant movement was able to expand 
rapidly; several more hsien were brought under 
communist control, and the armed forces under 
Wei’s control were expanded, both by the arrival
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of the communist-led troops and by the incorporation
of defecting Kuomintang units. On December 11th,
1929, the second anniversary of the Canton
Commune, the Yt*. Chiang Soviet was set up, and at
the same time the armed forces in the area were
given the name of Red 7th Army.
The establishment of the Soviet and of the
Red Army marked the eclipse of the local Chuang
people in the leadership of their own movement.
All top positions were held by cadres who had come
in from outside. Chang Yttn-yi, was commander
of the 7th Army. T 1 eng Hsiao-p'ing was the
107political chief of the area. f T 1 eng was 
apparently acting directly under the orders of 
the CCP Centre, then in Shanghai, though direct 
contact between the Soviet area and Shanghai took 
40 days.108
In Rebruary/1950, a second soviet was set up,
in the Tso Chiang Valley at Lungchow, and the
8th Red Army formed from troops which YU Tso-yU,
the younger brother of Yti. Tso-po, had led there
after his brother's defeat in the previous
autumn, aid from locally incorporated units, mainly 
109bandits. Initially the activities of this
soviet were much more violent than those of the 
Right River Soviet; the French consulate at Lungchow
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was sacked, and the local catholic mission
entered, on suspicion, undoubtedly justified,
that the French were harbouring landlords and
110’bad elements'. (The Tongking authorities
111immediately closed the border with Kwangsi. )
The military organisation of the 8th Army
was very shaky, and when in March 1930, the
Kwangsi Clique sent an expeditionary force
into the Tso Chiang Valley, the bandit members of
the 8th Army defected, leaving a much depleted
force to make its way across country into the
In Chiang Valley, where it was amalgamated with
IIPthe 7th Army. The Tso Chiang Soviet lasted 
less than two months.
The Xu Chiang Soviet was established on a
123firmer basis. It grew to control eleven hsien; ^
land was confiscated from landlords, and
1 PAdistributed to the peasants, though little 
other action was taken against landlords and local
gentry who had not fled. This proved to be a
serious oversight; when the 7th Army, emboldened 
by its early success in expanding the Soviet 
area, decided to make expeditions outside the 
area, and bring in still more hsien, the landlords 
revived themselves, and their militia, and struck 
back at the peasant s . P o s e  and other towns in
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the Yu Ghiang Valley were lost, and though some
of them were recaptured when the yth came
hurrying bach from its expedition into Kweichow,
the structure of the Soviet was badly shaken.
It was never given a chance to recover, for
in August 1930, Teng Hsiao-p'ing arrived back
from Shanghai where he had been consulting with
the Communist Gentre, with instructions (written
in June) that the and 8th Armies should
leave the Soviet Area and move to the Gentral
116Soviet xn Kiangsi. This order was apparently
in line with the Centre's recent decision,
initiated by Li Li-san, to fight for cities, and
therefore to centralise all scattered military
units. It was an unrealistic order. To get to
Kiangsi, the armies would have to march hundreds
of miles over very rough territory, territory
which was garrisoned by uniformly hostile forces.
The Soviet Area itself would be left virtually
undefended. There was apparently a clash between
Wei Pa-chiin and Teng Hsiao-p' ing as to whether
the Gentral Committee's order should be obeyed,
but Teng forced its acceptance, and in September,
the greater part of the communist forces left 
117the area, * They did not arrive in Kiangsi 
(at Chingkangshan) until the spring of the
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following year; their journey was an agonising
battle against cold, hunger, rugged terrain and
constant enemy attacks, a foretaste of the
rigours of the Long March. Only a third of the
number who had started out actually arrived -
about 6,500 men."^^
The Soviet area itself came under attack from
the forces of the Kwangsi Clique soon after the
departure of the communist forces* Tunglan hsien
was devastated, but the Soviet administration
and many of the local inhabitants retreated into
the hills, where they held out for some time,
living in caves* Eventually, however, they
were crushed, and Weii Ra-chtin himself betrayed
119and executed*  ^ His head was displayed
throughout the province, as a grisly warning to
120would-be dissidents. Several other leaders
of the Kwangsi Communist movement met similar/^
violent ends* Yii Tso-yti, the leader of the
8th Red Army, fled to Hong Kong, but was
extradited by the British authorities to Canton,
121where he was executed. Li Ming-jui went with
the main force into Kiangsi, but was executed 
there by the communist authorities, on suspiscion 
of being in league with Wang Ching-wei.“^ ^
After this debacle, there was no further
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effective communist activity in Kwangsi until
shortly before the final victory in 194*9 9
although a skeleton underground organisation
12 3was maintained in the major cities, •  ^ The cause 
of the collapse of the Kwangsi Soviet can be 
ascribed largely to the ineptitude both of the 
local leaders9 who failed to establish a firm 
basis for the Soviet, and of the Centre, who 
removed its only prop;. Insufficient advantage 
was taken of the opportunity to organise the 
masses during the first half of 1930, when the 
Kwangsi Clique was preoccupied with other enemies. 
When the Kwangsi Clique went into the offensive 
in the second part of the year, the Soviet 
area was poorly defended, and lacked sufficient 
popular organisation to put up adequate resistance 
to the forces of the Kwangsi Clique and their 
landlord allies. With the collapse of the Soviet 
came the suppression of Chuang resistance to the 
Han, their autonomous movement destroyed largely 
as a result of the opportunism of communist Hans, 
who had taken over their movement, expanded it 
to a point where it invited massive retaliation 
from the provincial authorities, and then left it 
defenceless.
The activities of the Ghuang peasant movement 
had little effect on the rest of the province, 
either before or after the formation of the 
Soviet there. They are interesting chiefly in 
the light they throw on the position of the 
minority peoples at the time, and because of their 
connection with the policies of the communist 
centre at the time. For the Kwangsi authorities 
they represented only a minor irritant, which did 
not interfere with the general process of government. 
From 1926 on, the province was militarily secure, 
and, after the suppression of the mass movements 
by the end of that year, the bulk of the civilian 
population was under firm control. These were 
the conditions i;hat Huang Shao-hsiung wanted to 
carry out his plans for the reconstruction of the 
province.
Reconstruction in Kwangsi
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Sun Yat-sen laid out his plans for national 
reconstruction in his Ghien-kuo Ta-kang, 
published in 1924. It consisted of twenty-five 
articles, which contained provisions for the 
work to be undertaken at the various stages of 
the revolution, military, tutelary and 
constitutional. They recognised that development
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would be uneven, and that individual regions
would move ahead at different speeds* One of
their main aims was to prepare the way for
local self-government, and to provide the
economic conditions in which this self-government
124-could function, Huang Shao-hsiung's ideas
on reconstruction differed, in that they contained 
little that would foster popular self-government, 
Technically, according to Article 7 of Sun’s plan, 
Kwangsi should have moved out of the military 
period and into the tutelary one as soon as the 
military settlement of the province was achieved*
But although Kwangsi set up the organs of 
civilian control, such as a provincial Government 
Committee, the province remained under military 
dictatorship, and no attempt was made to undertake 
the training in self-government at hsien level 
which Article 8 provided for. Kwangsifs 
reconstruction consisted simply of attempts to 
put the province's economy on a viable footing.
Kwangsi lacked both the financial and human 
capital necessary to make substantial steps in 
economic reconstruction* However, it was fortunate in 
that during the period from 1926 to 1929, when 
Huang Shao-hsiung was ruling the province, most of 
the rest of China was seriously affected by civil
war; Kwangsi was able to attract experts from
other parts of China who were temporarily unable
to work in their own areas* 80% of the experts
engaged in reconstruction in Kwangsi came from
125outside the province. ^ In addition to these
resident experts, other experts visited the
province on short trips (which were often
combined with officially sponsored oourist trips
in the Kweilin region, one of China's most famous
scenic areas). In 1928, a large group of experts
was sent into the province by the Academics
Sinica. Kwangsi was chosen for this scheme, the
first of its kind, because it "has for a number
of years enjoyed peace and order, and has itself
started on a programme of reconstruction and
126internal development". In the sane year, an
educational seminar was held at Kweilin, to discuss
plans for the development of education in the
province; 2000 academics and teachers attended,
many of them nationally-known figures from
127outside the province. ( At the end of the year,
the provincial Reconstruction Assembly met at
Liuchow, in the centre of the province; again
1 PR
many external experts attended.
The visiting experts were chiefly concerned 
with making plans for the long-term development
of the province's agriculture, industry and
mining, which were slow to show results*; the
noticeable achievements in Huang's rule were
in the reconstruction of the siperficial fabric
of the province, chiefly in the cleaning up of
its cities, and in the development of roads* Many
of the other projects never passed beyond the
planning stage, a common fate for reconstruction
measures in Kuomintang China*
By 1926, the cleaning up of Kwangsi1s cities
and towns had become urgent* Most of them were
built on the banks of the West River and its
tributaries, and were subject to severe flooding,
since the level of the river fluctuated enormously
129at different seasons*  ^As well as being 
subjected to periodic inundations, the cities of 
Kwangsi were frequently ravaged by fire, for the 
houses were densly packed* In 1924, one third 
of the city of Wuchow was destroyed by fire, and 
70,000 people made h o m e l e s s , a n d  in 1928, 
Liuchow was similarly devastated*1^1 Appalling 
urban conditions also encouraged the spread of 
disease, in a province where malaria, dysentry, 
cholera, smallpox, meningitis, typhoid, leprosy, 
diptheria and plague were all endemic*1^  There
224
were frequent epidemics of these diseases, and 
though vaccination, the only effective safeguard, 
was already being practised in Kwangsi at the 
turn of the century, ^  it was inconceivable, 
with the medical resources available, that a 
comprehensive programme could ever be implemented* 
Urban improvements offered some hope of at least 
limiting the spread of disease* ^
Huang Shao-hsiung started a programme of 
urban modernization soon after he took over the 
direction of civil government in 1925* The work 
was concentrated on Wuchow, the main commercial 
centre, ^ o n  Nanning the provincial capital, and 
on Liuchow, at the geographical centre of the 
province, which Huang hoped would become the 
capital of the province* Streets were widened, 
roads surfaced, sewers installed, and water and 
electricity plants set up* The widening of streets 
aroused the same kind of local opposition as was 
shown in Nanking, where thousands of people were 
displaced to make way for the access road to 
Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum, but in general the 
improvements were welcomed, especially by foreign 
residents, one of whom even saw in them a sign 
that "a new day has dawned in Ghina.,,‘^ ^
Road construction proceeded rapidly, from
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1925 one Kwangsi1s communications had been up 
to this time almost exclusively by river. But 
river traffic could be very slow, especially on 
journeys upstream, and was frequently interrupted 
by changes in water level. The construction of 
roads was undertaken partly with the aim of speeding 
transport in goods, and thus the encouragement of 
trade, and partly to make the movement of troops 
within the province easier; the construction of a 
good road to the Kweichow border facilitated the 
transit of opium from Kweichow, a consideration 
which cannot have escaped the roadfs planners.
The road building programme was the most 
successful facet of reconstruction in Kwangsi at 
this period; a great deal of money was devoted to 
it, though most of the labour for it was provided
/ 1 ~Z\ V
by corvee, By 1928, Kwangsi apparently had
138more roads than any other province in Ohina. ^
Other aspects of the development of communications 
were less successful. The idea of building a 
branch railway line between Kweilin and Hengchow, 
in Hunan, first mooted in 1912, was revived, but 
came to nothing; the line was not built until the 
anti^Japanese War, Wor did anything come of 
another projected railway, between Lungchow and
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Nanning (to link up with, the railway constructed
up to the Chinese border in Indo-China). An air
network, linking the cities of Kwangsi with
Canton, did not come into being until after 1930,
nor were the x^ rooden planes envisaged by Huang
Shao-hsiung ever built in Kwangsi, though some
were made in Kwangtung, where enthusiasm for
139aviation reached fever-pitch at this time,
Huang Shao-hsiung was aware that as long as
Kwangsi had no industry, the province would be
dependent on imports to provide many basic
necessities, and that the adverse balance of
trade would continue; he believed that if Kwangsi
could set up a few small-scale light industries,
the burden of imports could be eased. He sponsored
a scheme to set up small factories, with official 
140capital. He also tried to raise capital from
wealthy overseas Chinese, who originally came from
Kwangsi, Very little progress was made; the only
plants which started functioning in Kwangsi between
1926 and 1929 produced such goods as cigarettes,
ice and matches, which had little role to play
either in easing Kwangsi*s import surplus, or in
141aiding the development of the province.
It was clear that though Kwangsi could depend
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temporarily on external experts to help in its
reconstruction, it would eventually need experts
of her own. It was decided therefore to set up
a university at Wuchow, which would train
technicians and scientists for reconstruction work.
It was established at Wuchow, in 1928. Its first
director was lvla Ghiin-wu, the most distinguished
living Kwangsi native, a former secretary of
Bun Yat-sen, former governor of Kwangsi, and a
well-known educator. The university was
Huang Shao-hsiung's pet scheme, and he formed it
to suit his own tastes; he had no respect for
arts courses, and so none were offered. He wanted
to train only the tools for his reconstruction
programme, not "high-level vagrants'1 (kao-teng 
. 14-2yu-mrn;. A large proportion of the provincial 
education budget (three million yuan in 1928) 
was devoted to the university, presupposing a
14- 3relative lack of interest in lower education. J 
Some attention was paid at this period to the 
mammoth task of improving agriculture; the prospect 
of attempting to make all round improvements was 
too daunting, and the Kwangsi authorities contented 
themselves with setting up an experimental station 
at Liuchow. This centre, which was staffed almosc
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entirely "by experts from Canton, conducted various
experiments on crop improvement and livestock
rearing; unfortunately, its schemes were too
impractical for poverty-stricken Kwangsi* Most
peasants could not afford to rebuild their own
houses, let alone put up chickenhouses which cost
144-more than an average peasant's house. The one 
policy which might have made a slight improvement 
in the lot of the peasantry, that of a genea?al 
reduction in land rents, which was still official 
Kuomintang policy, was discontinued in Kwangsi 
and in the other three provinces controlled by 
the Kwangsi Clique in 1928.^"^
Some progress was made in reclaimmation work, 
and in reafforestation; a re damnation area was 
designated near Liuchow, and reclammation work 
allocated to disbanded soldiers, each of whom 
was allotted ten mou of land.^^ Ihe planting 
of trees was encouraged throughout the province, 
lung trees grew particularly easily in Kwangsi, 
and could fulfil^ a dual purpose: in preventing 
erosion on hills which had been stripped bare 
in the past, and in providing a valuable product 
for export, tung oil. ^ung trees are hardy, and 
need little care; they could be planted on 
otherwise barren hill land. Tjjgg oil, extracted
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from the nuts of the tree, is used in many
manufacturing processes, especially in the paint
industry. For China, it was a very important
export; it was produced chiefly in Xunna^
Szechwan and Kwangsi. A Chinese exporter of tung
oil described the importance that was given to
the trade; ua good many of my fellow-countrymen
entertain the idea that China Tung Oil is
absolutely indispensible for foreigners, as if
it were bread and butter...it is simply beyond
their imagination that Tung Oil is only used as
a drying oil - they insist on a conception nothing
147short of metaphysical11. f At Hanning, Huang
Shao-hsiung introduced a scheme whereby civil
servants were required to plant a certain number of
tung treesf -srad it was while he himself was
engaged on this work one day in spring 1929 that
he received a telegram telling him of the arrest
148of Li Chi-shen in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek 
had struck the first blow in his campaign to 
destroy the Kwangsi Clique. The period of 
stability which had allowed Huang Shao-hsiung to 
carry out his limited reforms in Kwangsi was at 
an end.
Li Chi-shen and Kwangsi•
It was ironic that it should be Li Chi-shen1s
arrest which signalled the irrevocable split 
of the Kwangsi Clique from the Nanking.!, government, 
for it was he who had been instrumental in 
bringing the Kwangsi leaders into the Kuomintang 
camp, and it was he who played a major role in 
establishing a close relationship between 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi.
Li was a native of Wuchow, but from an 
early age had made his career in the Cantonese army. 
His connections with Kwangsi only became marked 
when the new leaders rose to power there. He 
was particularly close to Huang Shao-hsiung, who
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came from a neighbouring hsien of Wuchow, Junp;~-hsien. 
During the period of their consolidation of power 
in Kwangsi, from 1925 to 1925, Li Chi-shen, who 
was then stationed in western Kwangtung, was 
almost a paternal figure to the young and. 
inexperienced Kwangsi leaders, but later, durhg 
the Northern Expedition, the position was reversed;
Li1s activities were confined to Kwangtung, where 
he held a paramount position, but they did not 
bring him the national reputation that came to 
Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. He found 
himself identified not as an independent figure, 
but as a member of the newly-emerged Kwangsi Clique.
Li's political standpoint was almost
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indistinguishable from that of the Kwangsi
leaders; its main features were a strong leaning
to regional independence and autocratic rule
based on military control, coupled with a desire
for modernisation, a fierce anti-communism, and
150even fiercer antipathy to Ghiang Kai-shek. ^ '
It can be assumed that many of these features
originated with Li Chi-shen, and were adopted by
the Kwangsi leaders, whose experience lagged
behind his, but this is not to say that he ever
persuaded them to accept ideas with which they
were not in sympathy. Li's role as a'pathfinder'
for the Kwangsi Clique was particularly prominent
in the question of relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
At the beginning of 1926, a Russian adviser in
Kwangtung noted "a great secret enmity" between
Chiang and Li, which arose, on Chiang1s side at
any rate, out of his conviction that Li was his 
151rival. Li was not Chiang's rival for control
of the Kuomintang, but he certainly desired to 
see Chiang and the Kuomintang armies out of 
Kwangtung. Li's troops controlled a large 
area of southern and western Kwangtung; in addition
232
Wang Ching-wei had granted Li control over the
152local customs revenue for the two areas, ^ Li 
was anxious to see all ’guest* troops out of 
the province, and the tremendous drain on 
Kwangtung*s resources lessened? but whether it 
would have served his interests to conduct a 
personal campaign against Ohiang Kai-shek is 
dubious. Nevertheless, an obscure anti-Ohiang 
campaign, believed to originate in Li's 
headquarters, was under way in March 1926.
Scurrilous pamphlets were circulated, calling for 
Ohiang1s departure from Canton. After the 
Chung-Shan Incident at the end of March, the trouble 
was smoothed over, and the agitation ascribed to 
communists in Li's entourage, an equa-l-ly-
155unsatisfactory explanation of the campaign. ^
There was no further overt hostility between 
Chiang and Li until 1929; Li did not openly 
support his colleagues in the Kwangsi Clique 
when they fenced Chiang* s resignation in August 
1927, but the coldness and suspicion persisted 
between the two men through the intervening years.
Li gained the control over Kwangtung that he 
wanted when the bulk of the Kuomintang forcen, 
including a section of his own army, under
Ch'ang Ra~k'uei, moved north in the summer of 
1926. He was made rear commander of the 
National Revolutionary Army, and was the senior 
military commander in Kwangtung, which was 
garrisoned chiefly by his troops. He was 
in a far more powerful position than T'an Yen-k'ai 
who was in charge of the Kuomintang government, 
which remained in Canton until the end of the year 
In December, when the government moved north, 
a branch political council was set up in Canton, 
and Li became its first chairman. Kwangtung 
became virtually independent; the Kuomintang 
was preoccupied with affairs in the Yangtze 
provinces, and with the growing rift in the 
Kuomintang itself. Having established his 
autonomy, Li proceeded to give full play to his 
authoritarian and rightist tendencies, and moved 
to curtail the Biass movements in Kwangtung. In
December, regulations were issued restricting
] r>^workers' activities. ''1 Repression mounted 
through the early months of 1927 * and culminated 
in the Purge of April 1927, which was carried 
out as ferociously in Kwangtung as it was in 
Shanghai.
Li co-operated with Chiang Kai-shek over the
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planning of the Purge, hut he did not allow the 
co-operation to go too far. He continued to 
refuse to allow Nanking appointees to take up 
posts in Kwangtung, and to remit to Nanking 
the sums of moneyedemanded. His independence 
was shattered, however, by the events of the 
late summer of 1927; with the return of Gh'ang 
Fa-k’uei to the province, Li lost much ground, 
and although he was able to re-establish his 
control early in 1928, after the failure of the 
Canton Commune, several of his subordinates had 
managed to grasp strongholds for themselves in 
different sections of the province, from which 
Li could not dislodge them*1^
In addition, Li began to suffer from his 
connection with the Kwangsi Clique* The anti-Kwangsi 
* Canton-for-the-Cantonese1 movement, initiated 
by Wang Ching-wei and Ch’ang Fa-k'uei in the 
autumn of 192?, was still gaining ground. Unwisely,
Li continued his practice of bringing Huang Shao-hsiung 
to Canton to hold the fort for him when he was out 
of the province. Huang spent eight months in 
Kwangtung between November 1926 and November 1927
in Kwangtung-,- and -also-a- good-part- o-f- 1-928 , and
also a good part of 1928; Li was absent for more 
than half che year, in Nanking, This was unwise;
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it emphasised Li’s connection with the Kwangsi 
Clique, at a time when he should have been trying 
to assuage the local nationalism of the Cantonese. 
But Li did not trust his Cantonese subordinates 
any longer. When he left the province in the 
summer of 1928, to attend the 5th Plenum of the 
Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, he took 
his chief rival, the Kwangtung governor, Ch’en 
Ming-shu, with him, and kept him with him for the 
duration of his stay in the north. Li managed to 
maintain his hold on Kwangtung, which was 
increasingly precarious, until his arrest in March, 
19299 in Nanking; this marked the severance of his 
links with Kwangtung.
Li introduced a programme of reconstruction in 
Kwangtung, on which the Kwangsi programme was 
probably modelled. But the process of reconstruction 
in the two provinces was vastly different. With 
an enormously wealthy merchant community, Kwangtung 
could count on industrial and commercial development 
taking place through private enterprise, so long 
as the provincial government was prepared to 
co-operate by controlling the mass movements which 
many merchants had come to hate. Li concentrated 
on major schemes, such as the construction of a 
railway between Kowloon and Ganton, and the
improvement of Whampao harbour facilities. He 
negotiated with Hong Kong to raise a loan to 
build the railway, thus incurring the odium of 
local financial circles, who wished to finance 
the development themselves.
It is probable that after the establishment of 
the Kwangsi Clique's main centre at Wuhan, at the 
end of 1927, Li Chi-shen played a lesser role in 
the formulation of Clique policy. But he continued 
to act as the Clique's chief spokesman within the 
Kuomintang, since he was still the only member to 
hold a seat on the Central Executive Committee.
The advantages which his position in Kwangtung 
brought to the base province, Kwangsi, were 
substantial, but were less material than psychological. 
Kwangsi was free for four years from any sustained 
military threat from Kwangtung; the province felt 
secure and less isolated than it had been during 
the years of internal civil war.
Huang Shao-hsiung's rule over Kwangsi between 
1925 and 1929 was a great improvement on anything
that had preceeded it; it gave the province much 
needed internal security, a luxury which few other 
provinces enjoyed at the time. A tentative start 
was made towards modernisation, though it was little 
more than a foundation for the more systematic efforts
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at reconstruction made by the other leaders of 
the Kwangsi Clique in the early 1936’s. Huang*s 
efforts might have been more successful if he had 
not suppressed a large number of the most 
effective and modern-minded people in the province, 
when he turned against ccommunists and left-wingers.
Huang's efforts diould be seen not as a 
preconceived scheme of modernisation, but as 
piece-meal, unco-ordinated responses to opportunities 
for modernisation which occurred naturally, or 
forced themselves upon his attention. His 
primary function throughout the period was to 
maintain a stable and efficient military organisation 
in the base province of the Kwangsi Clique. This 
was the rold demanded of him by his colleagues in 
Wuhan and in Peking. They made no objection to 
his attempts at reconstruction, particularly as 
many of them had the effect of increasing military 
efficiency. Huang Shao-hsiung only met Li Tsung-jen 
once during the whole period from the departure 
of the Northern Expedition, in the spring of 1926, 
to Li's precipitate return to Kwangsi three years 
later; he did not see Pai Ch'ung-hsi at all. There 
was thus no opportunity for detailed discussions 
on the government of Kwangsi, which was left 
entirely in Huang's hands. Huang kept a firm hand
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on the Clique's base, periodically supplied 
the leaders outside the province with the 
additional troops they needed, and helped 
Li Chi-shen to maintain his position in Kwangtung; 
all these activities were time-consuming, and his 
efforts at reconstruction could be little more 
than a side-line. He lacked any ideological or 
theoretical framework in which to mould his plans, 
which in consequence took on a patch-work nature, 
often giving the impression of having been 
decided on whim. He had a penchant for superficial, 
quickly-realised schemes, rather than for basic 
reforms. A university was tacked onto a 
virtually non-existent basic education system; 
an extensive bus service was set up, though the 
majority of the inhabitants of Kwangsi'could not 
afford bus fares; sophisticated agricultural 
experiments were carried out, while the peasants 
of Kwangsi still suffered under an oppressive 
agricultural system, which was left unchanged; 
electricity plants were installed, but their 
output was so low that the lighting provided was 
weaker than ordinary oil lamps. None of these 
reforms affected the basic social and economic 
structure of the province, or did anything to 
alleviate the chronic poverty and misery of the
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vast bulk of the inhabitants„ Only the Chuang 
peasant movement, which was anathema to Huang, 
made any attempt to improve the lot of the 
peasantry. In the rest of the province, the 
peasants were still under the rule of the same 
landlords and gentry who had ruled before Huang 
took over the government of the province; the 
only improvement in their position lay in the 
removal of the danger of depradations by bandits 
and lawless soldiers. This in itself was an 
achievement, but hardly sufficient to justify 
praise for Huang's rule.
CHAPTER VI
The Kwangsi Glique in National Politics, 1928-1929 
In 1928, after the completion of the Northern 
Expedition, the Kuomintang set about consolidating 
its rule over a reunified China; the Period of 
Tutelage, which Sun Yat-sen had decreed should 
follow the completion of the unification of China 
by military means, began. The Kuomintang had moved 
out of its period of fervent revolution, but the 
hope of sudden transformation which had underlain 
the lost revolutionary fervour remained, and found 
its expression in a stream of speeches, articles, 
official plans and conferences, whose themes were 
unification, modernisation, independence, progress, 
democracy and national revival. The words which 
expressed the hope took 011 a life of their own; 
the leaders of the Kuomintang spolce with passion of 
their plans for a new China, and felt they had 
achieved something with their words alone. A 
delusive and schizophrenic process was underway: 
faced with the magnitude of China's problems, her 
new leaders shied away from the effort that a real 
solution of her problems would call for, and 
satisfied themselves with outpourings of words, as 
if the words themselves contained solutions. They
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failed to devote themselves to the practical 
application of the Kuomintang policies of reform 
and reconstruction devoted themselves to 
expounding their own theories, and building their 
personal careers. Their fault was not that they 
were cynical, self-interested men, though many of 
them were, but that they lacked genuine political 
commitment. Their original commitment to the 
Kuomintang had been eroded by the strife within the 
Party, and by the influx of men without any 
commitment, with whom they had to contend for 
power. They were disunited; ideology of the 
Kuomintang was no longer strong enough to provide 
a unifying force, and a spur to action, and the 
social and legal sanctions which might have obliged 
the new leaders of China to put aside individual and 
factional interests were virtually non-existent. 
There was no leader strong enough.to stand above 
the factionalism which now dominated the Party. 
Chiang Kai-shek's position depended on his 
consummate ability to manoeuvre and manipulate 
within the framework of factions, rather than on 
any moral or popular superiority. Nanking's 
independent military allies, Peng Yu-hjftsiang, Yen 
Hsi-sban and the Kwangsi Clique, consolidated their 
regional bases while the Kuomintang leaders 
quarrelled v/ith each other. The Kuomintang had
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defeated one group of warlords, only to find that 
two-thirds of the provinces which were nominally 
Kuomintang-controlled were in the hands of 
"Kuomintang warlords", men who were prepared to 
pledge themselves to the Kuomintang cause, but were 
not prepared to hand over authority or regional 
control to 'national' leaders whom they did not 
respect, and who could not compel their submission.
After the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek 
decided that if unity could not be reached by mutual 
agreement, he would achieve it by force. He moved, 
first to throw out the political factions most 
strongly opposed to himself, and second to crush 
the holders of regional power, In the spring of 
1929, the Kwangsi Clique, the most vulnerable of 
the regional groups, was crushed, and over the 
following year, 3?eng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-slian 
were defeated. The most glaring abuses of disunity 
were destroyed; but the more fundamental abuse,the 
gulf between words and action, between policies and 
their implementation remained.
In his memoirs, Chou Ku-hai laments the lost 
chances of the Kuomintang*:
"If, after the memorial service to 0?un Yat- 
sen' sjbspirit in the Western Hills, in July, . 
1928, everyone had buried themselves with one 
determination in the £work of3 rehabilitation 
and reconstruction, how could there have been 
the battles at Wuhan in the spring of 1929, 
and in Hunan in the winter of 1929? Even
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more so, how could there have been the 
large-scale Central Chins, plain fighting in 
1930? In this fighting, the extent of the 
losses in material and man power were really 
staggering. If there had not been these 
repeated civil wars, how could the communists 
have gone on the rampage and given rise to 
successive years of military operations to 
suppress t h em ? u
But the Kuomintang; in 1928 suffered from ^hass
of internal conflicts, and no common will existed to
resolve them. The opportunities offered in the
crucial period after the reunification were allowed
to slip away; everyone supported the ideas of
unification, and of social, economic, political and
military reform, but in an atmosphere of mutual
suspicion and intrigue, little was done to realise
them.
The Failure of Voluntary Disbandment
On July 11th, 1928, shortly after the victory 
of the Northern Expedition had been announced to 
Sun Yat-sen's spirit in the Temple of the Azure 
Clouds outside Peking, the four commanders of the 
Group Armies met in closed session at f'angshan, 
near Peking, to discuss the future of their armies. 
The following day a communique was issued, which 
recognised the supreme authority of the National 
Government over all four armies, and called for the 
establishment of a Disbandment Committee, for the 
reorganisation of Kuomintang forces into sixty
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divisions, for the reduction of overall troops 
numbers to about 500,000, and, for the smooth
*
reintegration into civilian life of disbanded soldier^ 
In the /Meantime, individual group army commanders 
were to be responsible for disbandment in their own 
armies, and were to attempt reduce their troops by 
between 30% and 50% within the next six months, ^
An order forbidding further1 recruitment had been
Zj.
issued on July 9th. The number of troops in China
was estimated to be about two million.^ In terms
of the area and population of China, this figure
was not excessive, but "given economic backwardness,
the protracted period of warfare, the decline in
production, and the sufferings of the people, £China}
was really not up to bearing the burden of support
6for these great numbers of troops." The bulk of 
China's troops were not financed by the National 
Government in Nanking; some were still outside even 
nominal Kuomintang control; others, in the three 
areas controlled by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Group 
Armies, were financed locally. But while Nanking 
did not have to finance these troops, it did not 
receive any revenue from the provinces which they 
controlled. Only Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi 
and Fukien contributed to the revenue of the National 
Government, and only the first two made reliable 
payments. In a speech to the Disbandment Conference
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in January, 1929, T.Y, Soong, the Minister of
Finance, described the situation in other provinces:
"The national revenues from such provinces as 
Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shensi,
Kansu, Honan, Shansi and Suiyuan, not to 
mention those from the Three Eastern Provinces. 
Szechwan, Xnnnan and Kweichow are entirely 
appropriated by the localities mentioned.
In the provinces of Hopei, Shantung and Fukien, 
the revenue officials are at least commissionec 
by the Central Government, but in other 
provinces they are appointed by local and 
military authorities, and most of them even 
fail to render accounts.” 7
From its limited revenue, Hanking had to support not
only its own troops, of the 1st Grour:> Army, but
also the apparatus of national government. How
limited this income was is indicated by the fact
that in Soong1s calculations of the optimum revenue
from the provinces to the National Government,
Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hupei and Hunan, the four
provinces controlled by the Kwangsi Clique, were
supposed to contribute 45% of it, whereas in reality,
o
they contributed nothing. It was clear that if
the finances of the National Government were to be 
put on a viable footing, this retention of revenue 
by individual provinces would have to be stopped.
At the same time, the percentage of revenue 
devoted to the armed forces, which accounted for as 
much as 80% of the total, would have to be cut.
This could most easily be done by reducing the 
number of troops.
Just as the National Government was crippled
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by the demands which, military expenditure made on
its revenue, so were the areas controlled by the
other group armies, Feng Yu-hsiang was forced to
impose enormous taxes on his provinces to support
his forces; this over-taxation was one of a number
of factors which reduced many of the inhabitants
of Ceng's provinces to starvation. ^ Yen Hsi-shan
brought financial chaos to Shansi, by diverting
so much of the provincial revenue for military
purposes that the provincial government had to be
10financed with unbacked paper currency. The 4th 
Group Army centre at Wuhan was plagued with 
financial difficulties, though the situation there 
may have been eased by payments from Nanking, 
extracted as a condition of further participation in 
the Northern Sxpedition.^
There was no opposition to the general 
principle of disbandment, and the broad outline 
contained in the T *angshan Communique was ratified 
by the 5th Plenum, meeting at Nanking in August. 
There were however disagreements on the part of the 
four group commanders as to the desirable relative 
strengths of their armies, and as to the methods 
of disbandment*"^ Nevertheless, a certain amount 
of voluntary disbandment did take place.
Desertion was very common, and the halting of
recruitment, which prevented the replacement of
deserters, soon reduced numbers. All the group
armies contained soldiers which their commanders
were happy to get rid of - opium smokers, old men,
troops incorporated from the armies of old-fashioned
warlords. Chiang Ilai-shek's 1st Group Army had
especially large numbers of such men, and early
reported large numbers of demobilisations. ^  In
Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen used the pretext of
disbandment to get rid of several units, originally
subordinate to his rivals. ^  The 4th Group Army,
which contained a large number of non-Kwangsi units,
attempted to redress this situation by cutting up
such units and amalgamating sections with reliable
units, and by disbanding altogether units that wei'e
15not trusted. ^ This reorganisation was carried out
in conjunction with the reorganisation of all
Kuomintang troops into divisions (often accomplished
by substituting the word 1 shih' for ' clrfan1 ) „ which
was completed by November; by that time, 340,000
16men had been disbanded.
By January, 1929, when the Disbandment 
Conference opened in Nanking, it had become clear 
that hopes for wide-spread disbandment were 
unfounded. A certain amount of dead wood had been 
trimmed, and many enemy soldiers had been 
demobilised, but there were still, according to
Ho Ting-chin, the Chief-of-Staff, at least 1,600,000 
troops in China, of which only 900,000 were in the 
four group armies; and while the 1st Group Army, 
with 24-0,000 men, was larger than any of the other 
group armies, it was considerably smaller than the 
combined forces of the Kwangsi Clique (4th Group 
Army and Kwangtung/Kwangsi troops), Yrhich numbered 
350,000.17
Chiang Kai-shek's appeal to his allies to 
disband more of their troops entitled "My hopes for 
the Disbandment Committee", which was published on 
January 1st, gave some indication, by the nature of 
its entreaties to his "armed comrades", of how 
fragile military unity within the Kuomintang might 
be. He called on them to abandon selfish, personal 
ambitions, and independent power, and to follov/ 
instead the examples of Japan and Turkey in 
uniting emder central leadership. He made 
concessions to regional independence, in speaking 
with approval of the federal systems of the United 
States and Germany, though he stressed that these 
systems worked only because the central government 
had control over military and foreign p o l i c y . ^
He appealed to the patriotism of his fellow 
commanders, and called for their loyalty to the 
Centre, an appeal which might have been emotive
enough had not these men been convinced that the 
’Centre’ meant only the power base of a rival
1°clique, dominated by one man, Chiang himself, '
The Conference passed a number of resolutions 
concerning the financing of disbandment, and setting 
out plans for the employment of disbanded soldiers 
and officers, but the most important decision was 
one which in effect confirmed the regionalist 
structure of the Kuomintang armies; the titles of 
Group Armies were abandoned, but the Disbandment 
Area Headquarters which replaced them corresponded 
to the areas controlled by the group armies, with 
the personnel in charge unchanged. This ’reform* 
in military structure was simply a change of 
nomenclature, as the reorganisation of units from 
armies into divisions had been; the control of 
hanking over the forces of the three largest 
Kuomintang militarists, Keng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-slian 
and Li Tsung-jen was as illusory as ever.c
T.V. Soong*s report to the Conference 
underlined the seriousness of the situation. 
Nanking's inability to exert its authority over all 
its forces meant that disbandment could not be 
enforced, and that military expenditure could not 
be reduced. Soong reported that 78% of the 
Nanking’s government revenue went on military
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expenditure, and that unless this proportion was
reduced* China would never be able to undertake
the programmes of reconstruction and reform
21envisaged by Sun Yat-sen.
Jhen the Disbandment Conference closed at the
end of January, it was clear that voluntary reform
and reduction in size of the Kuomintang armies had
failed, that regional militarists were as firmly
entrenched as ever, and would not surrender their
positions of their own accord. From this followed
the corollary that China's other internal problems
could not be solved: "putting the army in order was
the basis of putting finances in order; if nothing
was done about finances, there was no point in
talking about People's Livelihood, or Reconstruction
so the Disbandment Conference really was the key
to the rehabilitation (regulation) of internal 
22
government". "
1 Disbandment * remained curx^ent in Chinese 
military life only to the extent that the word 
remained in use as a part of the names of military 
headquarters, which were increasingly concerned, 
not with disbandment, but with waging renewed civil 
wax1. "The plan to reduce the armed forces was 
scrapped. The civil wars swelled the strength of 
the army to over two hundred divisions of 
heterogeneous troops, and the only reductions were
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those effected by casualties as thousands of men 
perished in internecine war'*. ^
The 5th Plenum
The moves towards military rationalisation and 
centralisation after the completion of the Northern 
Expedition were unsuccessful; moves towards 
political unity were even more so. Contending 
forces within the Kuomintang continued to flourish, 
as was blatantly revealed at the 5th Plenum of the 
Central Executive Committee, held at Nanking in 
August, 1928. The Plenum reflected the deep enmity 
between the Right wing of the Party, as represented 
by a group of senior Kuomintang politicians, 
commonly referred to as the Elders or Genro, and
p/i
the Left-wing, now known as the Canton group.
The enmity stemmed from the events of the second 
half of 1927; the Left wing blamed the Kwangsi 
Clique, and the Right wing, for their ouster, first 
from Wuhan, and then from Canton. They regarded 
the Kwangsi Clique as the most obvious manifestation 
of military regionalism, as a force which threatened 
not only the Kuomintang1s chances of establishing 
central control over China, but also the ability of 
the Party to ensure the ascendancy of civilian over 
military rule. Chiang Kai-shek, their old enemy, 
joined them in their fear of regional independence,
and he and the Left wing came together in an uneasy 
alliance whose aim was the destruction of the 
Kwangsi Clique, and the regional tendencies for 
which it stood* The clash between the proponents 
of centralised authority and of regional indepcndenc 
was centred on the question of the Branch Political 
Councils, which was one of the dominant themes of 
the Plenum (and the only one to be discussed here).
To state the animosity which dominated, the 
Plenum simply in terms of regionalist versus 
centralist tendencies is too bald. The hostility 
of the Left wing to the Kwangsi Clique, and to the 
Alders, had additional roots, as did the hostility 
of Chiang Kai-shek to the Clique, but this was the 
issue around which hostility crystalised at this 
time.
The Branch Political Councils
The Branch Political Councils had been set up 
at Wuhan, Taiyfian, and Ihkifeng after the 4th. plenum, 
in Bebruary, 1928, as a rationalisation of regional 
control during a period of continuing warfare 
against the Northern warlords. They had 
considerable powers for the execution of civil and 
Party rule in the areas assigned to them, which 
corresponded 'with the areas ruled by the Group 
Armies, and were in effect the civilian branches
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of these Armies, dominated by their commanders.
'They were completely independent of Hanking, though 
their actions were phrased within the framework 
of official Kuomintang policy. With the exception 
of the Peking Council, their chairmen were regional 
militarists ~ Li Tsung-jen at Wuhan, Peng YiS.-hsiang 
at kAifeng, Yen Hsi-shan at Taiyuan and Li Chi-shen 
at Canton. Yen and Peng appear to have attached 
little importance to them, presumably because both 
men were content to rule without even the semblance 
of civil rule sanctioned from Nanking, but Li 
Tsung-jen and Li Chi-shen, who had longer contacts 
with the Kuomintang, and who had previously pledged 
themselves more firmly to the concept of Party rule, 
appear to have felt the need for official clothing 
for their actual regional independence, to maintain 
the outward forms of adherence to unitary government 
whichii&ey prophesied.
When the Left wing campaigned at the Plenum
for the dissolution of the Branch Political Councils
Li Chi-shen, the only member of the Kwangsi Clique
qualified to attend the Plenum, spoke out strongly
in their defence. Li, who had been making speeches
on the desirability of regional local government
for some time past, claimed, disingenuously, that 
the Councils represented no threat of the
development of independent regional power, but
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were a practical necessity for effective
p o
government in a country as vast as China. He
was supported by the Blders, who underlined their
position by walking out of the Plenum when it
appeared that it might decide to dissolve the 
29Councils. y Eventually, a compromise was reached, 
by which the Councils were to be retained until 
the end of 1928, though with increased restrictions, 
notably on the appointment and dismissal of 
officials within the areas controlled by the 
Councils
The 5 th Plenum solved few of the problems 
facing the Kuomintang after the Northern Expedition 
which it had been expected to, and the constant 
walk-outs by delegates gave the whole affair a 
farcical apx^earance. When it was over, Chiang 
Kai-shek and the majority of the other delegates 
retired from Nanking. Chiang went first into 
hospital in Shanghai, for treatment of "severe 
tooth-ache", and then on to his native Penghua.
In a neighbouring room in the hospital was Li 
Isung-jen, with eye trouble (possibly a recurrence 
of trouble from an old wound in the face). Li 
Chi-shen went off to mokanshan, with some of the 
.,-dders.^1 Only Peng YiS-hsiang stayed in Nanking, 
providing a spectacle for the inhabitants, and an
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embarrassment to luxury-loving Kuomintang officials, 
witli his ostentatious frugality.
The Regional Power of the Kwangsi Clique.
In the summer of 1925, three obscure youing men
had established their control, after four years of
constant fighting, over one of China's most
backward and poverty-stricken provinces. Three
years later, In the summer of 1928, these three,
now joined by a fourth, found themselves controlling
an empire within an empire, which extended from
"Chennankuan in the south to Shanhaikuan in the 
52north". Huang Shao-hsiung controlled Kwangsi,
Li Chi-shen Kwangtung, Li Tsung-jen Hunan and 
Hupei; Pai Ch'ung-hsi was established in Peking, 
though his control extended from there only towards 
Lanchuria, and did not cover the area between Wuhan 
and Peking. The Kwangsi leaders must have been 
just as startled and excited by this rapid 
transformation in their fortunes as the leaders at 
Nanking were alarmed by it. Their position did 
not compare with that of Peng Xu-hsiang or Yen 
Hsi-shan, who had established their positions as 
militarists independently of the Kuomintang, and 
had given their allegiance to it from a position 
of strength. The Kwangsi leaders had started 
from a negligible base, the control of a province
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unimportant economically or strategically, and had 
carved out their empire fortuitously, through luclc 
and design, in the context of the vicissitudes that 
accompanied the rise to national power of the 
Kuomintang. One thing is certain: the Kwangsi
leaders cannot have started their co-operation 
with the Kuomintang, or committed troops to the 
Northern expedition, with this end in view. If 
their ambitions in 1926 were regional, they lay 
chiefly in protecting Kwangsi from invasion from 
Hunan. They wanted to play some part in what was 
the most important and forward-looking political 
and military movement In China at the time, an 
adventure which they could afford to take while 
retaining control over their home base as an 
insurance against disaster* But though they may 
have had originally committed their forces to the 
Kuomintang without thought of thereby extending 
their own regional domains, they found themselves 
caught up In the welter of competing political 
groupings, In a situation where central leadership 
of the Kuomintang shifted, where unity ceased to 
have any meaning. The Kwangsi leaders were thrown 
back on to a narrower unity, that of the regional 
group, which was preserved through the bonds of
common origin, shared experience and personal 
friendship. This unity was unshakeable. Since
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there were four of them, they could operate in four 
different areas; Kwangsi power could be extended 
over a wide range, if the casual opportunities 
offered by the confusion within the Kuomintang were 
seised. “This Cthe extension of Kwangsi power] was 
actually a state of affairs which had developed 
naturally from the general situation, but the Centre
in Nanking regarded this......as a tremendous
threatn-^
It was a situation which the Kwangsi leaders 
found slightly embarrassing, for they knew that their 
position as regional militarists was nearer to that 
of the old warlords than it was to the Kuomintang 
ideal of soldiers subordinate to the Party. To 
compensate for this gap between theory and practice, 
Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi attempted, in the 
numerous speeches and circular telegrami^s that they 
issued at this time, to present themselves as loyal 
Party men, practical and progressive. Both made 
repeated references to the necessity of disbandment, 
called for the peaceful settlement of the Manchurian 
question, for the suitable employment of disbanded 
soldiers, for a start on the work of Reconstruction, 
and for the summoning of the People's Convention.
Pai Ch'ung-hsi's projection of a progressive image 
was so successful that he was accused in the foreign 
press of following "discredited Red instruction". ^
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Pai Ch’ung-hsi was very interested in Sinkiang, 
and made numerous proposals for the settlement of 
disbanded soldiers in that province, to prevent its 
1sovietization1. There was a possibility, at the 
end of 192S, that he might lead an expeditionary 
force into the North-west himself. ^  It was 
envisaged that he would become a "new Tso Tsung- 
t'ang,1' re-establishing central authority on the 
borders of China. ^
Paifs interest in Sinkiang and in other 
predominantly Moslem areas stemmed from his Moslem 
background. Pai took his status as a minority
person seriously; after the fall of Peking, he 
called on Nanking to give special aid to the Mongols 
(Ch!i-min), and in November he became a member of 
the Committee of the China Moslem Society 
(Chung-kuo Hui-chiao Hui) . ^  In a speech in 
December, 1928, he called for more support from 
Nanking for the minority peoples of the Inner Asian 
border regions, citing Sun Yat-sen's call for the 
unity and equality of the five races of China.
He drew attention to the exploitation of these 
peoples by foreign powers - the Manchus in 
Manchuria by the Japanese, the Mongols in Outer 
Mongolia by the Soviet Union, the Moslems in 
Sinkiang by the Soviets, and the Tibetans by the
British. The Moslems in particular, he said, 
were spirited and courageous and united by ties of 
religion with Moslems in other countries; given- 
the chance, they could act as their co-religionists 
had in Turkey, to throw off external oppression 
and to help to secure China1s independence from 
foreign oppression; (Pai did not envisage that they 
should try and secure their independence from Han 
oppression) J Pai's ideas on Sinkiang did not 
arouse great interest, perhaps because there v/ere 
so few other Moslems in public life, and he never 
went to Sinkiang; his position at Peking, and as 
a leader of the Kwangsi Clique was too finely 
balanced to allow him to leave, without 
precipitating trouble for his colleagues in the 
Clique.
In mid-1928, the Kwangsi Clique ruled four 
provinces, (Hunan, Hupei, Kwangtung and Kwangsi) 
and three major urban areas (Canton, Wuhan and 
Peking), It controlled about 350?000 troops, of
ts.
whom 120,000 were stationed in Kwangtung and Kwangsi 
and. 230,000 in Hunan, Hupei and the Peking/Tientsin 
region; ^0 superficially, this represented a 
formidable strength, but it was a shakey edifice, 
and ironically its main source of weakness lay in 
regional rivalries within the Clique’s empire,
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the same threat which, on a larger scale, the 
Kwangsi Clique represented to hanking. Outside 
Kwangsi, only a minority of the forces of the 
Kwangsi Clique were actually from Kwangsi.
Kwangtung was garrisoned almost exclusively by 
Cantonese units, and Iiunan by Hunanese ones; in 
both areas local chauvinism had a long history, 
which was reinforced in Kwangtung by a tradition 
of hostility to Kwangsi. The position at Peking, 
and in Hup e i , wa s mo r e c omp 1 ex. Th e tro op s 
commanded by Pai Gh1 ung-iisi at Peking, where he 
held the post of Field Commander (ch'ien-ti tsung- 
chih-hui), were mainly Hunanese, the former troops 
of T'ang Sheng-ghih, whose downfall the Kwangsi 
Clique had brought about at. the end. of 1927*
But three of Pai1s immediate subordinates at Peking, 
Li p'in-hsien, Teh Ch'i and Liao Lei, were Kwangsi 
natives (and fellow-students of Pai1s at Faoting), 
who had made their career in the Hunan army. Ql 
They were regarded by the Kwangsi Clique as loyal; 
in fact their loyalties were confused and wavering, 
for whatever the nature of their personal 
relationship with the Clique, and with Pai, their
own subordinates were all Hunanese, loyal to T'ang 
Sheng™chih, who 'was in Hong Kong, fulminating 
against the Kwangsi Clique. ^
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The situation in Hupei paralleled that in 
Peking, but in reverse; there the problem was not 
'foreign' troops commanded by Kwangsi men, but 
Kwangsi troops commanded by 'foreign' officers.
Two of the senior commanders at Wuhan, Hu Tsung-to 
and l !ao Chdn, were Hupei natives, who had served 
for many years in the Kwangsi Army, and who had 
moved into the Wuhan region with Kwangsi troops 
late in 1927* Once established in Hupei, their 
ties with Kwangsi weakened, and they quickly created 
strong positions for themselves, partly with the 
aid of Li Tsung-jeKl, who believed that he could 
placate local antipathy towards 'foreign' troops 
by raising up local men, whose real loyalty would 
remain with him. In this he miscalculated, for 
Hu and T'ao became less and less amenable to Kwangsi 
control, and came to regard Kwangsi units in the 
province as 'guest troops', whom they discriminated 
against in the distribution of local revenue.
Their independent stance was assisted by the fact 
that both men no?/ controlled, in addition to 
Kwangsi troops, substantial numbers of local Hupei 
troops, whose original commanders had been
LsJ?
dismissed. This elevation of Hu and T'ao
angered and alienated Kwangsi men of similar rank, 
such as I-Isia Wei, Li king-jui, Tang Teng-hui, and
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Chung Tsu p'ei* Chung returned to Kwangsi in 
disgust, hut the other three remained in Hupei,
Z}
a prey, in their bitterness, to external influences. 
These influences took the form of secret political 
connections with Yu Tso-po, a prominent Kwangsi 
left-winger, and hitter enemy of the Kwangsi Clique. 
Yu was a cousin of Li Iding-jui, and was able through 
him to channel existing discontent amongst Kwangsi 
officers stationed in Hupei against the Clique 
leaders.
The overall military position of the Kwangsi
Clique in late 1928 was this: of the thirteen
division commanders in the 4th Group Army, only
two were Kwangsi natives who had served in the
Kwangsi Army; five had strong connections with
Kwangsi, either because they were Kwangsi natives
serving in Hunan units, or because they were Hupei
natives serving with Kwangsi ones, but their loyalty
was suspect; and five had no prior connection with 
45Kwangsi.  ^ In addition, there were the troops in
Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which had not been
incorporated into the Group Army system. Huang 
Shao-hsiung*s control over troops in Kwangsi was
solid, and he also had about 5*000 Kwangsi troops
46m  Kwangtung, But command over the rest of the
Cantonese forces, though nominally Li Chi-shen*s,
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was in fact in the hands of his immediate 
subordinates, all Cantonese, upon whose loyalty 
Li could not count.
This military situation was not healthy, from 
the Clique's point of view, for it made it very 
vulnerable to betrayal, as warlord armies had 
traditionally been. To build up a large military 
clique on the basis of provincial loyalty had been 
impossible; Kwangsi itself was incapable of 
supplying the necessary men. Other units had been 
amalgamated, but since the fundamental loyalty 
of the Clique was to Kwangsi, a loyalty outsiders 
could not share, it was impossible to make them 
loyal and reliable to the Clique. They were 
amenable, under the right circumstances, to offers 
and bribes from outsiders to abandon the Clique.
At least one of the Kwangsi leaders
appreciated the danger of this situation; at the
end of 1928, Huang Shao-hsiung sent a representative
to V/uhan, proposing to Li Tsung-jen that the Clique
should withdraw forces from Hupei, and concentrate
47them nearer Kwangsi. 1 But Li could not conceive 
of abandoning the position he had acquired in 
Central China, however compelling the reasons for 
such an action might be; he preferred to try and 
hold on to as much territory as possible.
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Kwangsi's shortage of dependable military
personnel was outweighed by an almost complete
absence of civilian aides. There was no question
of the Clique being able to staff civil government
organs in the areas under its control with Kwangsi
men. Local men were therefore selected, the main
criteria being that they should be politically
right-wing. Their loyalty to the Clique was not
important, since they would exercise no decisive
authority, and would be subordinate to military
authorities. In Hupei, Li Tsung-jen took no part
in civilian government, adopting a policy of rTIupei
48for the Hupei natives". This took the form of
a "loose 1aissez-faire rule which was approved by 
the merchants and farmers who resented official
ll Q
interference in their affairs”. The government
of Hunan was entirely in the hands of Hunanese, and
the Kwangsi Clique appears to have made no attempt
to impose its authority there until February 1929,
when the provincial governor5 Lu Ti-p'ing was
dismissed by the Wuhan Branch Political Council.
In Kwangtung, Li Chi-shen was chairman of the
Canton Branch Political Council, but he was
Involved In a struggle with the Kwangtung Provincial
5CChairman, Ch'en king-shu for control of Kwangtung.
In Peking, the situation was rather different, for
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the Branch Political Council there, headed by
Chang Chi, an ardent Right-winger, and all;/ of the
Kwangsi Clique, had some independent standing,
because of its composition. But the Council was
made impotent by the tension between Yen Hsi-sham
and Pai Ch’ung-hsi (see below), and was never able
to develop any functional index>endence of the 
SImilitary.
The economic weakness of the areas controlled
by the Kwangsi Clique provided the final facet of
a gloomy picture. The provinces of Hunan and
Kwangtung, and the cities of Canton, Wuhan and
Peking, were traditionally among China's more
prosperous areas; Hupei too was affluent in
comparison with Kwangsi. But" in 1928 Kwangtung
and Hunan were still recovering from the troubles
of 1927, a process which was particularly slow
in Hunan, where there was continuing Communist
activity. There was a very serious failure of
the autumn harvest in both Hunan and Hupei in 1928,
caused by drought; by the end of 1928, there was
52widespread famine in the two provinces. Peking
was suffering from a catastrophic commercial decline 
which set in after the establishment of the 
government at Nanking, and the departure of national 
and international organisations to Nanking.
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Between June and November, 1928, 3 ?500 businesses in
the city closed down, rents slumped, and about a
quarter of a million people were driven into
destitution. ^  An article in December described
the previous six months as a "period of retreat"
for the Peking/Tientsin area, which was becoming a
backwater. The waterways connecting Tientsin with
the sea were silting up; in Peking itself the econcm
decline was reflected in the physical decline of the
city. ^ Wuhan was still gravely affected by the
curtailment of foreign business, which, in the
context of continuing anti-foreign (especially
anti-Japanese) boycotts, showed little sign of
reviving. There were 100,000 people unemployed in
55the three Julian cities. But in contrast to
Peking a certain amount of superficial reconstructior
work was carried out there; streets were widened,
the city wall of Wuchang torn down, and ancient
56buildings restored. ^
The weakness of the situation of the Kwangsi 
Clique, militarily, governmentally and economically 
made it unlikely that the Clique would be able to 
survive a powerful attack from Nanking. It had 
two additional handicaps, the geographic location of 
the forces of the Clique, and its lack of political 
support in the top echelons of the Kuomintang.
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The //lain force of the Kwangsi Clique was 
concentrated around Wuhan, up-river from Hanking; 
for the defence of Wuhan against river-borne attack, 
a strong naval force on the Yangtse was essential; 
troops numbers were relatively unimportant.
Hanking had a stronger river fleet than did the 
Kwangsi Clique* Wuhan’s connections by land with 
the other centres of the Kwangsi Clique were 
tenuous* Peking and Wuhan were connected only by 
the thin tentacle of the Wuhan/Peking Railway, large 
sections of which were not under Kwangsi control,
The railway link between Wuhan and Canton was still 
not complete, though there were plans to complete
5the missing section between Ch'angsha and Shaokuan,
Strategically, the deployment of Kwangsi forces was
cumbersome and potentially dangerous.
Politically, the Kwangsi Clique’s chief allies
were the Party Elders, Wu Chih-hui, Chang Ching-
chiang, Li Shih-tseng and Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei, a group
whose members had prestigious records within the
Kuomintang, but little actual power within the
Party structure* They were generally regarded as
old-fashioned and impractical, though their
SBintegrity was respected, ^ Many of them still 
kept to the vows of frugality and abstinence that 
they had made as young anarchists twenty years
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before* The four of them had been leading 
anarchists, and though they had lost their political 
fervour, they had not lost their dislike of 
bureaucratic government, Li Shih-tseng in 
particular advocated the devolution of central 
authority, which the Kwangsi Clique took as a 
justification of their own regional power, The 
Elders gave their support to the Kwangsi Clique 
partly because they themselves had no other allies 
within the Kuomintang, and partly because they 
approved of the discipline and public frugality of 
the Kwangsi leaders. ^
The Kwangsi Clique had a few supporters in the 
Government, presumably men who had been appointed 
as Kwangsi nominees. These were the Minister of 
Agriculture, Yi Pei-Chi, and the Minister of Health, 
Hsftieh Tu-pi. Neither of them was important, ^
In September, Hu Han-min returned from his 
period of voluntary exile, which dated from the end 
of 1927. Hu's prestige within the Party was 
enormous, as one of Sun Yat-sen's chief followers, 
but he was unable after his return to assume the 
kind of authority that he felt he deserved. He 
did however establish himself as the leader of the 
Right-wing of the Kuomintang, where his sympathies 
lay, and through his link with the Elders became
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61also linked with the Kwangsi Clique. This
increased the prestige of the Clique's political 
supporters, hut made little real difference to the 
political balance of power, which had swung firmly 
in Chiang Kai-shek's favour; the Left-wing was 
again in decline.
The hostility between Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Kwangsi Clique increased throughout the period from 
the summer of 1928 to the spring of 1929, in spite 
of efforts, chiefly by the Right wing, to bring 
about a rapprochement. The outright clash, which 
did not occur until March, 19299 was widely 
anticipated, and surprised no one when it came.
The nature of the clash revealed that the Kwangsi 
Clique had npt been able to correct the weakness 
of their military position, or make adequate 
preparations to meet a Nanking offensive.
Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Peking.
Pai Ch'ung-hsi is in many ways the most 
interesting member of the Kwangsi Clique; he was 
undoubtedly the most gifted of the Kwangsi leaders, 
especially as a soldier. He was also the least 
parochial, and was more reflective and deliberate 
in his actions than Li Tsung-jen, who responded to 
situations rather than manipulating them. Pai's
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bearing and his public utterances suggest that he 
felt himself an exceptional man, a man of destiny,
on the national scene, not in the narrow world of 
Kwangsi, where the more homely Li was in his element, 
Pai's nine months in Peking should have been a time 
for reinforcing the reputation that he had built 
up during the course of the Northern Expedition.
Yet surprisingly they were empty months, very 
different from the early years of the 19?0s when 
?Pai, forced to retreat to Kwangsi, was able to 
stamp his personality on the province. Perhaps 
this was due to the facts that he had no existing 
following in the North; that the Peking region was 
undergoing a major recession, both political and 
economic; that Pai himself was ill for part of the 
time; that his time in Peking was too short to do 
anything spectacular; and that he was involved 
in a power struggle with Yen Hsi-shan. Whatever 
the reason, Pai's failure to realise his potential 
in Peking must have been a great disappointment to 
him; he never again appeared so arrogant or 
confident as he had during the Northern Expedition.
As the armies of the Northern Expedition 
approached Peking, the chief concern of the 
commander-in-chief, Chiang Kai-shek was that the
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city and surrounding region shouild not fall into 
the hands of Peng Y^-hsiang or Yen Hsi-shan, and 
become a regional stronghold for one or other of 
them. Feng Yu-hsiang, who was in a good position 
to take Peking area, did not do so, apparently in 
deference to the wishes of the National Government, 
and of the Diplomatic Corps.62 ' (It may also be 
suspected that Chiang Kai-shek had promised Feng 
some other plum, such as control of Shantung.)
Yen Hsi-shan was made Peking/Tientsin Garrison 
Commander on June 4-th, two days before his troops 
entered Peking, but his authority in the area was 
immediately circumscribed by the arrival of troops 
of Pai Ch'ung-hsi, which had been rushed north by 
train in the final stages of the Expedition.
While Yen was grateful for their presence, since 
they reinforced his position in relation to Feng 
Yu-hsiang, he also regarded them both as a threat 
and as a sign of Chiang Kai-shek's determination to 
curtail his power.
Pai's participation in the occupation of 
Peking had been bought at a high price, which 
he was able to demand, since his troops were the 
only 'independent' force which Chiang could insert 
between Feng and Yen, as a block to the supremacy 
of either one, while his own troops were bogged
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down in Shantung. Chiang's invitation to Pai 
possibly had a deeper motive, in that he knew that 
Pai would not be able to resist the temptation to 
try and establish himself in Peking, and that in 
doing so the forces of the Kwangsi Clique would be 
dangerously over-extended and thus an easier target 
for attack* He knew that he could count on the 
co-operation of f a n g  Sheng-chih, the original 
commander of the troops which went north with Pai, 
if Pai became too obstreperous: "if Pai Ch'ung-hsi
proves recalcitrant, he can be checked by the 
recall from Hong Kong and the rehabilitation of 
f a n g  Sheng-chih. . • " Pai was being used by
Chiang as a pawn in his attempts to divide and rule 
his unruly militarist colleagues. He was secretly 
instructed by Chiang to keep an eye on Yen Hsi-shan 
he later discovered that Peng Yii-hsiang had been
6Sgiven the same instructions concerning himself,  ^
Pai must have been aware of the long-term weakness 
of his position in Peking, and yet it did not deter 
him from entering into a furtive battle with Yen 
Hsi-shan, to establish his ascendancy there.
The battle started immediately after the fall
of Peking, Yen Hsi-shan's appointees found
themselves being crowded out, by Hanking civilian
66officials, and Kwangsi military ones. His first
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major setback came when his appointee to the post
of mayor of Peking was forced to resign at the
beginning of July, before even taking up office,
67m  favour of a Nanking man. { By the end of July,
he had been out-manoeuvred, and he stumped back to
T'aiyuan in high dudgeon, refusing to go to Nanking
to attend (as an observer) the Plenum. He
withdrew a number of his troops in the Peking/
68Tientsin region into Shansi. Militarily, he
was more powerful in North China than was Pai
Ch'ung-hsi, but having failed to gain overall contro
of Peking and Tientsin by installing his own
supporters in key civil and military posts in the
area, he could not afford to try and take it by
force, since he would be opposed in such an
enterprise not only by pai Ch'ung-hsi, but also by
Peng lu-hsiang, and ¥/ould probably fail. He did
not resign his position as Garrison Commander,
however*, he remained the technical controller of
the area, and he left sufficient troops to prevent
a q
his total eclipse. ^
It was widely rumoured that Pai Ch'ung-hsi
was trying to open up "a new sphere of power" in 
70the north. ' Pai denied these rumours, and 
substance was given to his denials when in August 
he was forced to transfer south about a third of
274
the troops he had brought north with him, because
of the development of potential threats to the
position of the Kwangsi Clique on the Xangtse.
There was trouble in Hunan, where P ’eng Te-huai
rebelled in July, and at the same time, there was
fear of an attach from Hanking, ^  Hanking was
building up troops around Kiukiang, and Wuhan was
uncertain whether they were meant for use against
72itself, or against the communists in Kiangsi. (
At the same time Pai was preparing an expedition 
into East Hopei, to clear that area of the forces 
of Ch'ang Tsung-ch'ang. It had been expected, 
immediately after the fall of Peking and Tientsin, 
and the assassination of Ch'ang Tso-lin, that Chang 
Hsileh-liang would submit peacably to the Kuomintang. 
But after he had withdrawn into Manchuria, it became 
clear that he no longer exercised control over his 
ally, Chang Tsung-ch*ang, in East Hopei, who was 
threatening to move into Manchuria. negotiations 
for the switch of Chang Hs^eh-liang to the 
Kuomintang, in which Pai ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen 
had been playing an active part, broke down at the 
end of July. 73 jn sep^e^er, Pai launched a swift 
expedition into East Hopei*, Chang Tsung-ch'ang1 s 
forces were trapped on the Luan Piver, by Chang 
Hsileh-liang *s forces sent to prevent their retreat
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74-into Manchuria. ( Some of Chang Tsung-ch1 ang1 s
forces were evacuated into East Shantung, and the
rest were demobilised in East Hopei. At the
beginning of Octobei1, Pai started negotiations
with Chang Hsifih-lxang1 s representatives, which were
followed by a series of visits by Chang*s
representatives to Nanking, culminating in Chang *s
attachment to the Kuomintang in December.
The Kwangsi Clique appear to have been unhappy
about the full acceptance of Ghang Hsii'eh-liang into
the Kuomintang, and in particular about his being
made a member of the State Council. They clashed
with Chiang Kai-shek, on the matter, Li Tsung-jen
saying that he would "never shake the hand of a
75Pengtien man11. (^
Paifs involvement in East Hopei, and the 
weakening of his position in Peking caused by the 
enforced departure of some of his units, was taken 
by Yen Hsi-shan as the cue for his own return to 
th^iffensive in the power struggle for control of 
Peking. He returned to the city in .September, and
7 a
stayed there until December, shadow boxing with Pai.
77Pai came up on top again. 1 ( But by the start 
of 1929, his position had begun to slip in relation 
to his own troops. His movements became 
increasingly mysterious, and the part he played, in
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the military and civil government of Peking and the
surrounding area increasingly small*
He did not continue his early attempts to
place the population of Peking under a firm military
discipline, the most striking example of which had
been his attempt, in July, 1929? to crush the nascent
labour unions* Pai's authoritarian nature disliked
any mass activity that was not strictly controlled,
and he was appalled to see union membership leap
from nil to about 30,000 in the month after the
Kuomintang occupation of Peking, ^  At the first
meeting of the Peking Branch Political Council on
July 18th, he put forward a motion calling for the
closure of the unions, and got the consent of Yen
Hsi-shan, his technical superior, to issue an order
no
banning unions, on August 16th. Unfortunately,
Pai based his action on the resolution of the 4th 
Plenum, which had envisaged firm control of mass 
movements, but which had been reversed by a 
resolution of the 5th Plenum, meeting early in 
August, which gave the mass movements protection 
from interference by military or local authorities: 
his order was soon countermanded from Nanking.
Union activity continued, and some unions even 
brought their members out on strike - the postal 
workers in September, and the tram workers in
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November. 80
Pai's period in Peking was not a happy one,
and his secret and ignominious flight from the city
in March was a fitting end to it. He had attempted
to beat a dignified retreat from the area in
November, 1928, after Yen Hsi-shan1s return to
Peking, by resigning, but he had been dissuaded from
doing so by Nanking delegates, Y/ho Y/ere presumably
worried that Pai's withdrawal would effect the
balance of power in the north, in Yen Hsi-shan's 
81x avour.
V
Pai's return to the south would also have 
strengthened the Wuhan branch of the Kwangsi Clique, 
a development which Nanking could not have welcomed, 
especially since the Kwangsi Clique seemed to have 
been emboldened by its success at the 5th Plenum, 
when with the Party Elders, it had held its own 
against the combined forces of the Left and Chiang 
Kai-shek, to attempt to extend its authority still 
further in central and south-west China.
The Kwangsi Clique's Conceit
It was apparent by the early autumn of 1928 
that the extension of the power of the Kwangsi 
Clique had gone to its (collective) head, and that 
over-weaning ambition had replaced calm calculation 
in its desire to extend itself further. Huang
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Shao-hsiung, as we have seen, was aware of the 
danger of this hasty, unconsolidated expansion, 
but his advice was ignored*
The Kwangsi Cliquefs ambitions lay towards 
Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan, which they hoped to 
bring into a defensive alliance, dominated by 
Kwangsi and Kwangtung, In September, a five 
province meeting was held in Liuchow, Kwangsi, to 
discuss matters of common defence (wu-sheng lidn- 
fan^ hui-i). In October, Kweichow delegates
arrived in Canton to continue discussions, though - 
whatever progress may have been made towards an 
alliance was wiped out when civil war started in 
Kweichou in November,
The Clique was showing itself very casual 
of public opinion, as was demonstrated in the 
Shanghai opium scandal, which blew up in December, 
1928, The traffic in opium was one of the most 
widely attacked practices of the old-style warlords, 
and the Kuomintang had pledged itself to wipe it 
out* The Conference for the Suppression of Opium 
met in Nanking in November, and passed sweeping 
resolutions on the banning of the trade in opium, 
and the smoking of opium* But at the end of the 
month, the Shanghai Municipal Police discovered a 
consignment of 20,000 ounces of opium being off-
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loaded, at night and under military guard, from a 
steamer recently arrived in Shanghai from Wuhan.
The police tried to seize the opium, but were 
prevented from doing so by the guards, who informed 
them that the opium was 'official* and consigned 
to the Shanghai Garrison commander, Hsiung Shih-hui 
(an old colleague of the Kwangsi Clique), They 
then rushed off with the opium into the French 
Concession,
The matter might have ended there, if the 
Shanghai Commissioner of Police had not raised it 
with the Opium Suppression Commission in Nanking. 
Public protest was aroused and a team was sent to 
Shanghai to investigate, but before it could get 
down to work, there was an official clamp-down, and 
a ban on newspaper comment. The Commissioner of 
Police was dismissed, the head of the Opium 
Suppression Board and the mayor of Shanghai 
resigned; the case was never solved, nor were 
any of'the high-ranking official and military men 
implicated ever exposed. Only a few minor 
smugglers were prosecuted. But the case had 
badly strained the faith of the optimists who 
believed that social reform would follow in the 
wake of the Kuomintang victory; the provisions of 
the Kuomintangrs own policy on the suppression of
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opium had been blatantly disregarded immediately
after they had been laid down. Since the clamp-
down on investigation and press reporting had been
decreed from Nanking, the central authorities
shared part of the discredit which fell upon the
Kwangsi Clique, the presumed owners of the opium,
who were believed to have sold the opium to private
merchants in order to raise money for arms
shipments; but the Clique was branded with the
stigma of old-style warlord, because, for all their
protestations to be modern-minded and soberly
progressive, they had been caught behaving exactly
qzl
as the old-style warlords did.
The Nanking/Kwangsi Split
After the unsatisfactory conclusion of the 
Disbandment Conference, in January, 192% it was 
widely expected that a clash between the Nanking 
Government and its militarists allies would not be 
long delayed. If the National Government was to 
live up to its claim to have reunified the whole 
of China, and to convince the foreign governments 
with which it was conducting negotiations for the 
revision of unequal treaties that its rule 
represented a departure from that of 'national1 
governments during the warlord period, it had to 
discipline its embarrassing allies, whose open
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independence of Nanking made mockery of Nanking's 
claims to national sovereignty. There were two 
reasons why the first target for attack should he 
the Kwangsi Clique: first, the deployment of the
Clique's forces, and the location of its main 
stronghold, at Wuhan, made it an easy target from 
the strategic point of view, and second, the Clique 
had made many enemies through its political 
ineptitude. Its leaders had continued their policy 
of agrandisement in the face of mounting hostility, 
both at Nanking, and from influential civil and 
military circles in the regions under their control. 
nThe warlords of the Kwangsi Clique were quite 
unaware that Heaven was angry and the people 
murmuring in resentment, and simply continued with 
their plans to extend their sphere of power11. ^
The Nanking Government did not have to look for a 
specific pretext on which to attack the Kwangsi 
Clique; the Clique provided one by flouting the 
central authority so seriously that Nanking was 
forced to take action. This was the Hunan 
Incident of February, 1929.
On February 19th, the Wuhan Branch Political 
Council issued an order for the dismissal of the 
Chairman of Hunan, Lu Ti-p'ing, and his chief 
subordinate, f a n  Tao-yuan, an order which was
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carried out forcibly by the two senior Kwangsi 
commanders at Wuhan, Yeh Gh'i and Hsia Wei, who 
occupied Oh'angsha, drove Lu and his troops into 
Kiangsi, and pursued T'an into West Hunan. ^
Several theories have been put forward for the 
reasons for Wuhan's dismissal of lu ll-p'ing*
Wuhan's official pretext was that Lu had been 
dilatory in attacking communists still operating in 
Hunan, and that he had retained for himself Hunan 
provincial revenue which he should have remitted to
O ry
Wuhan. ' Hanking claimed on the other hand that
in dismissing Lu Wuhan was trying to prevent him from
88remitting national tax revenue direct to Hanking.
These questions of distribution of revenue were
important, but it is likely that they were
outweighed by Wuhan fears that Chiang Kai-shek was
trying to detach Hunan from the control of the
Kwangsi Clique, and to disrupt the connection
between the central and southern branches of their
empire. Ho Chien, a T'ang Sheng-chih man, had
reported to Wuhan in mid-February that Hanking was
supplying Lu with large amounts of arms and
ammunition, to enable him to declare his
89independence of ?/uhan. ^
Whatever the reason for Wuhan's action, it 
constituted a direct challenge to Nanking's
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authority, for though the Wuhan Branch Political 
Council claimed that its action lay within the range 
of action permitted to the branch political councils 
by the centre, this claim was only valid in,terms 
of the original regulations for the councils, 
passed at the 4th Plenum of the Kuomintang Central 
Executive Committee in Pebruary, 1928; the 
modified regulations, passed by the 5th Plenum, in 
Atigust, 1928, had removed from the councils the 
right of appointment and dismissal* Technically, 
Wuhan's action was illegal. It was also rash, for 
Chiang Kai-shek had consolidated his own position 
at Nanking, and in the process, the power of the 
Nanking Government, and he was now in a position to 
meet overt challenges of this kind. The 
foundations of a centralised and bureaucratic 
governmental regime had been laid at Nanking. 
Peripheral political groupings were being squeezed 
out, notably the Left-Kuomintang, which had now 
lost all power at Nanking; the mass movements were 
dead. Chiang!s position at Nanking was 
unassailable. In the military field, Nanking had 
hired a group of German military advisers, who 
arrived in China at the end of 1928. They were to 
lay the foundations of a more professional and 
better equipped army, and although their impact
284
on overall military policy had had little effect 
as yet, they were able to offer Chiang valuable 
strategic and tactical advice.
The new situation at Nanking suggested that 
the holders of independent regional power should 
adopt a cautious attitude in the assertion of their 
independence. The Wuhan leaders failed to do this; 
they acted arrogantly and defiantly. The leaders 
of the Kwangsi Clique realised the danger of such 
action, and subsequently tried to exonerate 
themselves by claiming that they had not been aware 
of what the Wuhan Branch Political Council was 
planning to do, and had been taken by surprise by 
the dismissal of Lu $i~p'ing. ^  This seems 
unlikely. It is true that Li TsuaHjf-jen was not in 
Wuhan at the time, and did not attend the meeting 
of the Wuhan Council where the decision was taken 
to dismiss Lu, but his hurried, nocturnal 
departure from Nanking two days after Lu's 
dismissal, followed by his defence of Wuhan's 
action, from the security of a hospital in the 
Prench Concession at Shanghai, suggests that he 
was implicated in Wuhan's actions. Pai Ch'ung-hsi
probably knew of Wuhan's plans too, though he may 
not have participated in their drafting, and may 
have tried to prevent their being carried out.^
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Li’s claim that Wuhan action caught him by surprise 
is negated by the Tact that military preparations 
for a coup against Lu, and for a strengthening of 
Kwangsi authority in Hunan, and possibly for its 
extension into Kiangsi, had been under way for a 
considerable time before Lu's actual dismissal.
Teh Ch'i had moved his division into north Hunan in 
December, 1928; other troops of the 4th Group Army 
were being drawn up along the Kiangsi border
Q Il
officially to defend against Communist incursions. 
Ihese troop movements went beyond defensive moves 
and must have been regarded with concern in Hanking.
Hanking had been making its own preparations 
to cope with the Kwangsi Clique for some time before 
the Hunan Incident provided the pretext for action. 
Chiang Kai-shek had brought Chou Fu-hai from 
Shanghai early in February to plan a propaganda 
campaign against the Kwangsi Clique* ^  He had 
built up his troop strength in north Kiangsi and In 
Anhwei, officially in preparation for action against 
communists in Kiangsi, and bandits in Anhwei.
Of greater significance were Chiang's undercover 
'diplomatic* activities, which secured the support 
of Feng Yil-hsiang for Hanking, and the promise of 
defection from the Kwangsi Clique of many of its 
subordinates. It is difficult to date these
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negotiations accurately, since they were secret, 
and their results were not revealed until the end 
of March; hut they probably took some time to 
complete, and must have been taking place before 
the Hunan Incident. (The details of Chiang's 
•diplomacy' will be discussed below*)
In the light of the preparations made both by
the Wuhan authorities, and the Nanking Government
in anticipation of a clash, it might have been
supposed that once a suitable pretext was provided
such as the Hunan incident, war would follow
swiftly. This did not happen; there was a hiatus,
during which feverish negotiations to reach a
peaceful settlement took place. The prime movers
in these negotiations were the Kuomintang Elders,
who acted as political brokers, trying to appease
Chiang Kai-shek, and to get Li Tsung-jen to go to
Nanking and answer, in his capacity as chairman of
the Wuhan Branch Political Council, for its actions.
Probably due to their efforts, a commission of
enquiry was appointed on February 27th. to investigate
the Hunan Incident; its members were Li Tsung-jen,
Li Chi-shen, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Ho Ying-ch'in, a
composition which suggested it would not be critical
96of the Kwangsi Clique. J Li Tsung-jen and Pai 
Ch'ung-hsi joined in the conciliatory moves of the
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Elders; on March 4th, Li issued a telegram
stating his personal loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek,
which was followed two days later by a similar
97telegram from Pai, But Li was not prepared to
go to Nanking, as the Elders urged him; He
preferred to make his gestures of conciliation
from the security of a foreign concession, and,
as was his practice in times of stress, from a
hospital bed, Li Chi-shen was less cautious.
He came north to sit on the commission of enquiry;
in Shanghai he was met by the Elders, who
accompanied him to Nanking, and gave their personal
98guarantees for his safety. ' Li Chi-shen
apparently believed that he could stop war breaking
out between Nanking and Wuhan, as he had done a year
before, just before the start of the final stage of
the Northern Expedition, when a Wuhan/Nanking clash
had been expected, but was headed off by Li's
intervention. Li Tsung-jen was not so sanguine;
he recognised the situation as hopeless, and
resigned all his posts on March 8th, the day before
99Li Chi-shen arrived in Shanghai.
The situation was hopeless. By the middle 
of March, Nanking had at least 150,000 troops 
drawn up in West Kiangsi and west Anhwei, faced by 
only 60,000 Wuhan t r o o p s . O t h e r  Wuhan troops
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were in west Hunan, pursuing I ’an Iao~yuan, and at
Wushengkuan, on the border between Hupei and Honan,
where another enemy faced them - Feng Tti-hsiang.
In addition, the defection of supporters of the
Kwangsi Clique at Peking, in Hunan, in Kwangtung
and at Wuhan itself had been secured*
As in the Wuhan/Nanking crisis of the summer
of 1927, the attitude of Feng Yil-hsiang, who
dominated the northern flank of both the Hanking
and the Wuhan forces, was crucial* Feng was
approached by both sides, but, as before, he chose
to side with Nanking* On March 4d?h, Feng and Yen
Hsi-shan issued telegrams, pledging themselves to 
10?Nanking. “ Yenfs action was a natural 
reflection of the hostility between himself and 
Pai Ch'ung-hsi, which had centred on their struggle 
for power In the Peking/Tientsin region* Feng's 
attitude was not dictated by personal hostility, 
but by strategic considerations; he calculated 
that Wuhan was likely to be defeated, and that 
it would be wise to ally with the probable victor* 
In addition, Feng could sell his support to 
Nanking at a good price - in this case the control 
of Shantung - whereas Wuhan had nothing to offer 
him. Feng also accepted two million dollars from 
Nanking, and in return deployed Han Fu-ch'u with
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10^560,000 men on the Hunan/I-Iupei border. y
Feng's attachment to Nanking foreshadowed the
defeat of the Kwangsi Clique at Y/uhan; its fate
was sealed, at Wuhan and in every other area
controlled by the Clique except Kwangsi, by the
defections of its subordinates*
In Hunan, where the first defection occurred,
Ho Chien, who had been appointed by the Wuhan Branch
Political Council to succeed Lu dSl-p'ing as chairman
of the province, resigned on March 9th after only
a few days In office, declaring; that the divisions
existing within China would "deeply wound the
Tsung-li1 s £Sun Yat-sen's) spirit in Heaven"*
His resignation was clearly a rejection of the
authority of the Wuhan Branch Political Council,
and a move towards Nanking. |Y5
The second open defection occurred in Peking,
where Pai Ch'ung-hsi's position had been precarious
for some time* He had never succeeded in
entrenching himself firmly in Peking, and by early
1929 he appeared to have given up the attempt.
He made several attempts to resign, as did the head
(f<&
of the Peking Branch Political Council, Chang Chi; ' 
when they failed, Pai, like Li Tsung-jen, retired 
into hospital at the end of January. In
February, Pai came out of hospital, and went to
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rest and recuperate in the villa o-jmsiung Hsi-ling, 
at Hsiangshan, outside Peking, (l0 (There he 
remained incommunicado for almost a month, while 
Peking buzzed with rumours about his position, which 
were intensified when he came back to Peking early 
in March, only to retire into hospital again. He 
transferred control of military affairs under his 
command to his immediate subordinate, Li P'in-hsien, 
an official confirmation of a transfer which had in 
fact occurred some time before, and then disappeared 
completely; he was believed to have left hospital, 
but no one was sure whether he had left Peking, or 
gone into the Legation Quarter, until on March 14th, 
it was revealed that he had left Peking two days 
earlier, CIO*))
What had happened was that Pai's subordinates 
had deserted him for their old commander, fa n g  
Sheng-chih, who had just arrived in north China. Cll°) 
The threat that Chiang Kai-shek had dangled before 
Pai Ch'ung-hsi ever since he came to Peking, of 
reactivating f a n g  Sheng-chih should Pai need to be 
restricted, had materialised. One of fang's 
aides secretly visited f a n g  former subordinates 
in the north, armed with two and a half million 
yuan, almost certainly supplied by Chiang Kai-shek, 
and obtained their defection from Pai, (III) Pai
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owed his escape from Peking to the dual loyalties
of his most immediate subordinates, Li P fin-hsien
and Liao Lei, who were Kwangsi natives; they
could not resist the pressure within their Ilunanese
luaits to welcome fa n g  Sheng-chih back, but they
made sure that their fellow-provincial should 
112escape,
Pai may have intended to leave Peking by air
and fly to Wuhan* A plane had flown north from
Wuhan to Peking the week before, ostensibly making
one of the many exhibition flights which were
currently in vogue. His biography states that
he did go to Wuhan, and there were similar reports
11*
in the Chinese press.  ^ But most accounts of his
escape claim that he went south by boat, and that
after an adventure off Shanghai, when he evaded
arrest by the Nanking authorities either by hiding
in a wardrobe or by transferring from one ship to
another, he reached Hong Kong at the end of March,
and made his way from there to Kwangsi, still in
secrecy, for by then the Kwangtung leaders had
114declared for Nanking.
Nanking had also arranged for further defections, 
to be revealed only when fighting started. In 
Kwangtung, Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ch'en Ming-shp, the 
two senior leaders in the absence of Li Chi-shen
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had arranged to declare for Nanking.
At Wuhan, the defection of two senior Kwangsi 
commanders, Li Ming-jui and Yang Teng-hui had been 
arranged, using methods of inducement which played 
on family and educational links, but also involved 
questions of political principle, which other 
defections from the Kwangsi Clique did not. Li and 
Yang were sworn brothers; they had both left Kwangsi 
in 1926 as junior officers, and lad won steady 
promotion up to the rank of brigadier. But they 
were far from contented; during the year they had 
been at Wuhan, they had suffered discrimination from 
the local Hupei generals, and in particular from the 
ilupei men who had made their careers in the Kwangsi 
army. Li’s career had also been adversely 
affected by the fall from grace of his cousin, Y?i 
fso-po. (See Chapter V, p. ) Li himself was 
a left-winger, and was soon to join the Communist 
Party. Borne time early in 1929, Chiang Kai-shek's 
agents contacted Y& Tso-po, who was living in exile 
in Hong Kong, and asked him to co-operate in the 
destruction of the Kwangsi Clique, in return for a 
reward which would probably be the chairmanship of 
Kwangsi. Yi3 agreed to do so, and obtained the
sanction of his communist mentors in Hong Kong to 
do so. ^*5 n0^ g0 $Tu£ian himself; a
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fellow-student of LI Ming-jui1s went secretly to
Wuhan, and laid plans with Li and Tang whereby they
would come over to Nanking when fighting started
lift
on the Yangtse* Yd did not go to Wuhan until
the fighting was on; he travelled up river on one 
of the Hanking gunboats.
By the middle of March, Nanking's plans for 
the destruction of the Kwangsi Clique were complete. 
All that remained was the military drive up the 
Yangtse, but the hiatus continued, while the Elders 
and Li Chi-shen taied to reach a negotiated 
settlement. On March 13th, the Central Political 
Council discussed the Hunan Incident, and put the 
whole blame for it on Hu fsung-to, the senior 
commander at Wuhan in the absence of Li Tsung-jen, 
and on Chang Chih-pen and Chang Hua-p'u, the senior 
civilian officials there; Li Tsung-jen was
] 1 o
absolved of complicity. Eor a week, it seemed
possible that the Incident would be settled
peacably. Ihe Elders believed that they had
succeeded in "transmuting a large affair into a
119small one, and a small one into nothing". y 
Iheir confidence was misplaced. In the first place, 
Hu Isung-to and T'ao Chfln refused to accept the 
censure passed on them by the Political Council,
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and sent instead an angry telegram to Nanking
denouncing Nanking's military build-up against 
120Wuhan. In the second, Li Chi-shen was arrested
in Nanking, on March 21st, accused of plotting 
against the Nanking Government.
Li's arrest caused a sensation among the
delegates attending the 3rd Kuomintang Congress,
which had opened in Nanking a few days earlier,
and to which Li was a delegate. It also upset
Feng Yu-hsiang, who subsequently refused to visit
121Nanking, in case the same thing happened to him*
Li's imprisonment was not arduous; he was 
kept under house-arrest at T'angshan Hot Springs 
near Nanking, kept company by some of his guarantors, 
the Party Elders. 'Two Gun' Cohen, who was now 
Li's bodyguard, was informed by Sun Fo (then 
Minister of Communications) that Li would not be 
harmed:
"You must surely know that two of my venerable 
colleagues have guaranteed with their lives 
that General Li would be safe in Nanking.
Dhe senior of these has already honoured his 
pledge. He made the customary preparations 
for self-destruction, and warned General 
Chiang that unless he was allowed to share 
Li Chai-sura's imprisonment, he would commit 
suicide within the hour. He is now 
incarcerated with your chief." ^ 2  -(-eire-)
After Li's arrest, developments came swiftly.
On March 26th, the 3rd Congress dismissed Li Isung- 
jen, Li Chi-shen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi from all their
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posts, and expelled them from the kuomintang for
life. War was officially declared on the Kwangsi 
125Clicrue. The official denunciation of the
Clique (T'ao-fa Kuei-hsi Hsu an-cl^jan Ta-kang) . 
which was published three days later, accused the 
Kwangsi Clique of having shattered the unity of the 
nation, and the authority of the Kuomintang; 
abuse was heaped on Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the evil genius 
of the Clique, who was accused of having wormed 
his way into Chiang Kai-shek's confidence, and
1 O/!
of then abusing it. Chiang accused the Clique
leaders of being feudal regionalists, selfish,
secretive and opportunistic; of having joined the
Kuomintang only to further their private aims; of
having been in touch, during the Northern Expedition,
with the Kuomintang's enemies, chiefly Sun Ch'uan-
fang; of having looted Nanking in 1927; of having
tried to sow dissent among the group army
commanders; of having disregarded the regulations
governing disbandment, and those governing the
branch political councils; of having tried to form
an anti-Nanking alliance in the South-west; and
in general terms, of being crude, primitive, old-
125fashioned and a disgrace to China. ^
Nanking's military moves against Wuhan started 
immediately after the Declaration of War on March 26th
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Fighting started the same day on the Anhwei/Hnpei 
126border; Wuhan fell little more than a week
later. hanking troops advanced on four fronts:
Liu Cliih advanced along the north bank of the 
Yangtzej Ghu P !ei-te along the south; Han Pu-ch1u 
moved south from Hunan, Ghang_ Fa^ k-l-useik west out of 
Kiangsi. The Nanking forces advanced on Wuhan
in forced marches, crushing the ineffectual
" , ' "L ^8 ■-
resistance offered by Ifuhan forces. At the 
beginning of April, Li Ming-gui and Yang Teng-hui
1 28pulled out of the front line, according to plan,
and on April 4th, seeing that the situation was
hopeless, Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chun evacuated Wuhan,
leaving the city to be occupied by Nanking forces
Ipq
the following day. ^
This was a shattering defeat, and one which
could not be explained simply in terms of Chiang
Kai-shek1s political machinations; it indicated
serious tactical errors and weaknesses at Wuhan.
The Wuhan commanders had de£>loyed their troops
unwisely, committing a disproportionate number to
the pursuit of T 1 an Tao-yuan in west Hunan - a
mistake which a more experienced commander, such as
130
Li Tsung-jen or Pai Ch'ung-h&i might not have made.
A further serious miscalculation lay in the
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Clique's inability to get reinforcements through
to Wuhan from the south* Huang Shao-hsiung sent
131troops into Hunan, possibly as many as 30,000, ^
but he did not commit them until after the arrest
of Li Chi-shen, and their advance was blocked by bb
Chien, who had now been reappointed chairman of
132Hunan by Nanking*  ^ The Kwangtung commanders,
Chfen Ming-shu and Ch'en Chi-t'ang, turned Huang's
flank when they declared for Nanking on March 30th,
and issued an ultimatum to Huang to withdraw all
133Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung by April 1st,
Huang's campaign ground to a halt only a few miles 
within the southern border of Hunan*
Without adequate leadership at Wuhan, and 
without reinforcements from the South, it is 
doubtful that the Kwangsi Clique could have resisted 
the kind of multi-fronted operation which Nanking 
launched against it, but given the superiority of 
Nanking's tactical planning, its naval superiority 
on the Yangtze, and the speed of its attack, the 
outcome was a foregone conclusion* The speed of 
attack, permitted by forces marche^ surprised 
the Wuhan commanders, while Nanking's naval 
superiority made riverine positions below Y/uhan 
and the Wuhan cities themselves indefensible*
But it was Nanking's tactical skill which really
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shattered Wuhan defence, and for this, much v/as
o\ved to Nanking's German military advisers, in
134particular to Colonel Bauer.  ^ Bauer was credited 
with the detailed planning of Nanking's campaign 
against Wuhan, and went up river with Chiang Kai-shek
135
to give additional advice as the campaign progressed.
It was his first and last campaign with Chiang
Kai-shek; he caught smallpox in Wuhan, and died
of the disease a month later.
After the fall of Wuhan, Nanking forces
pursued Hu Tsung-to and T'ao Chun up-river, where
they found their retreat cut off by Liu Hsiang,
136in Szechwan, who had declared for Nanking. ^
Instead of making their way south along the Hunan/
Szechwan border into Kwangsi, as Li 0?sung-jen had
ordered, Hu and T'ao allowed their troops to be
disarmed, and took up Chiang Kai-shek's offer of
137/100,000 in travelling expenses to go abroad.
With the fall of Wuhan, the great edifice of 
Kwangsi power was destroyed. The chief reason 
for the failure of the Clique was its inability to 
establish adequate control over the regions and 
armies that it controlled, and its over-extension 
and over-confidence. The leaders of the Clique 
paid a heavy price for their mistakes; in 
addition to their territories outside Kwangsi, they
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lost the bulk of their troops, retaining only those 
in Kwangsi.
Chiang Kai-shek, who had supervised the 
expedition against Wuhan in person, stayed in Wuhan 
long enough to establish firm control over Hupei 
and then visited Ch'angsha to ensure that the same 
process was carried out in Hunan.
The Aftermath of Defeat
At the beginning of April, Li Tsung-jen, Pai 
Ch'ung-hsi and Huang Shao-hsiung met at Huang's home 
near Wuchow. It was the first time that Li and Pai 
had been in their home province since the start of 
the Northern Expedition three years before, and 
instead of returning home in triumph, they came as 
refugees. They were seething with anger and 
disappointment at their defeat, and humiliated by 
its ease. Huang Shao-hsiung was less agitated; 
he had not had the experience of being translated 
from a petty regional leader to being an important 
figure on the national scene, and he was possibly 
less than sympathetic at his colleagues' distress. 
The unity between the three men became taut and 
uneasy.
Huang had come to regard Kwangsi as his own 
private domain, and had shown a genuine, if erratic 
and ineffective, interest in improving itj his
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ambitions had been limited to Kwangsi and Kwangtung.
Li and Pai however had regarded Huang not as the
owner, but as their bailiff, and they had expected
a great deal from him. lie had been expected to
keep Kwangsi quiet and secure, and from time to
time to give military support for Clique operations
in Hunan and Hupei; he was also expected to supply
new recruits to the Kwangsi forces in the north,
and to send financial help, particularly during
the early stages of the Northern Expedition. His
work had been carried out in comparative obscurity,
and he had not won the fame that Li and Pai had.
How his defeated colleagues returned home, involving
him in a crisis which he had had no hand in creating,
and which he had tried to avoid. Huang understood
the realities of the new situation more clearly
than did the other two. He saw that the Clique* s
large-scale regionalism had been defeated, and that
their only hope now lay in a return to narrower
provincialism and in an accommodation on these lines
with Hanking, rather than in an attempt to assert
a new regional control in South China which Li and
Pai favoured. His realism brought him suspicion
138and distrust from Li and Pai, a breakdown in 
co-operation which was the more serious because 
Li Chi-shen was not on hand to patch it up.
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The first overt sign of a split in the Kwangsi 
leadership was shown in the reaction to peace feelers 
from Nanking and from Kwangtung* It was unclear at 
this time whether Nanking intended to press the 
attack on the Kwangsi Clique into their home province 
Nanking was involved with other problems, the 
question of Impending trouble with Feng Yu-hsiang, 
and, on the International front, the question of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway,* and the new leaders of 
Kwangtung appeared unwilling to go beyond the 
expulsion of Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung, possibly 
because of a prior arrangement with Huang Shao- 
hsiung.
The Cantonese leaders were prepared to make a 
generous settlement with Huang Shao-hsiung, provided 
he agreed to confine his activities to Kwangsi; 
the settlement included the continuing payment of 
a large military subsidy to Kwangsi every month, 
and a guaranteed purchase ox opium exported to
1*9
Kwangtung from Kwangsi. '
The Nanking approaches consisted of a long 
letter to Li, Pal and Huang from Li Chi-shen in 
prison in Nanking, and a conciliatory telegram from 
T ’an Yen-k'ai and Ho Ying-ch'in. Li's letter 
advised the Kwangsi leaders to surrender, admit 
their faults, and go abroad to Improve themselves.
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The Kwangsi leaders ignored the letter and its
advice, considering that it was written under duress,
I/la
and did not express Li1 s real feelings, 'Their
reply to the T ’an/Ho telegram was a fierce demand
for the release of Li Chi-shen, and the restoration
of the good name of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Gh’ung-hsi,
a reply which Huang Shao-hsiung was unhappy about,
but which he could not oppose without causing an
141immediate split with Li and Pai.
After this reply, negotiations with Nanking
were broken off, though Huang Shao-hsiung remained
14?m  contact with Canton* A fight-to-the-end
spirit was deliberately created in Kwangsi, and the
situation compared to the last stand of the 
143Taipings*  ^ Li and Pai were in a reckless mood, 
and were determined to win back something of Y/hat 
they had lost* They decided to launch an attack 
into Kwangtung, using the remaining troops of the 
Kwangsi Clique* The troops which Huang Shao-hsiung 
had sent into Hunan to reinforce Wuhan were 
withdrawn, and drawn up with others for an attack 
down the West River*
This uae of the Clique’s remaining troops 
must have been a further source of aggravation to 
Huang Shao-hsiung* Li and Pai, having lost
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enormous numbers of troops, were preparing to put 
Huang’s troops at risk in what he regarded as a 
hopeless attempt to set up in South China a multi- 
province bloc, such as the Kwangsi Clique had just 
lost, Huang knew that the casual opportunities 
which had come to the Kwangsi Clique in the political 
and military confusion of the Northern Expedition 
would not be repeated, and that a hysterical, 
unplanned expedition such as the present one would 
only lead to disaster. But Huang was still a 
cautious provincial militarist, while Li and Pai 
were outraged regionalists, whose pride had been 
pricked, and whose indignation drove them to make 
an attempt, however foolhardy, to restore their 
position as regional chiefs.
Paced with the intransigence of the Kwangsi
leaders, Nanking decided to launch a multi-fronted
attack on Kwangsi, using not Nanking’s own forces,
which were preparing for war with Peng Yu-hsiang,
but the forces of Kwangsi1s neighbours. The main
attacks were to come from Hunan and Kwangtung, but
it was also planned that Yunnan, Kweichow and
Szechwan should participate. By the end of April,
Ho Chien’s forces were already moving south towards
145the Kwangsi border. ^ Kwangsi's former ally,
Pan Shih-sheng, now stationed in the Kiangsi/Kunan
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/Kwangtung border region, declared his willingness
to fight Kwangsi, and put himself under H o 1s
. 146command.
Lung Yun, who now controlled Yunnan, took up
the post of commander of the \10th Anti-Kwangsi
Route Army, and announced his plan to attack
Kwangsi via Kweichow. Lung's interests lay not
in attacking Kwangsi, but in extending his control
over Kweichow, then much weakened by civil war.
Kweichow, to the extent that it could rise above
its internal strife, was more concerned with
repelling Lung's attack than with attacking Kwangsi.
It did not seem likely that Szechwan would play any
useful part in an attack on Kwangsi, for the
province was sunk in its unending civil wars,
The Kwangtung leaders continued to display
unwillingness to attack Kwangsi, and up to the end
of April continued to press Huang Shao-hsiung to
make a peacefiil settlement with Nanking, an attitude
which was supported by various groups within Kwangsi,
149
including the leading citizens (yao-,ien) of Kweilin.
Li and Pai had no intention of submitting, and 
their refusal to do so led Nanking, on May 4th to 
dismiss Huang Shao-hsiung as chairman of Kwangsi, 
and to replace him with one of his subordinate^,
Wu 1 1ing-yang; Lu Huan-yen became Disbandment
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Commissioner for the province (i.e. military chief),
ISOa post previously held concurrently by Huang, ^
The following day, Kwangsi forces attaching down 
the West River clashed with Cantonese forces.
Kwangsi forces fought as the Protect the Party,
Save the Country Army (Hu-tang Chiu-kuo Chun), a 
title which also used at this time by Peng Tu!- 
hsiang,
Initially, the prospects for the invading
Kwangsi forces seemed hopeful. As they moved down
the West River in two routes, Hs$ Ching-t’ang, a
Kwangtung division commander, declared for Kwangsi
in the East River district of Kwangtung. Part
of the Cantonese Navy declared its independence at
the same time. Li Tsung-jen had gone to Hong
Kong to try and secure further support from the
many ’exiles1 living there, leaving the direction
of the campaign into Kwangtung to Pai Ch’ung-hsi.
Li’s chief hope was probably to form some hind of
alliance with Peng xU-hsiang, who had already been
accused by Nanking of being in league with the
1
Kwangsi Clique. In fact, the vicissitudes of
the Kwangsi Clique at this time, and Peng's own 
difficulties in IVorth China seem to have prevented 
the formation of any effective co-operation;
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The Kwangsi drive down the West River was
at first so successful that Canton itself seemed
threatened. Confusion and panic in the city were
increased when bombs were dropped on it. The
bombing was at first blamed on the Kwangsi Airforce,
^which did not exisi^ ), but subsequently turned out to
be the work of Cantonese aeroplanes, which were
trying to hit naval vessels believed to be
supporting the Kwangsi Clique, which were anchored
154-off the Bund. But Kwangsi forces got bogged
down while trying to cross the North River, giving 
the Kwangtung generals time to mount a counter­
attack; in the second week of May, Pai Ch’ung-hsi 
was heavily defeated at Paini, while Hs^ i Ching-t’ang 
was thrown back from Shihlung, which was captured 
on May 13 th.
Meanwhile, a serious threat to Kwangsi xvas
building up from Hunan. By concentrating their
forces for an attack into Kwangtung, the Kwangsi
leaders had left their northern flank almost
undefended, a situation which Ho Chien quickly took
advantage of; on May 14-th, his troops took
Ch ’ uanchoti, just outside Kwangsi, and advanced
156towards Kweilin.  ^ Pai was forced to withdraw 
into Kwangsi, to launch a counter-attack against the 
Hunanese. He was able to throw Ho Chien back
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temporarily, but in doing so he was forced to
leave the West River front inadequately held,
The Cantonese counter-attacked, They had been
reinforced by the arrival from Wuhan of the troops
of Li Ming-jui and Tang Teng-hui, which had been
transferred south by sea; these forces were entrusted
with the task of attacking into Kwangsi; Wuchow
157fell to them on June 6th, y{ Soon afterwards, 
Nanking appointed Li Ming-jui Disbandment 
Commissioner for Kwangsi, and Yu Tso-po the 
provincial chairman, replacing Lu Huan-yen and 
Wu T'ing-yang, who had proved insufficiently useful 
to ITanking, ^  ®
Huang Shao-hsiung and Pai Ch'ung-hsi fled from 
Kwangsi through the back door, via Lungchow, and 
after a brief stay in Tonking, made their way to 
Hong Kong, Their rule over Kwangsi was ended, 
temporarily.
Their flight, and the fighting which had 
preceded it, brought Kwangsi close again to the 
despairing chaos which it had passed through in 
the period between the fall of Lu Yung-t'ing and 
the rise to power of the Kwangsi Clique. The 
local currency collapsed again, as it had after 
3jU !s flight, trade and commerce were badly 
dislocated, and civil government broke down.
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Huang thought of Lu as he and Pai fled from the
province, taking the same route that Lu had used
to make his escape eight years before; he must also
have been aware of the similar legacy of disorder
and disruption that he and Pai were leaving to
159their province, ^ J A French missionary in Hanking 
described the situation that they left behind:
'The civil war in Kwangsi fizzled out; the 
leaders of the Clique, seeing defeat falling 
upon them, fled lamentably, and while they 
are now junketing in Tonking and Hong Kong, 
the wretched people are suffering from the 
bankruptcy which they have brought about.' 160
The Aftermath of the Kwangsi Clique's Defeat
A few years after his fall in 1929, when Li
Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi were again established
as overlords of Kwangsi, Li made a speech which,
perhaps unwittingly, described his career to 1929«
“Since the Republic the majority of senior 
officers have received an education, and some 
have also received higher education. But 
they have still not been able to nurture pure 
and lofty characters £which would induce them]) 
to go out and strive for the nation. The 
result is that we are still sunk in the chaos 
of warlordism; the nation's peril increases 
daily, and society becomes increasingly 
disturbed* What is the reason for this?
It is entirely due to the lack of psychological 
reconstruction, to the pervasiveness of self- 
seeking........
When they [the senior officers^ started out, 
though they wanted to work for the nation, 
they found themselves in a corrupt environment, 
sux*rounded by an atmosphere of self-seeking, 
tainted and misled. They could not stand up 
to it." 161
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Lour years of control of Kwangsi and three years 
of participation in national affairs had had the 
effect of bringing out similarities between them 
and Lu Yung-t'ing which had been less obvious when 
they defeated him in 1924, The similarities 
expressed themselves in a series of negative 
characteristics: lack of political conviction,
lack of social responsibility, lack of allegiance 
to higher authority* They had made the same 
mistake as Lu, in trying to carve out a Kwangsi 
Empire which they did not have the strength to 
maintain.
The manner of their rise to power in Kwangsi, 
in the context of warlord struggles, had assured 
that these characteristics would be latent in them* 
But in 1926, when they first entered national 
politics, a possibility had existed that they would 
go another way. Two paths had lain open to them: 
either to stay in Kwangsi and pursue careers as 
provincial warlords, or to move into new careers 
as servants of the national revolutionary movement* 
They had kept a foot in both camps, by leaving one 
of their number behind, and sending two out*
Huang Shao-hsiung had remained a provincial warlord, 
though not of Lu Yung-t'ing's type; he had shown 
greater interest in the management of the province,
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and in the introduction of new ideas and his rule 
represented some progress from Lu's.
By contrast, Li and Pai had moved backwards, 
in terms of their political position and commitment 
to a national movement. The characteristics of 
local chauvinism, self-agrandisement and authoritarian 
government latent in them from their earlier careers 
had been enhanced during their careers in the 
Kuomintang. An orthodox interpretation, Kuomintang 
or Communist, would blame this on their basic 
veniality. But it can also be argued that it was 
a reaction to the failure of the Kuomintang to 
create in China circumstances which woul^iiave 
made it impossible for the Kwangsi generals, and 
many other men like them, to operate as independent 
militants, circumstances in which they would have 
been forced to submit to civilian control. They 
were certainly more willing to do this in 1926 than 
they were after the disintegration of Kuomintang 
political unity in 1927*
Some of the officers of Li's and Pai's 
generation managed the transformation from petty 
warlord to military servant of a political party, 
but not under the Kuomintang. Chu Te is a 
remarkable example of such a transformation, and one 
which is the more striking since Chu's career as a
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warlord made him a more unlikely candidate for 
transformation than the Kwangsi leaders. It 
spanned a longer period of time, and it had 
corrupted him as a person more deeply, for it had 
led him, amongst other things, to opium smoking.
But Chu is a remarkable man, and there are elements 
in his make-up which Li and Pai lacked* They went 
another way. The possibilities for transformation 
within them were not developed; conditions under 
the Kuomintang allowed them and even encouraged them 
to slip back into ?^arlord practices. In the end, 
the Kuomintang, having failed to remould its warlord 
allies, was forced to continue the anti-warlord wars 
officially ended with the completion of the Northern 
Expedition, and to crush its erstwhile allies, or 
at any rate those who dominated extensive areas of 
Kuomintang China.
In the process, Chiang Kai-shek established 
himself as absolute master of the Kuomintang, its 
government and its armies. The Kuomintang was not 
again threatened by large-scale regional independence.
This victory did not, however, give Chiang 
absolute control over China. Large-scale 
regionalism was replaced by provincial independence. 
These independent provinces constituted little threat 
to Nanking, since their leaders were no longer
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tempted to expand their power outside their own 
provinces, but they did represent a contradiction 
to the Kuomintang1s claims to have fully reunified 
China, a contradiction which was conveniently 
ignored by the Kuomintang and its friends in China 
and abroad*
CHAPTER VII
The Kwangsi Clique in the 1950s; The Reconstruction
Movement in Kwangsi
After the flight from Kwangsi of the leaders of 
the Kwangsi Clique in the spring of 1929* control 
of the provincial government passed to Yu Tso-po 
and Lu Huan-yen. Yu<*s connections with the communisi 
movement in Kwangsi, and with Wang Ching-wei^ led, ii 
the early autumn of the same year, to a rupture with 
Nanking, shortly after which Yu and his followers wea 
driven from power, when various army commanders in 
Kwangsi transferred their allegiance to Nanking. The 
leaders of the Kwangsi Clique used the confusion 
which this transfer of power engendered to return 
secretly to the province and to establish contact 
with various army units still loyal to them. By the
end of November, they had re-established their contrc
1 1 over the province# I
At the same time, Chang Pa-k’uei arrived in the 
province with his troops, having marched south from 
the Yangtze after quarrelling with Nanking. Chang, 
who had remained loyal to Wang Ching-wei, was trying 
to repeat his southward march of 1927 and to launch 
an attack into Kwangtung, in order to re-establish
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Wang at Canton. At the end of 1929? Chang and the
Kwangsi leaders drove down the West Kiver into
Kwangtung. The expedition was poorly conceived,
and hastily planned; after some initial anccesses,
the Chang/Kwangsi troops ran into heavy Cantonese
resistance, and were driven back in disarray into
3
Kwangsi. Wuohow was lost to the Cantonese.
In March, 1930, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan
allied for an attack on Chiang Kai-shek and acquired
the political support of Wang Ching-wei and his
clique, now known as the Reorganisationists. An
Expanded Conference (K fuo-ta Hui-i) was convened in
4Peking, with Wang as its chairman. Through their
alliance with Chang Fa-*k!uei, the leaders of the
Kwangsi Clique found themselves allied with Wang, in
spite of the past history of enmity between themselves 
5
and Wang. It was decided that they and Chang should 
attack north into Hunan, with Nanking as their ulti­
mate goal, in a pincer offensive coordinated with 
attacks by Feng and Yen in North China. Pai Ch'ung- 
hsi commanded the Kwangsi troops in the field; had he 
and Chang made adequate arrangements for the defence 
of their rear against possible attacks from Kwangtung 
and Yunnan, these two generals, whose standing as field 
commanders was unsurpassed in Kuomintang military circles, 
might have come near to achieving their objective.
They took Ch!angsha, and were pressing on north towards
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Wuhan, when they found themselves cut off. Cantonese
troops were moving towards Kwangsi, and into Hunan.
Chang's former subordinate, (Tski T'ing-k'ai, had
managed to interpose his troops between the Chang/Pai
forces and reinforcements under Huang Shao-hsiung
6moving north from Kwangsi. At the same time, a
Yunnanese attack into Kwangsi from the north-west
had penetrated as far as Nanning and the city was 
7besieged. Chang and Pai were forced to withdraw in 
haste into Kwangsi, but were not able to prevent 
several cities in the West River Valley near the
Q
Kwangtung border from falling into Cantonese hands.
Huang Shao-hsiung had been unhappy about the 
refusal of the other leaders of the Clique to come to 
terms with Nanking and Canton after their defeat in 
the spring of 1929? the reckless attacks into Kwang­
tung and Hunan added to his discontent, and caused 
an open breach between him and Li Tsung-jen and Pai 
Ch'ung-hsi. He left Kwangsi at the end of 1930 and 
never again worked directly with the Clique, though 
his relations with its leaders remained friendly. 1 
The crushing defeats which the Kwangsi Clique 
suffered in Kwangtung and Hunan forced upon Li Tsung- 
jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi the realisation that they could 
no longer hope to re-establish themselves as overlords 
of a regional grouping extending over several provinces. 
Their military strength, much weakened by the defections
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of 1929 and by their string of subsequent defeats, 
was sufficient only to allow them to retain control 
over Kwangsi. Their defeat in the Yangtze Talley 
had strengthened Nanking's authority, which now made 
itself felt over a formidable core area to the north 
and south of the Yangtze, from which attacks on 
dissident militarists in North and South China could 
be launched without the earlier fear of a flank 
attack from Wuhan. The failure of Wang Ching-wei's 
attempt to establish himself at Peking, blocked by 
the opposition of Chang Hs&eh-liang, impressed on Li 
and Pai the futility of putting their weight behind 
any attempt by a rival Kuomintang faction to unseat 
Chiang Kai-shek, Such enterprises laid Kwangsi open 
to attack from Nanking ‘loyalists1, such as Lung Yftn 
in Yunnan, ^ 4 t  the end of 1930, one of Kwangsi's 
most pressing needs was to re-establish good relations 
with her neighbours, to protect herself from possible 
attacks, rather than to invite further ones.
The continuing hostility between Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi was seriously affecting Kwangsi*s communica­
tions with the outside world, and therefore depressing 
trade and undermining the province's economy. Short of 
complete economic collapse, Kwangsi had to resume 
normal relations with Kwangtung. An occasion for 
r^proacl&ient arose in February, 1931 * when Hu Han-min, 
the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan, was arrested in 
Nanking for his opposition to the promulgation of the
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10ProvlMiLal Constitution. Hu*s arrest caused an
upsurge of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, both from
the Right and from the Left, which culminated in the
establishment of a separate government in Canton,
made up of a coalition of anti-Chiang politicians
11and militarists. A defensive alliance of south­
western provinces was formed, in which Kwangsi 
participated, and in the summer, a short-lived expedi­
tion was launched into Hunan against Hanking.
The independent government at Canton soon found 
itself in the same unfortunate position as Sun Yat-sen 
had each time he had tried to set up his own government 
there: the government was independent of the central 
government, but not of the local military commanders. 
Ch*en Chi-tfang proved recalcitrant and when, after 
the Mukden Incident, national feeling swung in favour 
of a settlement between Canton and Hanking, the politi­
cians at Canton gladly accepted a reunion with Hanking.
Southern independance continued after the departure 
of the politicians for Hanking. Kwangtung and Kwangsi 
were openly defiant of Hanking*, Yunnan and Kweichow 
maintained a de-facto independance. In December, 1931? 
three organisations were set up in Canton, the South- 
West Executive Section of the Central Executive Commi- 
ttee (Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yuan-hui Hsi-nan Chih- 
hsing Pu), the South-West Political Council of the 
national Government (Kuo-min Cheng-Pu Hsi-nan Cheng-wu 
Wei-yuan-hui) and the South-West Military Hranch Council 
of the national Government (Kuo-min Cheng-Eu Hsi-nan
Chuk-shih Fen-hui); these organisations claimed a 
dubious legality, though they were in definace of 
the Kuomintang and the National Government and were 
not sanctioned from Nanking* They were said to re­
present the five provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, 
Yunnan, Kweichow, and Fukien, but they had authority 
only in the first two* Even then, they played no 
part in the internal affairs of either province, but
13functioned only as organs of opposition to Nanking.
With the re-establishment of friendly relations
with Kwangtung, Kwangsi was assured against attack
from the quarter most dangerous to her, and so long
as Kwangtung was friendly, Kwangsi was also protected
14against an attack from Yunnan. There was no danger 
of an attack from the north, since Nanking was fully 
occuppied in North China and in Kiangsi, and the 
Hunanese authorities were far more concerned about 
their communist neighbours in Kiangsi than about their 
neighbour to the south.
Kwangsifs security from external threats did not 
permit the Kwangsi Clique to plan offensive actions 
outside the province; the vision of *Kwangsi Empire* 
had dissolved in the aftermath of the defeats in 1929 
and 1930. The Clique was forced to readjust its 
policies, and to accep>t its reduced p o s i t i o n ,  within 
the scope of a single province; a concrete, practical 
formula for the government of Kwangsi needed to be
worked out. For the first time, the leaders of the 
Clique were forced to outline specific policies and 
to establish guiding principles; they could no longer 
rely on their earlier practice of making spot adjust­
ments to the turns of national events, with a guiding 
aim of extending Kwangsi power; since they were now 
outside national politics, this was no longer relev$jit. 
They adopted a scheme of authoritarian reform, for 
the military, political, economic and cultural recon­
struction of Kwangsi.
As before, the Clique was ruled by a triumvirate. 
Huang Shao-hsiung was replaced by Huang Hsi!i-chlu (no 
relation), an 'army officer with a long career in the 
second echelon of the Clique. Li, Pai and Huang shared 
responsibility for planning and policy-formation and 
divided responsibility for individual facets of admini­
stration. Li was responsible for external relations 
and for the generation of popular support within the 
province; as such his position was most conspicuous 
to the outside world, and he was often considered to be 
the outright ruler of the Clique; in fact, while Huang 
occupied a slightly inferior position, Li and Pai were 
equals, with the balance of power if anything in Pai!s 
favour. Pai managed military affairs within the province
and ran the militia, while Huang was concerned with the
15civilian government of the province.
The general tone of the Reconstruction Movement
in Kwangsi, which got under way in 1931» was authori­
tarian and spartan, its policies reflecting the 
military backgrounds of its leaders. In theory, these 
loolicies were cast within the framework of Sun Yat- 
isen's Three Principles of the People, but the vagueness 
of the Principles gave wide scox)e for their modifica­
tion to suit the particular s?f circumstances of Kwangsi, 
and to conform to the personal ideas of the leaders 
of the province. Their long connection with the Kuomin- 
tang and the token ^acceptance of Sun's principles in 
almost all parts of China except those under communist 
control encouraged a continuing adherence to the ideo­
logy of the Kuomintang even after they had split with 
Nanking. In any event, the Kwangsi leaders regarded 
other political alternatives as unsuitable. Huang Hsu- 
ch'u stated that; "our feelings towards the highest 
political lines were that communism was untrustworthy,
capitalism was unworkable, end consequently only the
16
Three Princixoles of the People were suitable".
The Kwangsi leaders referred to external political 
influences, but their selection was random and indis­
criminate. Pai Chfung-hsi cited with respect ideas of
17Darwin, Kropotkin and Kuan-tzu; Li Tsung-jen men-
18tioned Confucius and G-Ibbon, it is unlikely that 
either man had more than a remote grasp of the 
significance of the foreign theories they cited. These 
ideas probably came from 'tame1 intellectuals with
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pretensions to sophistication working on their staffs, 
who would have picked them up in the numerous articles 
devoted to every form of western philosophy and political 
thought, which appeared in magazines such as Tung-fang 
Tsa-chih and Kuo-wen Ghou-pao .
The influence of the western ideas listed above
was negligible, but another source of western influence
may have been more important* Mussolini's ideas of the
Corporate State and of national regeneration coupled
with dictatorial internal rule found parallels (which
may have been unwitting) in the policies of the Kwangsi
Government. A French missionary reported in 1934 that:
"It seems certain that while the word of command is to
rely in the main 011 the principles given by the Founder
of the Republic in his Triple Demi sin, the mode of
execution of the plan is based on Italian Fascism.
The fascist doctrine is in fact frequently presented
in the government journal at Nanning, and a long expos^
of this doctrine, its aims and its methods is laid out
in a booklet of about a hundred pages on sale in all
IPtthe modern bookshops.." Both Li Tsung-jen and Pai 
Ch'ung-hsi sent personal followers to Europe during
20the early 1930s, to study Italian and German Fascism.
Fascist influence in Kwangsi is difficult to docu­
ment, since much of the official explanation and justi­
fication of Kwangsi policy in the early 1930s did not 
appear in print until the late 1930s and early 1940s.
During the intervening period., the Italian annexation 
of Abyssinia in 1935 and the formation of the Axis 
alliance between the European Fascists and Japan 
caused feeling to swing strongly against Mussolini, 
and to identify with oppressed Abyssinia rather than 
with aggresive Italy. However, in the early 1930s, 
the influence of Italian Fascism was widely felt in 
Ohina; the desire to build up a strong nation in Ohina 
appeared to correspond with what was being attempted 
in Italy and Germany, "countries which many believe to 
have achieved 'national revival* by means of authori­
tarian rule in the teeth of economic depression, com-
21
munism and international opposition".
The Kwangsi leaders were able to justify their 
adherence to Sun Yat-sen's philosophy while remaining 
outside the mainstream of contemporary Kuomintang 
politics first by claiming that the Nanking Government 
was perverting Sun*s aims, and second by manipulating 
relevant sections of Sun's programme to their own ends. 
Clause 17 of Sun's Chien-kuo Ta-kang (Outline of 
National Reconstruction), which refers to the period of 
constitutional government, (which had not yet been 
reached) states that: "During this period, the division 
of power between the central and the provincial govern­
ments shall follow the line of equilibrium. Those
3^5
affairs which have the nature of uniformity for the
whole nation shall belong to the central government.
Those that are particular to the locality, and need
particular attention she.ll belong to the local
22government.1 The Kwangsi leaders ignored earlier
clauses of the Chien-kuo Ta-kang which called for
hsien self-government before such a division of power
between the centre and the provinces should take place,
and Sun's emphasis on the hsien rather than the
province as the unit of local autonomy; they claimed
that the perversion of Sun's ideals by the Nanking
Government was such that his true followers, such as
themselves, had a duty to carry out his policies in
the best way that they could, even if this meant within
one province only, in the hope that their example would
influence others. At the same time they maintained that
Kwangsi differed so fundamentally from other areas that
23
only local rule was applicable. In spite of their
amendments to Sun's ideas, and their rejection of one
of his most fundamental principles, national unity,
Huang Hsu-ch'u felt able to claim that Kwangsi's
j)olicies were: "completely in accord with the principles
laid down by the Kuo-Fu (Father of the Republic) and
also absolutely without contradiction in relation to
. 24actual conditions."
The Kwangsi Reconstruction Movement had a strong 
appeal to and depended for much of its support on the 
highly developed localism and provincialism which
characterised the province, isolated from the rest
of China hy geographical harriers, poverty and a
tradition of rebelliousness towards central authority.
The moving force of the Movement was often referred to
25
as 'G-reater Kwangsi-ism1 (Ta Kuang-hsi Chu-i), or
26
local patriotism (l1amour de la petite patrie).
Fortunately for the Kwangsi Clique, this inward- 
looking provincialism was associated with Kwangsifs 
warlike tradition; in a province’s whose heroes had 
all been soldiers, it was easy for military men to 
attract to themselves the support of local chauvinists.
Within the small world of Kwangsi, a lower form 
of regionalism existed, based on the strong regional 
differences between the north-eastern part of the 
province, around Kweilin, settled originally from 
North and Central China, and the south-eastern section 
around Wuchow, settled from Kwangtung. This form of 
regionalism was expressed by the development of group­
ings within the Clique and its chief supporters, whose 
membership was also determined by questions of profes­
sion and outlook. Li Tsung-jen was supported by the 
old-fashioned landed interests, Pai Ch'ung-hsi by 
younger army officers and other modern-minded men, and 
Huang Iisu-ch'u by bureaucrats and merchants.
Opinions vary as to the quality of the relations 
between the leaders of the Clique and as to ifche balance 
of power between them. There was no overt friction
between the leaders, although Li Tsung-jen's position
relative to Pai Chung-hsi probably declined sharply
27
within the province during the period up to 1936. Li 
concerned himself little with affairs within the 
province, and spent much of his time in Canton, but 
although his absences weakened his position in rela­
tion to Pai, there is no evidence that Pai ever tried 
to deprive him of authority.
The Militia
The Kwangsi Militia, or Peoples* Oorps (Min-T*uan), 
was the fundamental organisational framework of the 
Kwangsi Reconstruction Movement. It was first set up 
in 1930, in response to the chaos which descended on 
the province after the defeats of the Kwangsi Clique 
in 1929 and 1930. The establishment of a militia was 
a traditional response to troubled conditions. Militia 
units were raised either by established governmental 
authorities to supplement inadequate regular troops, 
as for example the force raised by Lin Tse-hsu near 
Canton during the Opium War, or by civilian leaders in 
an individual locality where government protection was 
insufficient. There were historical precedents in 
Kwangsi for the first type of organisation, notably 
during the time of the Taiping Rebellion, when militias 
had been organised by the provincial authorities to 
counter the activities of the nascent Taiping forces 
and later towards the end of the Rebellion, to help
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to crush the defeated Taipings. Organisations of 
the second type had existed widely in Kwangsi during 
the recurrent periods of anarchy within the province, 
and had helped to produce a people who took naturally
to arming themselves against handits and petty war-
M/er** 28
lords and who accustomed to para-military activities.
The militia established by the Kwangsi Clique in
1930 was an amalgamation of existing but -uncoordinated
militia units, organised to cope with a situation where
the regular army had been so weakened by defection and
defeat that it could no longer guarantee internal order.
The Kwangsi leaders decided to secure internal order by
giving official sanction and organisation to the existing
guardians of local order.
The first commander of the militia was Huang Shao-
hsiung, who held the post for a few months before his
29
departure from the province at the end of 1930.
After his departure, control of the militia passed to 
Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who treated the militia as an offshoot 
of the provincial military establishment. In June, 1932, 
the militia was transferred to the provincial government, 
headed by Huang Hsu-ch'u, but after a year, it was 
returned to Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who retained control of it 
over the succeeding years. ^
The structure of the militia organisation at its 
inception was very simple; each hsien was ordered to
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train four corps of ninety men each for full-time
militia service, under the direction of twelve area
commands. The militia was to he financed hy the
hsien authorities and armed hy local requisitioning
of weapons. By the end of 1931, ah out 50,000
31militiamen had heen organised. The militia handled
the problems of local order and handit suppression,
while the regular army concentrated on eradicating
serious resistance, especially in the communist-heId
region in north-west Kwangsi. All ahle-hodied men
between the ages of 18 and 45 were eligible for
militia training, which was compulsory for those
drafted. There was great opposition to the scheme at
first on the part of the men taken away from their
32normal work, hut in spite of the opposition of 
participants, the militia scheme was so successful in 
maintaining order that the Kwangsi leaders decided in 
1933 to extend its scope and to use the militia 
organisation for the application of economic, social 
and political policy and as the vehicle for mass 
organisation. Its most important function remained 
that of local defence and for this purpose the original 
scheme of full-time, short-service militiamen was 
modified to a rota system, under which all ahle-hodied 
men were trained, first for a brief full-time period, 
and them for a longer part-time period, to form a huge 
reserve which could he mobilised in case of emergency.
Compensation was given to wage-earners during full­
time training, hut peasants, most of whom were con­
sidered to he self-employed, were expected to give 
their services 1voluntarily*, thus removing what
the Kwangsi leaders conveniently regarded as the
33mercenary stigma of the traditional militias. By 
19355 ihe Kwangsi Government claimed that over 450,000 
men had been trained.
M  The basis of the militia organisation was the
village corps, hut units were also set up in schools,
government offices and higher education institutions.
No^ ie was exempt from militia training except the sick,
35the criminal and members of certain professions.
The militia, as conceived after 1933, had a triple 
aim and was based on a policy known as the Policy of 
Three-fold Self-Reliance (San-tzu Cheng-ts1e), which 
consisted of Self-defence, Self-Sufficiency and Self- 
Government. "The militia does not merely ensure self- 
defence. Although it does not permit of the immediate 
achievement of self-government, it tends hy its train­
ing to create conditions which will bring self-govern­
ment nearer realisation. As regards self-sufficiency, 
the militia constitutes an instrument enabling the 
Provincial Government to orient the production and 
consumption of the province according to its own plans.
The aim of the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique was 
to obtain the organised participation of the people in
the defence of the province and in its social, economic 
and political reconstruction. Technically, this 
participation was supposed to he the first step on the 
road towards local self-government, and a training 
ground in the practice of democracy, hut there is 
little evidence to suggest that the Clique ever inten­
ded the members of the militia to play any hut a 
strictly directed role. Military discipline was to he
maintained, with the aim of "applying the military
37spirit to the direction of politics". The Clique 
accepted the concept of democracy only in their own 
interpretation of participation without rights. They 
convinced themselves that while low-level organisation 
was essential for the mobilisation and unification of 
the province (and the nation), the people were not 
sophisticated or educated enough to he entrusted with 
any real democratic powers. ^
The Clique believed that one of the chief failings 
of the hanking Government was its failure to extend the 
power of the government down to village level; until 
this was done, local power would remain in the hands of 
the traditional village leaders, who ha,d no interest 
in promoting the policies of Sun Yat-sen. Huang Hs{J.-ch* 
felt that the schemes which Nanking sponsored in the 
field of rural reconstruction, which typically involved 
only individual hsien, were too narrow; while these 
hsien might receive expert help, such limited schemes
33V
offered little to the reconstruction of the whole of
39Chinese rural life.
Nanking sponsored experimental hsien at Lanhsi in
Chekiang, and at Chiangning in Kiangsu; the government
also carried out reconstruction work in Kiangsi after
the expulsion of the communists from that province in
1934. There were provincially sponsored reconstruction
areas in Hopei, attached to Mass Education Movement run
hy James Yen, and in Shantung, where the provincial
chairman Han Eu-chfu promoted the work of Liang Sou-ming
in the Tsoup'ing Village Reconstruction Research 
40Institute. The proportion of the national income
devoted to rural reconstruction was tiny: 0.2$ was
41
allocated in 1931/2, 3-9$ in 1934/5* Opponents of 
the Nanking government felt that too much time and money 
was spent on research and planning, and too little in 
implementation, and that many reconstruction projects 
were vitiated hy bureaucratic management. These faults 
the Kwangsi leaders hoped to avoid.
Under the enlarged militia system, three posts had 
to he filled in every village on street -unit: village/ 
street head, militia chief, and school head. As there 
were over 25,000 village or street units, and as there 
was a scarcity of competent personnel, it was incon­
ceivable that the province would he able to install three 
men in each unit. But it was within the hounds of !
possibility that one man could be trained for each
unit to fulfil^ the three functions; a 'shoe-string
method1 (ch'iung tzo-fa) was adopted, whereby one
man would be trained to be concurrently village/street
head, school head and militia chief. The man appointed
would have his offices in the village school, which
would also act as the village bureau (ts'un kung-suo)
and as the militia headquarters, and would be located
in a village temple or ancestral hall.. Candidates for
the triple post were trained in government-run schools,
for a period varying from six to eighteen months,
according to the previous educational experience of the
trainee, and were given instruction in military, economic,
42
political and cultural subjects.
The system, which was known as 1 Three-in-One’ (San-
Wei Y'i-t'i), had the advantage of giving rural cadres
sufficient authority to prevent the sabotaging of the
militia programme by unsympathetic local leaders. The
headship of the village provided local power and the
headship of the school the salary of the cadre. The
payment of a salary would allow men without private
means to perform village management functions which
had traditionally been in the hands of local gentry who
43did not receive salaries for their work.
The trained cadres were in theory capable of 
directing work in Self-Defence, Self-government and 
Self-Sufficiency, the three parts of the San-tzu Cheng-
t^Ae. The detailed specifications for this policy
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were found in the Outline for the Reconstruction of
Kwangsi (Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang”ling), adopted in
August, 1934, hy a Joint Committee of Government,
Military and Party representatives, the highest
44authority in the province.
The most striking feature of the Kwangsi militia
was its para-military appearance. Its organisation
was modelled on army ranks; each militia-man was held
to he the equivalent of a private soldier, and militia
units at village, hsiang and hsien levels corresponded
4 5to units in the army. This structure was designed 
to promote an atmosphere of discipline and duty, which 
would ensure the efficiency of militia members in their 
local defence functions, and in their other activities. 
The policies contained in Self-Sufficiency section of 
the San tzu Gheng-ts^  did not contain any radical 
programmes for the reform of Kwangsi!s economy, hut 
consisted of communal and cooperative schemes, such 
as reafforestation, the planting of tung trees, instruc­
tion in agricultural method, communal ploughing, the 
establishment of village granaries and fish ponds, and 
the provision of corveh labour for government projects. 
The income from profit-making enterprises of this nature
was eventually expected to pay for the salary of the
46village cadre. The provisions of the Self-Government 
policy called for the taking of censuses, and the 
registration of land, in preparation for local self-
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government; both these tasks were carried out, but
with so little efficiency that their results were
47virtually useless. It was also believed that 
militia training would instil^ the collective spirit 
and discipline needed for self-government at some 
unspecified time in the future* Militia registration 
played an important role in population control: it 
prevented the free-movement of individuals, since 
individuals were not permitted to be without registra-
48tion, or to move from place to place without permission* 
The most important function of the militia system 
after its role in local defence was its educational 
function* Large numbers of basic schools were set up 
in villages and streets, to give children the rudiments 
of education and to train them for eventual participa­
tion in local government. The mass education movement, 
launched in 1933? called for compulsory education for 
children between six and twelve, and for part-time 
instruction for illiterate adults. Though the scheme 
can never have achieved universal education, it does 
appear to have been remarkably successful. Even a 
communist attack on the Kwangsi Clique states that 
education had penetrated even to the most backward areas 
of the province, though the form of education given is
seen as an attempt to “traduce the intellectuals and
49dupe the people". The schools were usually very 
simple and no attention was paid to the external trappings
334-
of education. Children came to school in whatever
50clothing they had, often in rags and barefoot.
The aim was to provide quantity, not quality, and in 
consequence, the standard of instruction was probably 
very low* The mass education movement was directed 
by Lei Pei-hung, an American-trained educator, and 
one of the few foreign-trained men working for the 
Kwangsi Government.
The militia subsumed many of the functions of 
local government in Kwangsi. The San-wei I-t1i system 
operated at hsiang and hsien levels as well as in the 
villages, and local power tended to be concentrated 
in the hands of militia officers. The Kuomintang 
Party organisation within the province played only a 
very limited role in the management of provincial and 
local affairs. The Party was out of touch with the 
Kuomintang headquarters in Hanking and was controlled 
directly by the Kwangsi Government, which expected it 
to play a only minimal role, in propaganda and political
51
training* Party membership was stagnant throughout
52the period 1931 to 1936. Local civil servants were
governed by stringent regulations issued by the
provincial government, and from 1933 on were in theory
53subject to government competency examinations. Givil 
servants at local levels and in the provincial govern­
ment were expected to wear grey homespun (t fu-pu)
uniforms; silk clothes and western style clothes were 
54banned* Heavy fines and punishments were laid down
for officials "breaking regulations or behaving
corruptly, which appear to have been implemented
at least partially; in 1933, there were twenty-two
former magistrates in prison in Nanning on charges
55of corruption. A french missionary report of 1934
noted the improvement in quality of government
officials and the removal from office of the utterly
incompetent; officials were constrained to accept a
simple and disciplined life, with poor financial
rewards: "no luxury, no waste, only an aurea medio-
critas (golden mean) with the satisfaction that the
accomplishment of one's duty gives, helped by a
56convinced patriotism." The Kwangsi Clique advocated 
the breakdown of the local power of the gentry, who 
had incurred the rage of the Clique by refusing to 
carry out its policies of militia training during the 
period 1931-1933* But the Clique had previously 
depended for its local support on the gentry, and it 
is unlikely that it was willing to deprive itself 
entirely of this support; it was only concerned to 
draw the teeth of gentry power, and to be able to
57implement policies of which the gentry disapproved.
The Provincial Government
The provincial government was reorganised in July, 
1931 after a period in abeyance during the troubles 
following the defeat of the Kwangsi Clique in 1929; 
its new chairman was Huang Hsu-ch'u, Huang introduced 
measures to streamline the operations of the government,
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and eventually in 1934 all branches of government
were amalgamated into a single office, 4he Combined
3 8G-overnment Office. The government was responsible 
for the economy of the province, for la|ge-scale re-£x
construction enterprises, for financial affairs and 
for middle and higher education. Military affairs 
remained independent of civilian control under the 
Headquarters of the 4th Group Army; the army was the 
paramount authority in the province and had financial 
priority, but its chiefs seemed prepared to give the
59
civilian government some degree of autonomous authority. 
The policies of the government were determined, like 
those of the militia, by the San-tzu Cheng-ts'e, though 
the government was not concerned with those sections of 
it which dealt with self-defence.
In the economic field, the government was concerned 
to ensure Kwangsi*s economic independence, and to build 
up its internal strength. Self-Sufficiency was inter­
preted not as a closed economy, but as a situation in 
which trade would be in balance. ^  pn attempting to 
strengthen Kwangsifs economy, the government was handi­
capped by the province's poverty, by the generally 
depressed international economic situation, and by the 
fluctuating rates of exchange between Kwangsi*s currency 
and other Chinese and foreign currencies. Kwangsi1s 
exports were largely agricultural, consisting of 
livestock and other perishables for the Canton market,
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and of products such as tung oil for the international 
market• Over the preceding years there had heen con­
siderable falls in the prices which Kwangsi's products 
realised, as a result of the world economic depression-
and of internal disruption, and the market for many of
61them was declining. This led to a contraction of 
total trade, as evidenced by a large number of business
6
failures in the main commercial centres of the province.
As trade declined, Cantonese merchants, who domin­
ated the trade and commerce of the province, began 
to remove themselves and what capital they could salv­
age from the province, thus weakening the overall 
situation still further. By 1935? the population of 
the economic hub of the province, Wuchow, had shrunk 
to half the figure of 120,000 which it had reached at 
its peak of prosperity. The decline in private 
economic activity meant that little private capital 
was available for new investment.
The poor trading situation had serious implica­
tions for the stability of the province*s internal 
economy, for the weakness of the kwangsi currency in 
relation to other currencies affected internal confid­
ence in it, and helped to force up prices within the 
54
province. The attempts of the government to streng­
then the province's economy were therefore directed 
chiefly towards improving the trading situation and 
bringing trade into balance. The methods used consisted
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of instituting tariffs and controls on imports, of
developing local industries to provide import-sub-
stitutes, and of encouraging existing and potential
export industries. A major internal 110011 to trade
and commerce, poor communications, was to be remedied
a heavy programme of road building. The currency
was to he controlled by the re-established Kwangsi
Bank, which was directly under government control,
6 5in an attempt to stabilise the currency.
To regulate imports, and to check the quality of
exports, a trade bureau was set up at Wuchow in 1935*
Various imports, particularly of luxury goods, were
banned; imports of woven cotton were discouraged, in
the hope that * foreign' cotton would be replaced by
66locally-woven t 'u-pu. One section of imports virtu­
ally disappeareds the boycott against Japanese goods, 
instituted after the Mukden Incident, was almost water- 
t i ^ t . 67
To provide locally manufactured import-substitutes,
the Kwangsi government adopted a dual policy of
encouraging private enterprise through tax concessions
and of injecting government capital into wholly or
partially government-owned enterprises* A number of
factories and workshops were set up, but the scale of
individual undertakings was so small that their output
68can have had little effect on import figures. Attempts 
were made to obtain foreign capital, especially from 
Kwangsi natives living outside the province, but there
is no evidence.that this scheme yielded significant
69amounts of investment. Investment from foreign
countries was equally difficult to obtains "The
provision of foreign capital for sound schemes is
the principal requirement of this area (Kwangtung
and Kwangsi), but the present (1.935J world unrest,
the lack of clearly defined and realisable security,
and the spirit of economic nationalism and high
taxation in China, do not at present dispose financial
interests to engage in schemes involving long credits.1
The development of export industries centred on
the tung oil trade, which usually accounted for as
much as 30 fo of Kwangsi* s exports in any one year, and
71on mineral products. In 1933, every able-bodied man 
in the provinee was ordered to plant a minimum of ten 
tung seedlings per annum and tung committees were set 
up in every hsien to supervise the work; Kwangsi was 
to be turned into 'the land of Tung' (t 1ung chih kuo). 
Kwangsi possessed large deposits of tin and manganese, 
which might prove commercially valuable if methods of 
extraction could be improved. The provincial govern­
ment did not intend to enter the mining field directly 
but planned to leave exploitation to private mining
companies, controlling the industry in a limited way
73through licensing. In 1934, a survey was carried 
out to study the feasibility of constructing a, railway 
from Hohsien in Kwangsi to Sanshui in Kwangtung, which
would be built as a combined operation of the two
provincial governments, and would aid the Kwangsi
mining industry by facilitating the export of minerals
74from the Hohsien area*
The railway scheme never materialised, nor did
other attempts to improve the tra.de balance meet
with great success• Although the import surplus was
reduced, from the point in 1933 where imports had
been three times as great as exports* Kwangsi was
not able to bring her trade into balance, nor to halt
the outflow of silver from the province, needed to pay
for imports; an order of 1932 banning the export of
76silver was ignored. Tung oil production, instead of
77rising, actually fell*
A further feature of government economic activity
in Kwangsi was the attempt to streamline the taxation
system and to balance the provincial budget. Many
petty taxes were abolished; systems of direct tax
collection were instituted to avoid tax-farming and
7 P
the corruption it involved. The limited tax reforms
were sufficient to ensure a rise in provincial revenue
every year until 1937, when Kwangsi was reintegrated
into the national system and various revenues formerly
retained by the provincial government passed to Nanking,
but, except in 1934, the rise was not sufficient to
79keep pace with expenditure. The chief cause of the
balancing of the provincial budget in 1934 was an
enormous rise in the income from 1 opium suppression
fines1, that is the tax on opium in transit through 
8 0Kwangsi. This rise may he ascribed to the restora­
tion of normal traffic after the confusion of the 
preceding period, for the income from this tax in 1934 
was no higher than that recorded in the years before 
1929* Income from opium taxation usually accounted
for 50y£ of the annual revenue of the provincial 
8lgovernment. 70^ of opium in transit through Kwangsi 
originated in Kweichow, the rest in Yunnan. The com­
mercial prosperity of Kwangsi, what there was of it, 
depended on the opium trade, in which a large propor­
tion of the commercial organisations of Wuchow and
8 2Nanning were involved. After the occupation of
U
Kweichow in 1934 by Nanking troops in pursuit of com­
munist forces on the Long March, the Kwangsi revenue 
from opium declined sharply, precipitating a severe 
financial crisis in the province, and providing a
compelling reason for Kwangsi*s submission to Nanking
-i nor 83 m  1936.
This development confirm a judgement of Ii.G-.W. 
Woodhead, the editor of the China Year Book, that 
regional independence in the South-West depended to 
a great extent on the opium revenues available to 
regional militarists there: "it is difficult to see 
how disbandment will ever become practicable until 
the Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow and Kwangsi militarists
have been deprived of this £opium} source of revenue.
They are able to obstruct or defy the Central Govern-
ment only because they are in a position to maintain
their armies out of this illicit revenue. Deprived
of this source of income, they would have to conform
84to the wishes of the National Government".
The crisis precipitated by the loss of opium 
revenue was an indication of the fundamental instability 
of the Kwangsi financial situation. The disproportion­
ate dependence on income from opium and the equally 
disproportionate expenditure on the armed forces created 
an extremely shaky situation which could easily be
85
upset, as was shown by Nanking's actions in 1935*
The most successful feature of economic reconstruc­
tion in Kwangsi was the road building programme. Huang 
Shao-hsiung' s administration between 1926 and 1929 had 
laid the foundations of an integrated road system; the 
achievements in road building during his rule were 
indicated by the fact that in 1933 Kwangsi still had 
more roads than any province except Shantung and Kwang­
tung , in spite of the fact that there had been little
86construction after the begining on 1929* Hoads were 
constructed partly by corve^ labour and partly by 
bands of unemployed men, disbanded soldiers, and rural 
lay-abouts. The use of this second category of labour 
had the beneficial side-effect of preventing these men 
from becoming bandits, a frequent recourse of such
3*7groups in the past* There was some doubt as to
whom the roads were to benefit. In Kwangsi, as it
other provinces, it seemed that: "military and
strategic, rather than economic reasons have prompted
most of this CroadJ development..." The peasants
suffered rather than benefited from such construction;
land was taken from them, often without compensation,
and they were obliged to supply corvee labour to build 
88the roads. The Kwangsi government had a further
incentive for building roads, aside from strategic
considerations, which was to facilitate the opium
traffic. The Kwangsi/Kweichow opium trade benefited,
before 1935, by the linking of the two provinces by
89a good motor road.
Little progress was made in other forms of com­
munications. Main rivers were dredged, and a prestige
airline was established in 1934 to link the major
90Kwangsi cities with Canton, but there was no rail­
way construction until after the start of the Anti- 
Japanese War, when the link with Hengchow in Hunan was 
finally constructed, after more than twenty years of 
planning.
In its scheme of reconstruction, the Kwangsi 
government was sometimes tempted to undertake projects 
which owed more to prestige than to sound economic 
considerations, though such projects conflicted with 
the desire of the Kwangsi leaders to give an impression
of frugality and simplicity. Prestige undertakings, 
apart from the airline, tended to take the form of 
urban improvements. In Nanning, the provincial 
capital, modern government offices were erected and 
wide boulevards driven through previously congested 
sections of the city. Waterworks and electricity 
stations were installed at Wuchow and Nanning. None 
of these schemes were essential and many of them did 
not function very successfully; visitors to the 
province were more impressed with the spartan spirit 
of the 'New Kwangsi' than with this backwoods' moderni-
91sation.
It is difficult to tell whether the spartan spirit 
applied to the private as well as to the public life 
of Kwangsi leaders and civil servants and whether it 
went deeper than the compulsory wearing by officials, 
civil servants and students of a simple grey uniform, 
the compulsory militia training of the same groups, and 
the serving of simple dishes at banquets. But these 
manifestations on their own were enough to amaze 
visitors from other parts of Nationalist China, where 
such practices among the official class would have been 
remarkable.
The outward puritanism of the Kwangsi leaders was 
expressed in policies which resembled those of the 
Nanking-sponsored New Life Movement, launched in 1935 
after such policies had become established in Kwangsi.
5*5
It was decreed that men's trousers and women's shirts
should come below the lrnee and women's sleeves below 
92the elbow. Prostitution, gambling and opium smoking
were not banned, but their operations were confined to
certain areas, and their practice forbidden to soldiers
93and civil servants*
The campaign against superstition and native
religion, first launched under Huang Shao-hsiung's
rule, continued, to the delight of the French Catholic
missionaries, who believed that the Kwangsi people
would turn towards Christianity rather than live without 
94religion* There was a satisfying upturn in the
number of conversions, while the construction of a new 
chapel at Nanning which coincided with the destruction
of a large temple in the city, was a source of ironic
■t 95plea\^sre to the missionaries. For the first time
their charitable work received official approval, a
reflection of Madame Li fsung-jen's attempts to cast
96herself in the role of a minor Madame Ghiang Kai-shek.
Madame Li, whom Li Tsung-jen married in his late twenties,
presumably as his second wife, was a strong and forceful
character and a great strength to her husband, whose
97work she was keenly interested in. Madam Pai Ch'ung-
98hsi, in contrast, was shy and retiring.
The government's educational programme, which was 
concerned only with middle and higher education, laid 
stress on practical and vocational training, to produce
the technicians and managers needed for the reconstruc­
tion programme* The shortage of teachers capable of 
giving this kind of instruction and the large capital 
outlays needed for the construction of technical 
schools and universities meant that the middle and 
higher education programme was small-scale and that 
there was an enormous imbalance between the number of 
children attending primary school and those attending 
higher level institutes. In 1933, there were only 577
university students and 14,533 middle school students
99to 650,000 primary school children* Many wealthy 
families continued to send their children outside the 
province for higher education.
In the field of agricultural reconstruction and 
improvement, the provincial government sponsored in 
1933 a full-scale economic and agricultural survey of 
Kwangsi, which was conducted by a team of experts from 
Peking, headed by Ch'ien 6hia-chu. The report,
published in 1936, was remarkably frank and revealing, 
and gave a picture of desperate poverty and backwardness. 
The findings of the report were confirmed by statistics 
produced by the statistical bureau of the Kwangsi 
Government itself, which revealed that all the tradi­
tional ills from which the peasants suffered were 
becoming more acute. Even though the government was 
fully informed on the plight of the peasantry, it ha,d 
no intention of making fundamental changes in the existing
agricultural system. Palliative reforms, such as the
holding of rents at 37$ of the crop, were ordered, but
there is no evidence that they were ever implemented
101on a wide scale. The government was determined
not to unleash a new rural revolution, but it was
prepared to introduce agricultural reconstruction
measures which did not strike at the system itself.
Several agricultural experimental stations were set up,
the largest of which was at Liuchow in the centre of the
province, where Wu T'ing-yang continued the work he had
begun under Huang Shao-hsiung. The area covered 100,000
mou, and was designed to demonstrate techniques of land
reclamation, in the hope that this would encourage a
province-wide movement to open up the very large amount
102
of unused agricultural land in Kwangsi. The experi­
ment attracted much publicity, but was not an unquali­
fied success. Many of the peasants drafted into the 
area as guinea pigs departed, and Wu was eventually 
forced to resign, accused of over-spending and of over­
bearing behaviour.
The provincial government also sponsored schemes 
of reafforestation, irrigation and veterinary work, 
but it is extremely doubtful whether any of these 
piecemeal measures contributed anything to a general 
improvement of agricultural conditions. The major 
impact of government policy upon the Kwangsi peasants 
was probably in the increased demands for corve'e and 
militia work.
A Kwangsi native returning to his home in 1935? 
after a long period outside the province was impressed 
by the superficial order and organisation of the province, 
but noted bitterly that the Reconstruction Movement 
was doing nothing to alleviate the bankruptcy of the 
rural population, but was putting new burdens on them, 
for it was they who provided the labour for reconstruc­
tion schemes,5 and they who indirectly paid for them.
The militia was no game (hao-wan ti tung-hsi), but a 
demanding, time-consuming activity. loS
The Army
Kwangsi1s standing army was modernised and retrained 
during the period of Kwangsi *s indexDendence from Nanking. 
Under Pai Oh'ung-hsi's keen surveillance and rigid 
discipline, the army was quickly restored to its former 
efficiency. The organisation of the army differed in 
one key respect from the forces which Pai, Li Tsung-jen 
and Huang Shao-hsiung had trained in the mid-1920s: it 
was incorporated much more closely into civilian life 
and strenuous attempts were ma,de to break down the 
division between civil and military. The militia system, 
which instilled the rudiments of military training into 
all able-bodied men, was only one section of a tripartite 
policy, the San-yd Cheng-ts1e, whose aim was to 
encourage the interdependence of the army and the 
civilian poxoulation. The other two sections covered
34*9
the military training of students and the raising of 
troops through conscription rather than on a mercenary 
basis. The system of training students was designed 
to create a large "body of potential officers and was 
necessitated by the shortage of junior officers in 
the Kwangsi Army; it also suited the anti-intellectual 
prejudices of the Kwangsi leaders. This prejudice was 
paralleled by a desire to attain respectability for 
their military rule by bringing the educated youth of 
the province into the military organisation.
Li Tsung-jen expressed the anti-intellectual 
prejudice when he described most students as flabby, 
in mind and in body; he believed that military train­
ing would stiffen them up, and give them the backbone 
that they needed. He and Pai Ch'ung-hsi criticised 
students and intellectuals for their inactivity in the 
defence of the nation and for their tendency to satisfy 
their outrage at the nation1s shame in speeches, instead
105
of in action. They wanted to eradicate the stigma
against the military, which kept the educated and 
privileged away from the army; enforced military train­
ing of students would have this effect while at the 
same time supplementing the meagre production of the 
regular military schools. It would also purge the 
students of their romantic and impractical attitudes,
which were characterised by such *perverse habits1 as
107the playing of violins and flutes. The atmosphere
at Kwangsi University, the main showplaoe of student
military training, was severe and puritanical; all
students wore military uniform, and lived a life
10 3disciplined in the extreme. The training of
students wa,s organised directly by the Army; students
in middle schools were expected to reach the level
of reserve officers and in higher education establish-
109ments of junior officers. The policy was forced
through in spite of early resistance, which led many
students to go and study outside the province. 110
It proved its worth during the Anti-Japanese War, when
Kwangsi was able to officer her greatly expanded armies
111without difficulty.
Oonscription was also very unpopular when first
introduced. Oonscription levies, under which each
hsien was obliged to provide a certain number of
recruits, were first held in 1934$ not more than two-
fifths of the men obtained at these levies were 
112volunteers. There was considerable corruption:
wealthy families bought their sons out, ignoring the
system of selection by lot, which was supposed to be
113used to fill local quotas. Nevertheless, the
conscription system had so much to recommend it to 
the Kwangsi military authorities that they persisted 
with it. Men who were obtained through this system 
could be reintegrated more easily into civilian life 
after their service; the quality of recruits could be
ensured; and by presenting conscription as the duty
of the citizen, the authorities provided themselves
with an excellent pretext for paying low wages to
serving soldiers. Nanking adopted a conscription
scheme in 1934, at about the same time as the Kwangsi
scheme got underway, but it was not as well-organised
or thorough-going. Luring the Anti-Japanese War it
degenerated into a system of press-ganging.
In spite of the poverty of Kwangsi, large sums
of money were spent on building up the army's capacity.
In 1934, $1,000,000 was set aside for developing the
provincial arsenals, notably the one at Nanning, where
114Crerman munitions experts were employed.
Under Pai Oh'ung-hsi's guidance the warlike 
reputation of Kwangsi, which had declined after the 
defeat of the Kwangsi Clique in 1929, was restored.
Its first major external test came in 1934 when com­
munist troops on the Long March passed through the 
northern part of the province, persued by large numbers
of Nanking troops. Eleven of Kwangsi's fifteen regular 
■yec/f'yptefifcs
dfivi-slo-Bs were sent into the area, supplemented by
115about 200,000 militia men. The Kwangsi leaders
were less concerned with the communist forces, who 
were moving west, than with the prospect of Nanking 
troops entering their province. To keep the Nanking 
troops out, they had to chase the communists out as 
fast as they could. Pai Gh'ung-hsi adopted a scorched 
earth policy, destroying food supplies in the path of
.the communist advance, and sending fire-raisers
disguised as communists into the same areas, to
make the local people turn against the communists:
"In this way, on the one hand the Red Army had
nowhere to lodge, and nowhere to eat; on the other
hand, the local people suspected the Red Army as
fire-raisers, and therefore showed hatred towards
116the Red Army." Ranking acknowledged Kwangsi's
contribution: "...the Generalissimo at this time
had the satisfaction of being able to obtain the
cooperation of the Kwangsi authorities in harassing 
117the Reds." The communist forces were only in
Kwangsi for seventeen days, and during that time 
apparently suffered heavy casualties.
The Second Defeat of the Kwangsi Clique
The independence of Kwangsi and of other south­
western provinces from Ranking during the first half 
of the 1930s had been permitted to continue partly 
because of Nanking's military involvement in other 
parts of China, against the communists in Kiangsi, 
against Feng Y$-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in North China,, 
and against the Japanese. The independent south­
western provinces did not represent a military threat 
to Ranking, since the'leaders of these provinces were 
no longer expansionist, and since the communists in 
Kiangsi provided an unwitting bulwark between the two 
sides. After the failure of the Canton Government in
1931, the South-western generals did not give their
support to other anti-Nanking moves; they restricted
their opposition to Ranking and to Chiang Kai-shek
to virulent propaganda campaigns. Neither Kwangtung
nor Kwangsi joined in the 1933 Fukien Revolt against
Ranking, although one of its leaders was li Chi-shen,
who, it was believed/would bring in his former allies 
3.18in Kwangsi. ' They wanted no oxDen breach with Ran­
king which might involve them in all-out war, but 
only to remain independent. On the other hand, there 
was no advantage for them in anting against the Fukien 
Rebels, for the trouble in Fukien threatened Ranking 
and weakened it in relation to themselves. But where 
they shared a common enemy with Ranking, they were 
willing to cooperate with Nanking. Ch'en Chi-t'ang's 
troops participated in several of the Extermination 
Campaigns against the communists in Kiangsi.
By 1935? the national situation had changed. 
Ranking had triumphed over most of its major opponents 
and had extended its authority to Fukien, Kiangsi and 
Kweichow. The leaders of the isouth-western alliance, 
that is the leaders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, found 
themselves surrounded by Nanking troops. This 
encirclement had a catastrophic effect on Kwangsi’s 
provincial budget, by causing the diversion of the 
Kweichow opium trade into other channels. In Kwang­
tung, Ch'en Chi-t'ang's position was threatened by
354
Nanking's purchase of some of his subordinates.
Although Gh'en's rule had brought unusual prosperity 
and security to Kwangtung, too many of the fruits of 
this prosperity had gone into the pockets of his
family and friends and resentment against him was
. . 119rising.
Nanking was anxious to settle the quarrels between 
itself and the ^outh-western generals, in view of the 
growing threat from Japan, and of mounting demands for 
national unity. But since the marn pretext for South­
western independence had been opposition to Nanking's 
appeasement of Japan, and since Nanking had yet to 
take a strong stand against Jajoan, there seemed little
1
hope that the dsouth-west would agree to a settlement.
It seemed unlikely that the dissident generals would 
submit to anything but overwhelming military pressure. 
They had nothing to gain from closer association with 
Nanking and much to lose? so long as they could a,ssua,ge 
their own nationalism and that of their populations by 
claiming that Nanking was betraying the true principles 
of the Kuomintang and the national destiny of China, 
they had sufficient ideological justification for their 
defiance.
Nevertheless, Nanking pressed for a negotiated 
settlement. Bmmisaries were sent to Hong Kong and 
Canton in 1934, but none of them, not even the former
355
leader of the Kwangsi Clique, Huang Shao-hsiung, who
was still on good terms with the Kwangsi leaders,
121were able to achieve anything. In 1935? the new
Nanking-appointed governor of Kweichow, Wu Chung-hsin,
an old friend of the Kwangsi leaders and formerly
chief-of-staff to Pai Ch'ung-hsi in Peking, tried to
122
bring about a settlement, but he too failed.
Nanking therefore decided on military action, or
the threat of it, by late 1935? Nanking troops had
encircled Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Numbering between
123400,000 and 600,000 they were massed in a huge arc 
stretching through Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kweichow 
and Yunnan. Against these troops, Kwangtung and
124
Kwangsi could muster between 270,000 and 300,000 men.
The death of Hu Han-min in May, 1936 stimulated 
a nationalist and anti-Nanking upsurge, and the South­
western leaders decided to make use of it to launch 
a new crusade against Nanking, in the name of resistance 
to Japan, thus preempting an attack from Nanking. 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi forces were organised as the 
Anti-Japanese National Salvation Forces (K 1ang-jih
Chiu-kuo Chun), commanded by Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Li Tsung-
125
jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, the
hero of the 193a . Shanghai fighting with Japan, was
persuaded to return from exile in Hong Kong to lend
126
his prestige to the undertaking. The campaign was
launched on June 1st, 1936, and was therefore named
y\
the L iu-1 Yun-tung? a battery of telegraimses was 
launched, calling for -fee active resistance to Japan, 
and was followed by the dispatch of troops into
127Hunan, officially moving north to fight the Japanese.
The campaign never proceeded any further? Chiang 
Kai-shek had made preparations for defections, the same 
method that he had used to defeat the Kwangsi Clique 
in 1929. He was unable to detach any of the subordi­
nates of the Clique itself, but his 'persuasion* won 
the defection of some of Ch'en Chi-t'ang's subordinates. 
Early in July, Yu Iian-mou, stationed near the Kiangsi 
border in north Kwangtung, went over to Nanking, and 
at the same time the Cantonese Air Force defected en 
masse. Ch'en fled to Hong Kong, his career in Kwang­
tung ended, but his retirement provided for by a
128fortune deposited in Hong Kong banks.
After the Cantonese collapse, Kwangsi forces were
withdrawn into Kwangsi in preparation for a siege. A
general mobilisation was declared and all able-bodied
men were drafted for military service. Transport was
requisitioned by the military? civilians fled from
129the towns, fearing bombing. The Kwangsi currency
slumped and the provincial government started printing
130money to subsidise the army. Pai Ch'ung-hsi planned
the establishment of an independent 'national' govern-
131ment at Nanning, of which Li Chi-shen became chairman.
Kwangsi1s own armed forces were supplemented by the
reorganisation of Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai's 19th Route Army,
disbanded after the Fukien Rebellion. Ts'ai came to
132the province to command it.
Nanking still preferred to negotiate a peaceful
settlement, rather than launch a campaign, which
would undoubtedly be bitter and protracted, into the
mountain fastness of Kwangsi. In August, Chiang Kai-
shek flew to Canton to conduct negotiations with
Kwangsi representatives there. At the same time a
propaganda campaign was set in motion against Kwangsi,
which accused the Kwangsi Clique of being in league with
Japanese against Nanking, and of receiving arms and
133
ammunition from Japan.
At the end of August, an incident occurred at 
Pakhoi, on the south-western coast of Kwangtung, which 
brought a settlement nearer. Units of the 19th Route 
Army took the city, and precipitated an international 
incident by killing the only Japanese in the city, a 
medicine dealer. Japanese gunboats moved into the 
harbour, and for a while it was feared that they might 
use the incident as a pretext for further aggression.
The incident was settled at the end of September, but 
by that time, the threat of Japanese repercussions and 
the realisation of the danger in which China stood had 
forced the Kwangsi leaders to accept that they should 
make an immediate settlement with Nanking, rather than
Z??o
try and continue their resistance: this would he a
patriotic act, showing unity in face of a common
danger. By bargaining before defeat, they could
obtain better terms, which in the event were not
harsh and represented a much lesser blow to the
Kwangsi leaders than had their defeat in 1929* "The
Generalissimo, favourably impressed by the admitted
excellence of the administration of Kwangsi affairs,
134was not inclined to be harsh in his demands..."
Under the terms of the settlement, agreed in early
September, Li Chi-shen, who had returned to Kwangsi
to head Pai Ch'ung-hsi*s independent government, was
to go abroad, Pai Ch'ung-hsi was to go to Nanking and
serve on the Military Affairs Commission there, and
Li Tsung-jen was to remain in Kwangsi as Pacification
Commissioner. Civil administration in Kwangsi was to
remain in the hands of Huang Hsxl-ch'u, but he would
be obliged to work closely with Nanking appointees in
key financial posts. Nanking would make an Immeidate
draft of three million .yuan available to Kwangsi, to
ease the financial crisis. The Kwangsi Army was to be
reduced in size, while Nanking would remove its troops
135from the Kwangsi border. “ On September 16th, Li, Pai 
and Huang took up their new appointments, and on the
136following day, Li flew to Canton to see Chiang Kai-shek. 
Pai did not go to Nanking? in spite of personal 
guarantees for his safety made by Chu Cheng, Chu P'ei-te
and Oh1 eng Ch'ien, Pai remained in Kwangsi, and did
not go to Nanking until the following summer, when
most of China’s regional militarists met to plan
137resistance to Japan.
The patriotic anti-Japanese movement gained a 
much needed boost from the Liu-i Yun-tung* for 
Kwangsi!s defiance of Nanking in the name of resist­
ance to Japan brought the issue out into the open. 
Although the patriotic organisations never a,Hied 
themselves directly with the ^outh-western leaders, 
they supported their stand and welcomed the publicity 
which they brought to the anti-Japanese cause.
Kwangsi’s strident demands on Nanking to resist the 
Japanese also eased the pressure which Nanking had
been applying to clamp down the patriotic movement, by
nr
making it too embaijassing for Nanking to continue such
policies. "Whatever may have been the motives of the
Southwest leaders in their anti-Japanese propaganda,
the fact remains that they have unleashed a flood of
patriotic passion throughout their own provinces, and
have gained for themselves wide-spread sympathy among
138patriotic elements of the nation.*'
For the second time, the Kwangsi Clique had succumbed 
to Chiang Kai-shek, though on this occasion the defeat 
was far less shattering than in 1929* Though its activ­
ities were now restricted, the Clique retained control 
of Kwangsi and the policies of reconstruction evolved in
360
the early 1930s continued to he implemented, in many 
cases with greater success than in the early period.
The militia expanded enormously, especially after 
the start of the Anti-Japanese War, which brought 
an economic boom to the province, as industries and 
schools, displaced from Occupied Ohina, moved into 
the province. The Reconstruction Movement launched 
by the Kwangsi Clique in the early 1930s marked a 
second and distinct phase of the careers of the Kwangsi 
leaders in Kuomintang politics. Forced to retreat into 
their home province, they attempted to formulate a 
policy which fitted both the demands of independent 
militarism and of the principles of the Kuomintang, 
and came up with a programme which called for the 
application of modified forms of the Three Peoples 
Principles within a framework of mass mobilisation 
and militarisation. This compromise policy may have 
represented a more effective method of government than 
was found in most other parts of Kuomintang Ohina.
Kwangsi was widely held to be a well governed province, 
its administration noticeably less corrupt than those 
of provinces under direct Nanking control.
It is difficult to measure the exact measure of 
success which the Reconstruction Movement achieved.
Large amounts of material were published by the Kwangsi 
leaders describing their aims and their achievements, 
and though the whole oeuvre is permeated with propaganda,
many of the claims of achievements do not seem out­
rageous « Year hooks and statistical handbooks, often 
very revealing, were also published, and independent 
reports, such as the economic report prepared by 
Oh*ienCffia-chfl., were sponsored. Accounts of visitors 
to the province were published, both in Kwangsi and 
elsewhere, and were consistently favourable. Catholic 
missionaries reported from the province during the 
whole period, and were generally well-disposed towards 
the Reconstruction Movement. Even communist accounts 
are not completely damning, though their tone is 
extremely hostile.
The Reconstruction Movement represented an attempt
to come to terms with the problems besetting China and
the Kuomintang government as China recovered from the
turmoil of the late 1920s; it sought to modernise the
province and to prepare resistance to external aggress
lA/cve-
sion. The policies of the Kwangsi Clique primarily 
designed to ensure the Clique's survival and to main­
tain its sovereignty in Kwangsi; despite the reforming 
tone in which they were couched, they did little to 
improve the worst ills of Kwangsi society, though they 
were successful in cleaning up the surface and in 
securing internal peace. When compared with the stan­
dards of provincial administration in Nanking-controlled 
China, the Reconstruction Movement of the Kwangsi Clique 
must be judged to have provided a preferable alternative; 
in absolute terms it was probably insignificant.
CONCLUSION
Th&s study of the Kwangsi Clique Avas looked at one of 
the leading regionalist groupings in Republican China and 
examined it in its relation to the Kuomintang and in its 
activities as ruler of an independent province. We have 
seen that regional power holding emerged during the second 
half of the 19th Century, when the decline of central 
authority encouraged the establishment of regional armies, 
and that the devolution from the centre reached its height 
after the collapse of the imperial system in the Warlord 
Period between 1916 and 1928. The Kwangsi leaders estab­
lished themselves during this period, within the warlord 
system; their early careers were spent fighting the 
battles of petty warlordism, an experience which was to 
colour their subsequent careers, but their backgrounds, 
as sons of families which, though declining, still had 
pretentions to culture, and their education, in modern 
military schools, cut them off from the bandit-warlords 
of Kwangsi, and encouraged them to associate themselves 
with the new orthodoxy of South China, the Kuomintang.
Once attached to the Kuomintang, their advancement was 
rapid, thanks to the fortuitous chances which the 
confusion of 1927 threw their way; by 1928 Kwangsi forces 
controlled four provinces and had a foothold in the 
Peking/Tientsin region. Their relations with the leader­
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ship of the Kuomintang was increasingly strained; in 
the space of six months in 1927 they broke first with 
the Left-wing and then with Chiang Kai-shek, cutting 
themselves off from the intricacies and Wangling of 
Kuomintang political life, in which they were out of 
their depth, and turning to the straightforward 
relationship of a regional clique. Their alienation 
from the Kuomintang leadership was a duel xorocess of 
rejections their reversion to regional loyalties 
occurred only after the Kuomintang had rejected them 
by failing to absorb them into a national framework.
The split between the Kwangsi Clique and the 
Centre in 1929 deprived the Clique of large-scale 
regional power, bub failed to crush it completely; the 
Clique retained control of its native province, which 
had been kept as a private kingdom while the Clique's 
major activities were concentrated outside the province. 
The process of local regeneration which had been started 
between 1926 and 1929 was continued and expanded; a 
reconstruction movement was launched, within the frame­
work of the Three Peoples' Principles but in opposition 
to the leadership of the Kuomintang designed to create 
a ne- order in Kwangsi to stand as an example for the 
rest of China. The militia system, the main channel 
of reconstruction, stressed discipline and austerity; 
it was authoritarian and demanded mass participation on 
a strictly directed basis. As a challenge to Nanking,
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and as an attempt to show up Nanking's activities in 
the field of reconstruction, the reconstruction 
movement was successful, for it kept Kwangsi free of 
external interference for six years, and won for 
Kwangsi a reputation for ordered progress and good 
government unrivalled in Kuomintang China,
In setting up their reconstruction movement 
within a single province, the Kwangsi leaders had cert­
ain advantages over Nanking! though they lacked the 
financial resources and human expertise which Nanking 
coulteraw on, they excercised an absolute control 
over their province which allowed them to mobilise the 
civilian population while keeping it well disciplined; 
they had no opponents to reconcile, but instead a group 
of loyal and long-serving subordinates; strong local 
control allowed the crushing of the Kwangsi communist 
movement, whereas communist activity continued in 
many Nanking-controlled provinces; continuity of 
leadership allowed the application of consistent policies,
while in Nanking-controlled provinces the top leadership
Iwas constantly changing, and policies with it*
The achievements of the Kwangsi Clique on behalf 
of the people of Kwangsi were limited; though the 
Kwangsi leaders made much of their humble origins, and 
exaggerated them to the point of distortion, they felt 
no deep concern for the welfare of the common people;
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they presented themselves as the sons of peasants 
only to win the loyalty of the peasantry. They did 
not attempt to disturb the existing social order or 
to introduce agrarian reform; nor did they buttress 
the civilian population from economic decline, brought 
on partly by the world depression, and partly by 
their own economic policies,
v/hile the autonomy of the Kwangsi Clique was at 
its height, between 1931 and 1936, there was no 
connection between Kwangsi and Nanking. And yet the 
Kwangsi Clique remained closely identified with the 
ideology of the Kuomintang and with the concept of 
national unity. Their autonomy was a defiance of a weak 
national government, not of the national orthodoxy; it 
contained no hint of secession from the nation, for 
regional warlords, whether in the darlord Period or after 
the technical reunification of China under the 
Kuomintang, never thought in terms of secession. The 
leaders of the Kwangsi Clique clung to the belief that 
they were loyal supporters of the Kuomintang and loyal 
Chinese, however much their actions weakened their 
objects of loyalty. Conveniently for them and other 
heter/dox adlierenelts on the Kuomintang, its ideology was 
vague enough to accomfodate a wide range opolitical 
belief. Sun Yat-sen left behind no specific credo, and 
none was elaborated by his disciples after his death:
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his "broad principles could he interpreted to suit 
.many tastes. The nehulousness of the ideology of the 
Kuomintang encouraged internal division; out of 
division grew two dangerous tendencies: first the 
habit of making unworkable compromises between poorly 
reconciled factions, in the interest of temporary 
stability; and second the development of cliques whose 
membership and aims were clearly defined, but on 
mutual interest or common origin rather than on 
political belief. These tendencies had the effect of 
concentrating the energies of Kuomintang leaders on 
manipulations between factions, rather than on the 
innovation and reconstruction for which the Kuomintang 
officially stood.
The Later Careers of the headers of the Kwangsi Clique
Within a year of the collapse of Kwangsi*s 
independence, China was at war with Japan. The Kwangsi 
armies were rapidly expanded from the reserve of 
trained men which the militia system had produced, and 
once again kwangsi troops went north to fight in Central 
China. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi left the province, 
Li to become the director of the 5th Jar Zone and Pai 
director of military training and deputy chief of staff.
Kwangsi ceased to be the preserve of the Kwangsi 
Clique; Huang Hsh-ch'u remained chairman of the province 
until 1949? but he had to share his authority with
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outsiders who moved into the province in increasing
numbers as the Anti-Japanese v/ar progressed and their
own provinces were occupied by the Japanese. (Kwangsi
was invaded in 1939, but the Japanese were driven hack;
large parts of the province were occupied in 1944).
The Kwangsi Clique continued to exist, hub only as a
focus of loyalty for Kwangsi men s erving outside the
province; it did not represent a threat to the Centre.
On the surface, relations between the leaders of the
Clique and Chiang Kai-shek were harmonious, and Pai
?
Ch'ung-hsi in particular seemed close to him. But 
antipathy between the Clique and Chiang did not disappear 
Li Tsung-jen's hostility to/ards Chiang grew stronger 
during the long periods of inactivity which marked his 
v/ar career after his victory at Taierchuang in 1933; 
the victory had come in the middle of a series of 
shattering defeats for the Chinese Army, and had 
esat, /blished Li as a patriotic general and national 
hero; h. blamed his subsequent idleness on Chiang*s 
jealous refusal to use him.
Li's hostilty was nob eased after the war; he was 
consigned to head the Generalissimo's Headquarters in 
Peking, and again found himself isolated end inactive, 
in what wan a purely nominal post. In 1948, he made an 
open challenge to Chiang by running for the office of 
Tice President against Qb*pLang's nominee, bun Po. Li 
won the election and the following year became Acting 
President when Chiang resigned shortly before the
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Kuoniintang' s firial defeat on the mainlando Li's
open defiance of Chiang ma.de it impossible for him to
3
go into exile on Taiwan, as Pai Ch'ung-hsi did; he
went instead to America* The other Kwangsi leaders
went different ways: Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-
4hsiung stayed on the mainland, while Huang Hsh-ch'u 
settled in Hong Kong* Thus the Kwangsi Clique broke 
up*
There was an unexpected postscript: in 1965 Li 
Tsung-jen returned to China to a tremendous welcome; 
he wan hailed as a patriot, his past career as an 
anti-communist conveniently ignored. Li's motives 
for returning home were straightforward: fifteen years 
in Mew Jemey had not reconciled him to exile, he was 
old and homesick; his wife, whose influence over him 
had always been strong, was chronically ill and 
believed that she could be cured by Chinese doctors 
(in fact she died in 1966)* Por Peking, the return 
of a prominent Kuomintang general was a propaganda 
coup, which may have been designed in pant to encourage 
the return of other Chinese living abroad, by demonst­
rating that even a man with an apparently black record 
would be well received. If this was Peking's motive, 
it was badly timed, for the start of the Cultural 
Revolution prevented any such development* It has 
incidentally provided a sx>ectacle of considerable
369
irony: Li Tsung-jen, former warlord and Litter opponent 
of communism, appears now on state occasions alongside 
a decimated Communist leadership; among the absentees 
are his most bitter personal enemies in the Communist 
camp, Chu Teh and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.
The Eclipse of Regional Independence
The start of the Anti-Japanese War marked the end 
of regional independence in Kuomintang China (though 
the pressures towards devolution of power in times of 
Central weakness have not been eradicated, as has been 
demonstrated by emergence of powerful and independent 
regional leaders during the Cultural Revolution). The 
last redoubts of autonomy were overwhelmed and turned 
into 'central' provinces by the influx of government 
organisations, schools, factories and civilian driven 
from Occupied China into the former hinterland. Foreign 
invasion ended the 'balkanisation1 of China by warlordism, 
a phenomenon which had dominated the early years of the 
Republic and had tenasciously survived long after 
warlords were officially a thing of the past. As with 
the political splits in 1927 and 1928, regional defiance 
of central authority left deep scars of disunity on 
the Kuomintang, which persisted even during the anti- 
Japanese /Yar, when pressures for unity were strongest.
T&h impermanent and fragmentary unity of the Kuomintang
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weakened its war effort and prevented it from putting 
up a good showing in the Anti-Japanese War or in the 
Civil War which followed it*
This failure to reestablish a genuine unity within 
the Kuomintang was matched by a failure to move away from 
the conservatism and authoritarianism which had come 
to characterise its leadership, through its struggles 
with the Communists and the Left-wingers and with its 
regionalist 'allies'. The struggle with the Communists 
and Left-wingers had led the Kuomintang to abandon the 
idea of mobilising the masses and to turn its face 
against social reform. And in the attempts to bring 
the regional independents to heel, the Centre had 
compromised itself by resorting to the very tactics 
which had enabled the regionalists to maintain their 
autonomy: basing its power solely on military might; 
concentrating its efforts on est iblishing rigid popul­
ation control rather than on attracting popular support; 
and forming cliques based on personal and regional 
ties. The partiality, conservatism and caution of 
regionalism were reflected in the Centre; its vitality 
was sapped by internal division, and even the crisis 
of invasion did not restore it. The leaders of the 
Kuomintang abdicated the role of directing the pass­
ionate mass nationalism which the actions of a brutal 
invader evoked to the Communist Party, which identified
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itself with, the masses, and channelled their new-found 
nationalism into effective resistance. The identification 
of the Communist Party with mass nationalism was a crucial 
factor in thes eventual Communist victory on the mainland.
Between the northern Expedition and the Anti- 
Japanese War, the Kuomintang was preoccuppied with its 
internal divisions, with its struggle against the Com­
munists and with attempts to enforce its rule over the 
areas it technically governed; these problems took preced­
ence over the application of longer term policies of 
reconstruction and regeneration, and the Kuomintang chance 
of establishing an effective government over the nation it 
had struggled so long to dominate slipped away. The 
crisis of the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War which 
followed it denied the Kuomintang a seeond chance.
X- -)f -X* * * -X- * -X- -X- 'X- -x* -x-
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QYB
Gompte Rendu
KHGOS
KHHHICMffiL
KHKMHIL
KMWH
ICWGB
NGH
TCSSNOKC0S
Bulletin de la Soci^td des Missions-Etrangeres 
de Paris.
Ghina Year Book.
Gompte Rendu des Travaux de la Soci<^W 
des Missions-Etrangeres de Baris.
ICuang-hsi ohih Ghien-she.
Kuang-hsi Hsin-hai Ko-ming Tzu-liao.
Kuang-hsi Ko-ming Hui-i Lu.
Ko-ming Wen-hsien.
Kuo-wen Ohou-pao.
North Ghina Herald.
Tsui-chin San-shih-nien Ohung-kuo GMn-shih 
Shih.
T U G Tung-fang Tsa-chih.
INTRODUCTION
373
Notes To ppo 1-8
1. Shensi? which lay in this "belt, was an exception, 
in that for the greater part of the period it was 
occuppied hy the Manchurian troops of Chang 
Hsueh-liang.
2. Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century 
China," introduction to Stanley Spector, Li Hung- 
chang and the jtn a i Army (Princeton, 1964), p . **' *
3* Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese
Conservatism (Stanford, 1957), p.2<R).
4* Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army
(Princeton, 1964) , p. n>.
5. Michael, op.cit., p. xxva
6. Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political 
Modernisation," in The Role of the Military in 
Underdeve1oped Countr1es, ed. John J. Johnson 
(Princeton, 1962), p.
7® James Sheridan, Chinese Warlord, the Career of
Peng Yu-hsiang (Stanford, 1966), p . 1
8* Winston Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord;
Ch!en Chiung-ming (1878-1933) ,1 in Harvard Papers 
on China, XVI (1962), pp.198-244.
9. Sheridan, loc.sit.
10. Donald Guilin, Warlord; Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi
Province, 1911-1949 (Princeton, 1967)*
11. Joseph Levenson, "The Province, the Nation and the 
World," in Approaches to Modern Chinese History, ed. 
Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy and Mary Wright 
(Berkeley, 1967), p. 270.
374
12. J.B. Spencer, "On Regionalism in China,'1 Journal 
of Geography, XLVI, No.4 (April, 1947), pp./32~5
13* Hced-a Iriye, After Imperialism (Cambridge, Mass.,
1965), P* 73
14* W.G. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy 1853-1868 (London 1955), P* W
15* Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840- 
1928, pp. vov-s
16. Shen Yun-lung ed., T'ang Chi-yao, Chin-tai Chung-
kuo Shih-liao Ts'ung-k'an, series 3, (Taipei, 1967), 
p^, /IV-12.0.
17* Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-
yuan-hui, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Ti-er-tz'u Tai-piao 
Ta-hui Hsuan-yen Chi Qhueh-ffi-an (C ant on, 19 2 6), p . /k
18. Mary Clahaugh Wright, "Modern China in Transition, 
1900-1950," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, (January, 1959),p*
19* Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "The Role of the Military in
Chinese Government, " Pacific Affairs, XXI (1948),p.73
20. The term 'warlord' (chun-fa) was used at this stage, 
in Kuomintang terminology, for all militarists who 
did not support the Kuomintang; regional militarists 
in South China who were allied to the Kuomintang were 
not known as warlords, though there was little 
qualitative difference Between them and the 'real' 
warlords of North and Central China. The leaders of 
the Kwangsi Clique did not officially Become 'war­
lords' until 1929, when they Broke with Nanking, 
although By that time they had dominated Kwangsi as 
military leaders for four years. The Kuomintang used 
the term 'warlord* to define the relationship Between 
the Kuomintang and an individual militarist, rather 
than to describe a specific phenomenon. cont...
375
Notes to pp. 18-25»
uAs soon as a military figure joined the camp of 
the Kuomintang alliance he was no longer a 
warlord, but a 'revolutionary general1• Once a 
'revolutionary general1 rebelled, he might again 
be called a warlord.” See Hsieh, op.cit., pp.
198-9.
21- KWCP, IV, No.36 (September 18th, 1927), ta-shih, p.5*
22. G-eorge Sokolsky, "The Kuomintang," in CYB, 1929-30, 
p.1174.
23. Sheridan, op.cit., pp. 14.15*
24. In spite of its size, Nanking's army proved 
incapable of performing the most crucial task of 
all, that of defending China aginst Japanese 
aggression.
25* Douglas Paauw, "The Kuomintang and Economic Stag­
nation, " Journal of Asian Studies, XVI, No.2 
(February, 1957), p.216.
26. The large number of unemployed meant that army 
recruitment quotas could usually be filled without 
difficulty, though conscription and impressment became 
increasingly common, especially after the start of 
the Anti-Japanese War.
27. China Weekly Review, LXVI, No.2 (September 9th,
1933), pp. 54-5.
CHAPTER I 376
Notes to pp 27-30
1. Trois Mois au KtMftangsi (Souvenirs d'un Offiofer en 
Mission), (Paris,1906), p. iv.
2. Naval Intelligence Division, China Proper (London, 
1945)? I? pp. 125-6.
3. Henry Macaleavy, The Black Flags (London, 1968), 
pp. 98-99.
4« Kuang-hsi Yin-hsiang Chi (n.p., 1935)? II? p. 32.
5. Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History 
(London, 1936), p. 30.
6. Luring the northward march of the Taipings, this 
canal proved very useful for the transportation of 
supplies. Se Laai Yi-faai, "The River Strategy of 
the Taipings," Oriens, V (1952), No.2, 306.
7. HeroId J.Wiens, Han Chinese Expansion in South China 
(Hampden, Conneticut, 1967)? p. 132 p. 144.
8. Franz Michael, The Taiping Rehellion (Seattle, 1966), 
pp. 18-19.
9. Joseph Dautremer, "Yunnan at Kttf&angsi, Frontieres 
Indo-Chinoises," Bulletin de 1*Association Amicale 
Franco-Chinoise, I (1909) No. 5?” 284.
10. As long as he operated outside China, Liu was not 
regarded as a Bandit By the Chinese authorities.
But as an ally. Se Rene RistelhueBBer, "Notre 
Conflict avec la Chine au Sujet de Tonkin," Revue 
d'Histoire Diplomatique, No.3 (1954)? 2.
11. Kuang-hsi Sheng Cheng-fu T'ung-chi Ch'u, Ku-chin
kuang-hsi Lli-kuei Jen-niing Chien (Kweilin, 1934), 
pp. 92-A3 Ea^a-aft-e-r ■ cited as Ku^ =aDain. Kuang-toi.
Macaleavy, op.cit., pp. 99-l£>9?* 20,2 pp. 281-3
377
Notes to pp 30-32
12. Trois Mo is au Ktmangsi, p. 93*
13* Ts'en was the son of the celebrated governor- 
general of Yunnan and Kweichow at the time of 
the Sino-French War, Ts’en Yu-ying, a violent 
xenophobe who had cooperated with Liu Yung-fu 
in his opposition to the French in Tongking.
Ts’en Ch'un-hs'dan won fame in 1900, when he 
escorted the Empress Dowager to Sian after the 
occupation of Peking by foreign troops * His 
appointment to the governor-generalship of 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi may have been made in part 
as a sign of her gratitude. See the biographic 
of Ts'en Yu-ying in Arthur Hummel, Ermninent 
Chinese of the Oh’ing Period (Washington, 1943), 
II, 743-6.
14• Ts'en Ch!un-hslian, Lo Chai Man Pi (Peking, 1933), 
(reprinted Taipei, 1962, ed. Wu Hsiang-hsiang) 
"Ts’en Oh’un-hsuan," pp. 11-12.
15« Kuang-hsi Shao-shu Min-tsu She-hui Li-shih Tlcto- 
ch'a Tsu, Kuang-hsi Hsin-hai Ko-ming Tzu- liao 
(Nanning, I960), p*5 « Hereafter cited as KHHHKMTL
16. Li Tsung-huang, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Tang Shih 
(Nanking, 1935), p. 68.
17. Hummel, op.cit., p. 745*
18 * KHHEKIVITL, p.7, p.11.
*
3-9* Irois Mo is au Kouangsi, p. 129*
20. A different version of the French failure to
develop trade is given in a British source: "The 
French are neither as capable as pioneers, nor as 
competent to fill lonely outposts as Albions’s 
bulldog breed." See Wilbur Burton, The French 
Stranglehold on Yunnan (Shanghai, 1933), p* 7.
378
Notes to pp. 32-36.
H ji !!■ h um  mu 111—iim   ~ ■---------------------- -----
21. Dautremer, op.cit., p. 282.
22. Andre Baudrit, B^tail Humains Rapt, Vente
Infanticide dans I'Indochine et dans la Chine
du Sud (Saigon, 1942), p. 20.
23* Father Joseph Ouenot, Au Pays des Pavilions Noirs 
(Hong Kong, 1925), p* 5*
24* Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Soci^t£ des Missions- 
Etrangeres de Baris, 1921 (Paris, 1922), p. 78. 
Hereafter cited a,s Coinpte Rendu.
25* Bulletin de la Soci£te des Missions-Etrangeres de 
Paris, Ho. 110 (February, 1931), p* 95 Hereafter 
cited as BSME .
26. Ouenot, op.cit., p. 137*
27* Conrpte Rendu, 1920 (Paris, 1921), p. 44.
28. Mary R. Anderson, Protestant Mission Schools for 
Girls in South China (Hew York, 1943), p* 141.
29 * Ku-chin Kuang-hsi , p .74 .
Hsiao Yuan (pseud.) "Chi Lu Yung-t'ing pt.l," Kuo- 
Wen Chou-pao, XIII, Ho.12 (March 30th, 1936), p. 36 
Hereafter cited as KV/CP.
30. Wen Kung-chih, Tsui-chin San-shih-nien Chung-kuo 
ChUn-shih Shlh (Shanghai, 1930), (reprinted Taipei, 
1962, ed. Wu Hsiang-hsiang), II, pp. 334-5*
Hereafter cited as TCSSHCKCSS.
T'ao Chu-yin, Chin-tai I-wen (Shanghai, 1945), p* 56
31. K'un Kung (pseud.), "Xu Yung-t'ing Fa-chi Ch'ien-hou 
Yl-wen Pu-lu," Ch1un-Oh1iu, Ho.122 (August 1st, 1962),
pp. 11-12.
379
Notes to pp. 36-39*
32. Huang Hsu-cliu, "Ts'an-chia Hsin-hai Ko-ming 
Liu-chou Tu-li ti Ilui-i," Ch'un-Ch'iu, No. 66 
(April 1st, I960), pp. 7-8*
33* 1 1 ao Ghil-yin, Pei-yang Chtm-fa T'ung-chih Shih 
Oh1i Shih-hua (Peking, 1957), I, p. 68.
34* Chin Tien-jung, "Hsi-nan Lao-chiang Liu Chen-huan 
Chuan-chi," Oh1un-Ch* iu, No.166 (June 1st, 1964), 
pp.3-4*
Li Mo-hsing, "Hsin-hai Ko-ming tsai Liu-chou," 
Ohin-tai Shih-tzu-Ilao, (1958, Pt.2), No.19, p. 48.
35* Lo Hsiang-lin ed. , Ko-ming Wen-hsien (Taipei, 1958- 
), XII, p. Hereafter cited as KMWH.
36. Ouenot, op.cit., p. 1.
37. T 1 ao Chfl-yin, Ohin-tai I-wen, p . 57•
Li Ohien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840- 
1928, (trans. Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls) (New 
York, 1956) , p. 325
38. Tsou Lu, Hui Ku Lu (Chungking, 1943), p« 78.
39. T ’ao Chu-yin, Ohin-tai I-wen, p.58.
40. Huang Hsu-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu no. 25," Oh'un- 
Oh'iu, No.177 (November 16th, 1964), p. 14.
T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Chiin-fa., II, p. 73*
41* ibid, p. 175.
42. Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, op. cit., pp.10-11.
43. Hsiao Yilan (pseud.) "Chi Lu Yung-t'ing, pt.2," 
KWGP, XIII, No.14 (April 13th, 1936), p. 28.
44. T0SSN0K0SS, III, p.35*
Nortes to pp. 39-42
380
45* Hsiao Yuan, loc.sit.
T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Chiin-fa, II, p. 1*77*
46. ibid, p.178.
47. Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London, 1961)
p. 126.
48. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang ChVm-fa, II, p* 179*
49* TCSSNCKOSS, III, p. 42.
50. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p.337«
T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Ch&i-fa, II, p. 194*
51- TCSSNCKOSS, III, p. 45*
T'ang Chi-yao, of Yunnan, was the actual head of 
the Military Government, but he remained in Yunnan, 
and took no part in the running of the Government.
See Li Chien-nung, p. 339-
52. Ts'en Ch'un-hstian, op.cit., p. 13*
53* Huang Hsli-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, no. 6," Ch1 un- 
Ch'iu, No.158 (February 1st, 1964), p. 7*
54* The campaign against Lung Ch'i-kuang provided the 
first experience of military campaigning for a 
young lieutenant in the Kwangsi Army, Li Tsung-jen.
55* Ts'en Ch'un-hsiian, op.cit., p. 14*
56. TCSSNCKOSS, III, pp.48-49*
57* Lu spent most of his time at his home near Nanning, 
and appears to have given very little attention to 
governing his provinces.
58. T'ao Chtt-yin, Pei-yang ChHn-fa, III, p. 105
381
Notes to pp. 42-47.
59. Huang Hsu-ch' u , op.c it. , p . 8.
60. Although Lu commanded the largest single body of 
troops in Kwangtung, consisting of thie troops 
under three Kwangsi generals, Ma Oh/i (Lu's adopted 
sop), Lin Hu and Lin Chun-t'ing, he had only 
technical control over local Cantonese units, over 
the provincial guard, which was directly under the 
governor, Chu CKing-lan, and over Yunnanese troops 
which had remained in Kwangsi after the Hu-Kuo 
Movement. See TCSSNCKOSS, II, p.337 and T'ao Cbfti-yin, 
Pei-yang Chjjln-fa, III, pp. 169-171.
61. Huang Hsu-ch'u, loc.sit.
62. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Chun-fa, III, p. 171 •
63. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 378.
64. Huang Hsu-ch'u, "Pa-kuei I-wang Lu, pt.8," Ch'un- 
Ch'iu, No. 160 (March 1st, 1964)? p. 16.
65* Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 380.
66. Ts'en Ch1un-hsttan, op.cit., p. 19*
67. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 382.
68. Ts'en Ch' un-hsilan, op.cit., p. 14.
69. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 388.
70. Huang Shao-hsiung, Wu-shih Hui-i (Shanghai, 1945)? 
p. 35.
71. Li Chien-nung, op.cit., p. 398.
72. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Chun-fa, V, pp.118-121.
73. Chu Wei, Chun-fa Pien-luan (Shanghai, 1936), p. 36.
382
Notes to pp. 48-49*
74. T'ao Chu-yin, Pei-yang Ghfln-fa, V, pp. 193-204. 
75* ibid, VI, pp. 19-23*
76. Huang Shao-hsiung, op.cit., p. 45»
CHAPTER II 383
Notes to pp.50-53
1. The only major split within the Clique occurred
in 1930, when Huang Shao-hsiung left the Clique,
and was replaced in the top echelon hy 
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slightly wounded, and recovered sufficiently in 
hospital to Woo his Japanese nurse, whom he
Notes to pp.60-61
married on his discharge from hospital. See 
Ts'ao Chu-jen, Chiang Pai-li P'ing Chuan (Hong 
Kong, 1963), pp. 9-11.
13* C. Martin Wilbur and Julie How, Documents on 
Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in
Ghina, 1917-1927 New York, 1956, p. 393, p. 4-11, 
p. 4-18.
14* Among the Paoting graduates who rose to high
positions within the Kuomintang military structure 
were T'ang Sheng-chih, Oh'en Ming-shu, Ghiang 
Kuang-nai, Ho Ghien, Chang Pa-k*uei, Liu Shih,
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390
SSTotea to p p . 69-72.
de Paris, No.2 (February, 1922), p.48 
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5. Joseph Ouenot, Au Fays des Pavilions Noirs 
(Hong Kong, 1925), P*51»
6. Ouenot, op.cit., p.69*
7* BSMEr No. 3 (March, 1922), p.10?.
8. Huang Hstt-ch'u, "T'an-tao Ma GhUn-wu Oh'u 
Kuei-cheng Hsiang-ching, " Oh1un-Ch1iu, No. 85, 
(January 16th 1961), p.8.
9. Societe des Missions-Etrangeres de Paris, 
Gompte Rendu des Travaux de la Soci^t6 des 
Mission-Etrangeres de Paris, 1921, (Paris, 1922), 
p.80, Hereafter cited as Gompte Hendu.
• 1 IHWH I «g»— M M
10o Ouenot, op.cit., p.52*
11. Ch*ien Ghia-chii, Han Te-chang, Wu Pan-nung, 
Kuang-hsi Sheng Ching-chi Kai-k'uang, Kuo-1i 
Ghung-yang Yen-chiu-yuan She-hui K'o-hsiieh 
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ahout the prospect of fighting between Nanking and 
the South-West, which was a clean indication of the 
disunity and weakness of China. They claimed that 
the actions of the South-West were directed against 
Nanking, no against themselves. See ICWCP, XIII,
No. 23 (June 13th, 1936), I-chou Chien-p1ing, p.l; 
and Ibid, No.24 (June 22nd), I-chou Chien-p*ing, p*l*
128. Abend, op.cit., pp.
129* Compte Rendu, 1937 (Paris, 1938), p */09t
130. Kuang-hsi chih Chien-she, p.378; and BSME, No.177 
(September, 1936), p . 66^
131* Chang Kuo-p’ing, op.cit., p. 68.
132. Ts1ai T 1ing-k1ai Tzu-chuan, p. 547
133* Ibid, p.548; Abend, op.cit., p.198, p.223; and
Yaidya, op.cit., Section 1, p*14* This campaign was 
a continuation of the earlier campaign of the same 
nature. See Note 120 above.
134* The full conditions are listed in Vaidya, op.cit., 
Section 2, p*27*
135. Peng C1& -p*ei, op.cit., p.14*
136. T.A* Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938), p.279; 
and Chang Kuo-p1ing, op.cit.» p .70.
137* Voice of China, I, No.3 (July 1st, 1936), p.3.
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Notes to pp. 364-368•
In if n^  — npi n^^ — n 1*11 I* nfJ** Ji ^  i>p.ii
1* Between 1931 and 1936, Anhwei, Chekiang and Kiangsu 
all had three provincial charimen, Hupei and Fukien 
four, These changes in chairmen usually involved 
also changes in lower posts, such as commissioner
of Civil Agfairs and commissioner of Finance.
See CYB, 1931, p.579; 1931/2, pp.694-5; 1933, 
pp.402-6; 1934, pp.479-480; and 1935, p.78; 1936, 
pp.158-9.
2. Pai wrote the preface for an adulatory volume on 
Chiang published in 1946 by the Ministry of 
Na&tional Defence, of which Pai was then head, and 
also contributed an article extolling Chiang1s 
military talents. The large photographic section 
contains many pictures of Pai and Chiang together. 
See Wei-ta ti Chiang Chu-hsi (Shanghai, 1946).
3* Pai died in Taipei in 1967*
4. Bi Chi-shen held several high but probably nominal
posts after 1949, including that of chairman of 
the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang.
He died in 1959 • Huang Shao-hsiung held lesser 
posts, from which he was excluded in 1957 after 
being denounced as a rightists He did not emerge 
again until 1965 when, with other former Kuomintang 
militarists, including Ts’ai T fing~kfai and Ch'eng 
Chfien, he was brought out to welcome Li Tsung-jen.
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GLOSSARY
This glossary is not exhaustive, and lists only persons 
who were closely connected with Kwangsi or the Kwangsi Clique. 
There is a separate list of all Chinese phrases quoted in the 
test and footnotes.
People
Chang Chih-pen
Chang Hua-fu
Chang J en-min
Chang Kan
Chang YtLn-i
Chf en Chi-t * ang
Ch* en Chiung-ming
Chfen Hsieh-wu
Ch1 en Hsiung
Ch* en Li-ya
£0•*&o Mien-shu
Ch’en Ming-shu
Ch* en Ping-kfun
Ch*eng Ssu-yuan
Chiang Pai-li
Chou Iisi-huan
1£fS 
f a t e
f t  tit
Chou Tsu-huang 
Chuhg Tsu-p1ei
Ran Shih-sheng 
Reng Pao-chfu
./> fgi Han T s 1ai~f eng 
Hsia Wei 
Hsiung K0o~wu 
HstL Chfi-ming
Pitt*
pjjLM
HstL Ching-tfa$&
$  lit
Hstleh Tu-pi 
Hu Tsung-to 
Huang Chen-kuo 
Huang Chia-chih 
Huang HstL-chfu
vV/ J
? ^  $ £  &  A
I A
ft |
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Huang Hua-piao 
Huang Jih-k*uei 
Huang Shao-hsiung
ICung Ch!u
Lei Pei-hung 
Lei Pei-t*adi 
Li Ch!ao-fang 
Li Ghi-shen 
Li Ming-jui 
Li P fin-hsien 
Li Psung-jen 
Liang Ghfao-chi 
Liang Han-sung 
Liang Liu-tu 
Liang Sou-ming 
Liao Lei 
Lin Hu
Lin Ohtln~tfing 
Liu Chen-huan 
Liu Pai-kfuei 
Lu Ghing-ts'un 
Lu Iiuan-yen
^  ^  ^  Lu Ti-p'ing ;1'4-
■ft & Lu Yung-tf ing ^  ^
Lung Ghi-kuang ~1<f 7G
^  lung Chin-lcuang
Lung YUn ’f# “fT
"S' i‘4  Ma Chi ^
Ma Chttn-wu ^
^  ^  Ma Hsiao-chtln J^ 7
Mai Huan-chang 
^  Meng Chih ^
i  &  u
%  ^  4^ Pai Ch'ung-hsi &  3^
.3
\ i4* ~
#) Sheng Hung-ying
^  Shen Pao-i ^  ^
5]? *lf Su Yilgn-ch*un ^  ^
k
4 4  A  T‘an Gh’ao ^
^  L fan Hao-ming "1*^
m a t  T1 an Lien-fang
Jf'-J ®  ^  T'a4 Tao-yuan 
T 1 an'l Y en-k1 ai 
$  ^ 4 .  P'ang Chi-yao
33fang Sheng-chih M ^  % 
33faO Ohttn 
33 eng Pen-ying 
33 eng Yen-ta 
33s * en Chf un-hs'iian 
33s1 en Yil-ying
pZb, _tL
‘S.S|L
Wei Pa-ohtln Jjji 
Wei Ytln-sung ^
Wei Yung-ch!eng jjL;^ ^
Wu Chung-hsin ^  fa 
Wu 331 ing-yang 2^.
Yang Hsi-min 
Yang Teng-hui $$
Yeh Ch'i
Yi Pfei-clfi % •£% J| 
Yil Ghih-fang ^  ^  ^  
Ytt Tso-po ^  4^ 
Ytt Tso-ytt ^  "fi|
Phras es
Oheng-li Shui-wu Wei-yuan-hui fr£ ^  ^
chfi-min ^
Ohiang-chiao Ohiang-hsi Suo
Chien-kuo Ta-kang j4. 7\_ 4(%j
chfien-ti tsung-chih-hui j§^ ^  -^ ipf
Oh'ing-nien 33'uan ^  ^  M
\L
Oh1ing-1 ang g£
ch'iung tso-fa |j| -fig p'^
chu-i, chu-i ti chiln-tui Z. y %. fa6 ¥  Is*
chtLn, chtLn-fa Y  f *
Ohung-lcuo Hui-chiao Hui
Ohung-shan I Shih-pi en r dltw $ *
I t .  I ^   ^ts/e / ^w* ^
Qhung-yang Ohih-hsing Wei-ytLan-hui Hsi-nan +  £  i £  a  $  
Chih-hsing Pu ^  1^ 7
fen-cliih ho-tso ^7 \{$ /*> ■f^E
hao-wan ti tung-hsi v£?
Hsi-shaa Hui-i &  £ %  -|4
hsiang $kp 
hsien #  
hsiu-ts’ai ^
Hu-fa, Hu-fa C M n  / “fit
Hu-lcuo, Hu-3cuo C M n  @| f Ijgj
Hu-tang Ohiu-kuo Chiin it Ite %■
Jimg-kung
Kang-jih Ohiu-kuo Ohiin ti 0  is ^
kao-teng yu-min ^  j|j fr Y^t 
k fo-chUn ^  Ijff 
kuan hua
Kuang-hsi Chien-she Kang-ling ^
Kuang-hsi Lu-chtLn Hsiao-hsiieh ®7 ^ ^
0 'J1Kuang-hsi iu-chiin Su-ch1 eng Hsiao-hsiieh J^ _ #3 
ICuang-nan Sheng 
K • uMs-ta Hui-i 
Kuo Pu
;S
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Kuo-min Ch. eng-fu Hsi-nan Oheng~wu &  $  3%. ®
Wei~yiian~h.ui H  ^
Kuo-min Ch.eng-£u Hsi-nan Chtba-shih.
Wei-yttan-hui ^  ''tg
Liu-i YiAn-tung ^
Lu-cMn Chung-hs'iieh. fiik IpF ^
Lu-cHttn Ytl-pei HstLeh.-h.siao
Min-cheng Hui-i 
Min-cheng Kung-shu 
mou 10^
Nan-Hu i^ y
pao-cliing an-min 
Pao-ting Chtln-hsiao 
Pei-ghing Lu-chtln Pa-hstleh. 
Pi YtLn Ssu ^  ^
San-wei I-tf i j£
San-tau Oh.eng-ts r e S  fa
San-ytt Oheng-ts’e S  “Wi
/'T"\
Shan-hou Hui-i -§ 
Shan-hou Hui-pan
Shan-hou !Tu-pan 
shih ^  
ssu-ling <*J ^
Ta Kuang-hsi Ohu-i 7^  *§? i
T*ao-fa ICuei-hsi Hstlan~chfuan Ha-kang 
T'ao Tse Ohiin ^
Ting Kuei Ohtln ^  ^
ts'un kung-suo
tu-cMn, tu-pan ^  ^
tf u-pu
t'ung chih kuo X^  El0
t 1 ung-hsiang fs] fj
t^u-li wei-wang (A $ ^  i
wei-lao-tui ^  ^
Wu-sheng Lien-fang Hui-i _2z "9^*4'
yang-nu * f A
yao-jen <C,
yttan ^
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MAP I The First Base of the Kwanffsi Clique, 1922-3
/ 
t'h
ck 
'
MAP II Maximum Extent of Kwangsi Power, 1928-9.
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MAP III The Kwangsi Soviet, 1929-30*
